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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the production of scale as a strategy used to capture 
political and economic benefits deriving from an ecotourism development project in 
South Korea. It contributes to understanding how struggles over controlling “nature” 
deepen the marginalization of those who derive their livelihoods from the land by 
answering the following questions: 1) How do states deploy scale in creating a new scale 
of capital accumulation through struggles with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
over controlling an ecotourism project? 2) How do historical relationships determine the 
processes and outcomes of the coproduction of scale and nature? 3) How do the Jeju 
Special Self-Governing Province, the Jeju Olle Foundation, Jeju people, and tourists 
struggle over ownership of landscape? In answering these questions, I also answer an 
overarching question: What does the context of South Korea as a Newly Industrialized 
Country mean for the outcomes of these struggles?   
Evidence from ethnographic fieldwork suggests that NGO ecotourism 
interventions begin a process of “accumulation by dispossession” that the decentralized 
developmental state subsequently seeks to control. Because tourists are the source of 
state and/or NGO political economic power, their needs overtake the economic needs of 
residents. Local residents find themselves entangled in both state and NGO power 
struggles while simultaneously attempting to maintain agricultural livelihoods and close 
kinship relations disrupted by the establishment of the ecotourism project. The outcome 
of these struggles is the opening of new channels for capital accumulation for outsiders, 
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leaving proclaimed beneficiaries of the ecotourism project on the political economic 
margins, as they have been throughout South Korea’s history. 
The dissertation contributes to scale theory literature by demonstrating the 
process through which states reinforce authority on people and land by actively 
deploying scale while decentralizing. It also contributes to political ecology studies that 
draw on the simultaneous production of nature and scale by showing how an ecotourism 
project (1) depoliticizes state support of middle-class capital accumulation through 
ecotourism and (2) deepens historical uneven development among regions in South 
Korea. Lastly, the dissertation fills a gap in political ecology studies by examining the 
political ecological impacts in places where the use value of landscape shifts rapidly 
from livelihoods to aesthetics due to in-country economic growth. By doing so, the study 
speaks to debates on the false dichotomy of First and Third World political ecologies. It 
introduces a new “newly industrialized country (NIC) political ecology” focused on this 
unique political economic context that generates particular struggles between state/non-
state actor struggles over nature. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In summer 2011, the representative of a Village Women’s Association looked 
concerned. A tourist came into the snack shop where she and I sat, looked around, and 
bought a chocolate bar. The representative spied a water bottle stashed in his backpack 
when he left and said, “These people [tourists] come to the island with snacks and drinks 
ready. They don’t spend money here. I may have to close this snack shop and the lodge 
that I run in the village. The tourists are not coming to the village anyway.” 
  
Ecotourism’s contribution to the communities that implement ecotourism 
projects is of dubious value, despite generating more than 10% of the world’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Stronza and Gordillo 2008). In South Korea, ecotourism is one 
of the decentralized state agencies’ leading strategies for regional development. The 
government sector spent 2.3 billion USD establishing about 500 trails across the country 
(2010 to 2012)1, bringing about a nation-wide “walking fever.” State agencies’ trail 
establishment was inspired by the success of an ecotourism project on Jeju Island. The 
Jeju Olle Trail project became a benchmark of regional development programs among 
policy makers for its contribution to local economic development and to environmental 
conservation. 
                                                
1 2012, October 11, Yonhap News 
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State agency trail establishment was inspired by the success of an ecotourism 
project on Jeju Island: the Jeju Olle Trail project became a benchmark of regional 
development programs among policymakers for its contribution to local economic 
development and to environmental conservation. 
Despite the proclaimed goals of the Jeju Olle Trail project, what I witnessed 
during 16 months of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013 and from Jeju Island statistics depicts 
an opposite situation. Proclaimed beneficiaries have seemed to give up benefitting from 
the project, as the opening story suggests, and land use shift has been expedited from 
green zones to residential and commercial zones due to the rapidly increasing demand to 
consume Jeju nature. 
Relying on the framework of political ecology2, this dissertation determines the 
processes in which an exemplary regional development program ended up diverting 
promised economic benefits from a class proclaimed as beneficiaries. It also determines 
the processes in which state agencies and an NGO have reconfigured institutional 
arrangements involved in the Jeju Olle Trail by deploying discursively framed nature, 
resulting in channeling political economic benefits to the South Korean mainland urban 
middle class. The very characteristic of particularly framed nature on Jeju Island that 
attracted the urban middle class to the trail was jeopardized as a result. 
                                                
2 Political ecology is defined as multiscalar struggles over “access and control of resources” 
(Watts 2000:257) that are determined by a “broadly defined political economy” (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987:17).  
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As these goals well display, this dissertation views the Jeju Olle Trail project as a 
class3 project considering its class-selective distribution of benefits. In examining class 
struggles over discursively and materially determining access and control of the Jeju 
Olle Trail, the dissertation largely relies on three bodies of scholarship, namely 
geographic theories on neoliberalized state behavior, the coproduction of scale and 
nature, and landscape theories in political ecology. Based on these scholarships, the 
dissertation argues that (1) the state, in collaboration with NGOs, produces and 
reinforces new regional scales as it decentralizes, thereby maximizing localized state 
power on its territory; (2) historical enquiry is essential for understanding current uneven 
development—a process that depends on ecological discourses and practices; and (3) 
urban elites’ class values (especially environmental aesthetics) are increasingly reflected 
in NIC rural landscapes, threatening rural livelihoods.  
In developing these arguments, this dissertation emphasizes that South Korea is 
an East Asian NIC. The East Asian “Four Tigers,” Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, 
and Singapore, have achieved remarkable recent economic growth, especially from the 
mid-1960s to the 1990s. These countries’ economic growth is often described in a 
                                                
3 Class is determined in this dissertation by geography, socioeconomic status, and exclusively 
shared knowledge. By geography, the distinction lies between those from the mainland and those 
from Jeju Island. By socioeconomic status, classes are based on where they live (urban/rural), 
forms of labor (white-collar workers/physical labor-intensive workers), and involved industries 
for livelihoods (service/agriculture and fisheries). By exclusively shared knowledge, classes are 
defined by class-specific knowledge, including tastes for leisure activities and cultural 
consumption, opinions about social changes, and information for economic investments. Thus, 
the following chapters often call these contrasting classes “Jeju people” (or “Jeju rural villagers,” 
“rural entrepreneurs,” islanders”) and “the urban middle class” (or “tourists,” “supporters,” 
“urban entrepreneurs,” “migrants,” “mainlanders”); these terms denote the two classes defined 
based on the three discussed class distinctions. 
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relative sense compared to both the developed world (e.g., Storm and Naastepad 2005) 
and the developing world (e.g., World Bank 1993, the East Asian Miracle). Considering 
the four countries’ shift of economic status in the world, being apart from one side of the 
world and moving toward the other side of it, they are called “newly industrialized 
countries.” 
 The exceptional economic growth of these NICs caught scholarly attention. 
Researchers, particularly those from economic geography, urban planning, and 
development studies, strived to determine the factors that enabled success. Strong 
leadership of the so-called developmental state4 in economic development, as well as 
quality of human capital and social relations through nationality, kinship, school, or 
regions of origins within and beyond national boundaries, have been pointed out as East 
Asian particularities that could possibly have enabled the economic development (Kim 
and Lau 1994, Amsden 1994, Wade 1990). Later studies explore interesting and varied 
reconfiguration of national economies with shifting leadership of developmental states5 
and its control over industries and social capital due to the global imperatives of 
neoliberalism (Radice 2008, Kim 1999, Welss 2000). As such, East Asian NICs have 
shown unique trajectories of socioeconomic development.  
                                                
4 ““Developmental state” is shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and 
moneyed influences that structures economic life in capitalist Northeast Asia. This state form 
originated as the region’s idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West, and despite 
many problems associated with it, such as corruption and inefficiency, today state policies 
continue to be justified by the need to hone the nation’s economic competitiveness and by a 
residual nationalism (even in the contemporary context of globalization)”. (Woo-Cumings 
1999:1). 
5 Douglass (1994) contends that the developmental states in the four countries have distinctive 
characteristics in determining national economy; thus, it is problematic to define them as a lump 
sum.   
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This dissertation suggests exploring how East Asian NICs’ socioeconomic 
developmental paths and subsequent dynamic social and demographic shifts have 
mediated human-environment interactions. McCarthy (2002) demonstrates that political 
ecology themes6 equally matter to the First World, yet, it had rarely been under scholarly 
scrutiny. Thus, he urges political ecologists to turn their attention from then-dominant 
research interests in the Third World toward an unexplored region, the First World. 
McCarthy (2002) argues that the First World political ecology contributes to the political 
ecology scholarship by illuminating “ongoing nature of capitalist development” in 
relation to determining access and control of resources (page 1298). McCarthy’s 
suggestion has brought about prolific outcomes for one and a half decades (Robbins and 
Sharp 2003; Prudham 2004; Schroeder et al. 2006). These studies demonstrate multi-
scalar struggles over property rights mediated by contesting ideals about natural 
resources in the context of an advanced capitalist society. Here, the dissertation 
introduces another “unexplored” region in terms of political ecology concerns. By 
focusing on explaining political ecology concerns through the unique socioeconomic 
developmental paths of East Asian NICs, the dissertation illuminates another layer of 
“ongoing nature of capitalist development” in the political ecology scholarship 
(McCarthy 2002). The overarching goal of the dissertation is to determine how NIC-
specific characteristics of socioeconomic development determine multi-scalar power 
                                                
6 Themes of political ecology, according to Robbins (2004), include: 1) The degradation and 
marginalization; 2) The environmental conflict; 3) The conservation and control; and The 
environmental identity and social movement (page 14).  
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struggles among state and non-state actors, the urban middle class, and Jeju people over 
access and control of the Jeju Olle Trail.   
 This dissertation is composed of three independent manuscripts in addition to 
Research Methods (Chapter II) and Conclusion (Chapter VI). Structurally speaking, the 
description of methods and study sites in Chapter II applies to all three independent 
manuscripts. The three manuscripts (Chapters III, IV, V) provide their own literature 
reviews and arguments. The Conclusion in Chapter VI, along with this Introduction, ties 
up the dissertation as a single body of argument. Content-wise, Chapter II describes 
qualitative research methods and the research context of Jeju Island. Chapter III explores 
how a decentralized and entrepreneurial government at a provincial level has inscribed 
channels for private capital accumulation by producing a new scale of reinforced state 
authority using the Jeju Olle Trail project. Chapter IV determines the processes and 
outcomes of producing particular ideas about nature and determining the spatial 
arrangement of diverting newly created capital flows from proclaimed beneficiaries and 
directing them toward the South Korean mainlanders who have historically exploited the 
proclaimed beneficiaries and nature on Jeju Island. Chapter V examines South Korean 
class conflicts over rural landscape ownership. Chapter VI concludes the dissertation by 
articulating how the particular characteristics of East Asian NICs mediate political and 
ecological processes in the three main manuscripts.   
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY AREA AND METHODS 
 
 This dissertation examines the political and economic reconfiguration caused by 
the simultaneous productions of scale, nature, and landscapes in an ecotourism project of 
South Korea. It identifies how the new way of producing nature determines a capitalist 
production of tourism through power struggles, and how the produced nature differs 
from the historical ways of using nature not only for traditional production activities but 
also for tourism development. To reach the goal, I collected the interview, participant 
observation, and archival data from Jeju Island in South Korea, employing ethnographic 
methods as I discuss below in detail.  
 The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I introduce the Study Areas and the 
nature-based tourism project that the dissertation examines. Second, I discuss research 
design in relation to the three objectives of the dissertation.  
 
Study Area 
 
Jeju Island, South Korea  
The research site is administratively known as Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province (hereafter Jeju Island for the island, and JSSGP for the provincial government). 
Jeju Island is about one fiftieth of South Korea in size, located 450 kilometers south of 
Seoul in South Korea (See Figure 2.1). Jeju Island is a volcanic island located in 
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subtropical zone of 126˚33´E in longitude and 33˚22´29"N in latitude. Jeju Island is a 
two and a half hour flight to the southeast of Beijing.  The climate is mild relative to the 
South Korean mainland, with an annual average temperature of 12 degrees Celsius. 
Topographically, the elevation is highest at the island’s center because of Mt. Halla, and 
it decreases toward the coast. Costal areas7 with agricultural fields and residential areas 
accounts for 54% of the island’s total area, where agricultural fields and residential areas 
are developed. Jeju Island receives an annual precipitation of 2,044 mm (Figure 2.2).  
Administratively, the upper and lower halves of Jeju Island belong to Jeju City 
and the Seogwipo City, respectively. Jeju Island is further divided into twelve districts 
(eup/myeon) and sub-divided into 96 villages (li). Even though the two administrative 
units are called “cities,” only one of them would be considered urban. The people of 
Seogwipo City rely on agriculture and tourism for their livelihoods, while Jeju City is 
more urbanized and residents make their livings mostly from the service sector. Rural 
populations throughout the island have made their living through agriculture and 
fisheries that account for 16 percent of Jeju Island’s Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRPD, Korean Statistics Office 2012).  
Tourism has been one of the main industries of Jeju Island due to natural and 
cultural scenic beauty displayed by rolling mountains, beaches, and agricultural fields. 
As of 2011, tourism accounted for 39 percent of Jeju Island’s GRDP according to JSSGP 
estimates8. It is both a UNESCO natural and culture Heritage Site and is on the list of 
                                                
7 Less than 200 km above the sea level. 
8 Jeju Special Self-Governing Province webpage, http://www.jeju.go.kr 
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New7Wonders of Nature. Since the central government strategically incorporated 
tourism on Jeju Island in the 1960s, Jeju Island has enjoyed a reputation as the most 
popular tourist destination in the country. However, its tourism dwindled once South 
Korean citizens could freely travel to foreign countries beginning in the 1990s. In 
addition, the South Korean public developed the perception that visiting Jeju Island for 
tourism was equally or more costly, yet, provided less tourist attractions compared to 
neighboring countries such as Southeast Asian countries. The tourists, however, began to 
come back to visit Jeju Island in around 2010 with the establishment of the Jeju Olle 
Trail and its emphasis on new ways of seeing nature and culture on Jeju Island, which 
met the tourists’ demand for alternative tourism. 
 
         Figure 2.1 Location of Jeju Island, South Korea 
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                        Figure 2.2 Jeju Island 
 
                           Source: map.daum.net, Kakao Corporation  
 
 
 
The Jeju Olle Trail 
The Jeju Olle Trail is the name of a 425 km-long trail that encircles Jeju Island 
through 26 routes (See Figure 2.3). Olle is a word from the dialect of Jeju Island, 
meaning a small private lane in front of a house linked to larger village lanes. As the 
name implies, the Jeju Olle Trail passes through beaches, small lanes in villages, farm 
roads and pastures (see Figure 2.4). Among lands used for the trail, privately owned 
lands account for approximately 30% of the Jeju Olle Trail (Seogwipo City 2012). The 
project emphasizes tourism development and tourist activities that cause minimal harm 
to the environment. It also brings benefits to local people by enabling them to generate 
additional income beyond agriculture and fisheries through running lodges or restaurants 
along the trail.  
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The Jeju Olle Trail was initiated by an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) 
also named the Jeju Olle Foundation. A former journalist named Seo, Myongsuk retired 
to her hometown on Jeju Island. She then initiated the Jeju Olle Trail project after 
establishing an NGO named the Jeju Olle Foundation. Jeju residents helped the Jeju Olle 
Trail in leveling the trail, taking care of trash along the trail, and guiding tourists. Jeju 
people volunteered, particularly those from rural villages along the trail, because they 
expected economic benefits from the Jeju Olle Trail tourists’ spending on village-level 
local accommodations as proclaimed in the goals. Evidence from fieldwork 
demonstrates that tourists of the Jeju Olle Trail also contributed to the Jeju Olle Trail 
establishment through personally visiting and promoting the trail, participating in 
volunteer programs of the Jeju Olle Foundation. They also expressed their opinions 
about the trail to the Jeju Olle Foundation and also to state agencies under the JSSGP. As 
such, the Jeju Olle Foundation, tourists and Jeju people were the actors of the political 
economic struggles in establishing the Jeju Olle Trail and implementing the Jeju Olle 
Trail-related regional development programs. Because an NGO began to establish the 
Jeju Olle Trail with contributions from Jeju rural villages and tourists, the project was 
proclaimed as a “bottom-up approach” largely in South Korea (a Seogwipo City-
published report). Yet, state agencies also significantly contributed, by providing the 
NGO with financial and administrative support in order to facilitate establishment and 
promotion of the trail. Thus, both state and non-state actors participated in the processes 
of establishing the trail and implementing the trail-related developmental programs, 
rather than only non-state actors. 
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                    Figure 2.3 The Jeju Olle Trail 
                     
                   Source: www.daum.net, Kakao Corporation 
 
The Jeju Olle Trail generated a reverberation across and beyond the country. The 
trail attracted a large volume of tourists to Jeju Island based on the ideas of 
environmentalism and the bottom-up approach bringing economic benefits to rural 
communities. The success of the Jeju Olle Trail established it as an exemplar of the 
regional development using tourism. Provinces of South Korea began to competitively 
use the Jeju Olle Trail as a rural development model. From 2007 to 2012, more than 500 
trails were established (Bae, 2012, a report from the Green Environmental NGO). Also, 
Kyushu Province in Japan also used the Jeju Olle Trail as a benchmark and established 
the Kyushu Olle in 2012 with the sponsorship from the Jeju Olle Foundation.  As such, 
the Jeju Olle Trail has impacted regional developmental programs among South Korean 
provinces and a Japanese province.   
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Figure 2.4 Landscape Along the Jeju Olle Trail 
On the coast On low mountains 
  
Along agricultural fields On a village lane 
  
 
Research Sites: Four Villages 
 To determine struggles of political economy in the process of adopting a new 
form of tourism on Jeju Island, I conducted the research in four villages located in 
Seogwipo City. I limited the research scope in Seogwipo City (Figure 2.2) because most 
tourists visited the Jeju Olle Trail routes located in Seogwipo City, and JSSGP state 
agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation focused on bringing benefits to rural rather than 
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urban residents. I collected the data by village, because regional developmental 
programs are usually implemented on a village level in South Korea, including the Jeju 
Olle Trail. Among the villages that the Jeju Olle Trail passed through, I selected four 
villages for data collection: Shihungli on route 1, Woodo on route 1-1, Wolpyong on 
route 7, and Murungli on route 12 (Figure 2.5).  
 
  Figure 2.5 Location of Research Sites 
 
Village Names  
1. Shihungli 
2. Woodo 
3. Wolpyong 
4. Murung 2 li 
Source: www.daum.net, Kakao Corporation      
 
Table 2.1 Population and Agricultural Products of Research Sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Seogwipo City a. The Eup, Myon, Dong Page, http://www.seogwipo.go.kr/ 
Village Population # of 
HH 
Village 
Size (ha) 
Land use for 
Agriculture 
(%) 
Main Crops 
Shihungli 1100 500 797 70% Carrots, Beans, Potatoes 
Woodo 1628 831 618 66% Peanuts, Garlic 
Wolpyong 649 257 167 64% Oranges, Lilies 
Murungli 699 302 465 78% Garlic, Beans, Barley 
 
In order to find out patterns of village-level politics in the adoption of the trail 
and the competition for economic benefits, I took into account the following criteria in 
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selecting these four research sites. First, I considered temporal gaps of villages’ 
participation in the Jeju Olle Trail project (Table 2.1). The temporal gaps enabled me to 
find out how the Jeju Olle Trail project has evolved as a land/landscape control regime 
through time. Second, geographical distances among villages were considered (Figure 
2.5). Differing geographic conditions such as crops and vicinity to the sea allowed the 
research to examine different impacts of tourism and regional development programs on 
farmers and fishers on the East, Middle, West, and annexed Islands. Third, forms of rural 
livelihoods were considered. The selected rural villages relied livelihoods on agriculture 
and fisheries, with little tourism facilities before the Jeju Olle Trail was established. 
With the inception of the Jeju Olle Trail (Table 2.2), tourist facilities including local 
lodges, snack shops and restaurants have increased (for example, Shihungli from 4 to 14, 
Wolpyong from 2 to 4, and Murung 2 li from one to 6). It enabled the research to 
investigate the processes in which capital flows were generated and channeled at a 
village level. Fourth, I chose villages that explicitly adopted the Jeju Olle Trail, so that 
villagers’ interaction with state agencies, the Jeju Olle Foundation, and tourists were 
active and explicit enough for me to observe and examine. Among the four villages, 
Woodo is an exception of in the third and the fourth considerations. Woodo is selected 
considering its recent re-routing in July 2013 (when I stayed on Jeju Island) in addition 
to the criteria 1-2. The re-rerouting provided a unique opportunity to observe power 
struggles among actors in making decisions about establishing a route. It also 
represented three routes located in satellite islands of Jeju Island as the firstly designated 
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one. The last thing to note is that agriculture was conducted for commercial rather than 
subsistence purposes in the four villages. 
 
Table 2.2 Villages and the Jeju Olle Trail 
Village Trail 
Route # 
Year of Adoption Village land use along the Jeju 
Olle Trail 
Shihungli 1 September 2007 Farm roads, Mountains, Coast 
Woodo 1-1 May 2009; June 2013 reroute Farm roads, Residential areas, 
Coast 
Wolpyong 8 March 2008 Farm roads, Village roads 
Murungli 12 March 2009 Farm roads, Residential areas, 
Village lanes 
 
 
 
Data Collection Methods 
 
McCarthy (2005) calls for adopting ethnography as the research methods to 
explore multi-scalar power dynamics in human-environmental interactions. Heeding 
upon the call, I collected data by “doing ethnography” (Wolcott 1994: 42), which is used 
to find out cultural and social context-specific meanings.  
I stayed at Jeju city during 2013, and commuted to research sites in Seogwipo 
City, partly because of increasing demand for lands and houses on Jeju Island. At the 
beginning of the research period, I spent several hours each day at village offices and 
places related to the Jeju Olle Trail (such as cafés and an information center) in the study 
sites. Since many villagers came and went in those places, I got acquainted with 
individuals who later introduced me to others. Key informants and community 
gatekeepers were met in this way.  
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In-depth and Semi-structured Interviews 
I conducted in-depth and semi-structured interviews with rural villagers, local 
government officials, employees of local NGOs including the Jeju Olle Foundation, and 
tourists (Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Number of Interviews by Social Groups and Demography 
Category Total Gender Age Male Female 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 
Villagers 158 106 51 0 9 32 49 29 30 9 
Government Officials 17 14 3 0 4 12 1 0 0 0 
Jeju Olle Foundation 
Employees 
4 1 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 
Tourists 8 5 3 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Migrants 12 2 10 0 7 3 2 0 0 0 
Other (Media, 
Academia, NGOs) 
8 6 3 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 
Total 207 134 73 6 23 56 54 29 30 9 
 
 
 For villagers, I aimed to understand how the introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail 
impacted village-level economies and culture. More importantly, I focused on 
determining multi-scalar tensions at the intra village or municipality levels were created 
as rural villagers living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail participated in hosting tourists, and 
how the actors adapt to the shifted social relations of political economy to maximize 
their respective political and economic interests. To reach the goal, I interviewed those 
who I encountered in the villages. In doing so, I also ensured to interview village 
representatives as key informants including village leaders at the time of the Jeju Olle 
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Trail incorporation as well as current village leaders, village officers, representatives of 
Village Women Associations and Village Youth Associations.  
The second group of interviewees was provincial and municipal level 
government officials who I interviewed to understand institutionalization processes of 
the Jeju Olle Trail in state agencies of the JSSGP. These included government officials 
who took charge of the affairs related to the Jeju Olle Trail in Seogwipo City, Jeju City, 
and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province to find out how JSSGP state agencies 
interacted with other actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project. I also interviewed government 
officials at the county level of state agencies in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail, in charge of 
organizational restructuring of the Jeju Special-Self-Governing Province, and in a 
research group for the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Council. 
Jeju Olle Foundation employees were the third group. I aimed to found out the 
stated goals of the Jeju Olle Trail establishment and actual processes of its establishment 
and promotion, focusing on power dynamics of the actors. Interviewees were determined 
in preparing 2013 fieldwork including preliminary fieldwork. I interviewed with key 
contributors of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, namely the director and the previous 
exploring team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation. I also interviewed Jeju Olle 
Foundation employees in an information center and at the Jeju Olle Trail booth located 
at the Jeju International Airport. Even though the number of interviews was relatively 
small compared to other groups (Table 2.3), the information from this group was critical 
in determining discursive and material establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail and tourists’ 
attitudes about it.  
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I also interviewed tourists, local environmental NGO activists, Jeju residents 
other than those living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail, and local experts from academia 
and media. For tourists, I focused on finding out tourists’ perceptions about the Jeju Olle 
Trail and the ways (or sources) that they developed the perceptions. For other 
interviewee groups, I aimed to identify opinions about the Jeju Olle Trail among Jeju 
citizens beyond rural villages. I approached tourists while I was walking along the Jeju 
Olle Trail or staying guesthouses. Local experts and NGO activists were recruited 
through snowball sampling technique.  
I originally planned to type to record interview data, yet I changed to taking notes 
the answers and narratives of interview participants in order for convenience to carry and 
use. I also considered rural elderly population’s reluctance to participate in interviews 
when I used a laptop to type in answers in a couple of interviews at the initial stage.  
 
Participant Observations  
The second source of primary data is participant observations. In the four 
villages, I attempted to establish rapports with villagers for being situated in different 
social interactions such as among villagers and between villagers and tourists. Through 
interacting with villagers, I could improve my understanding about village-level power 
dynamics. In doing so, I behaved based on the belief that my positionality contributed 
revealing nuanced understanding of social relations, because the researcher’s presence 
continuously shifted power dynamics among villagers (Rose 1997). I also participated in 
various Jeju Olle Trail related events such as festivals, voluntary activities, and training 
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courses. These activities exposed me to the organizational environment of the Jeju Olle 
Foundation. I was also able to observe how the popular notions of the Jeju Olle Trail 
were produced, delivered, and subscribed to among the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists 
(advocates of the Jeju Olle Foundation).  
Participant observation was also important source of data collection from 
migrants. I realized the importance of migrants in the research in the middle of 
fieldwork, thus, focused more on interacting with them toward the end of fieldwork. 
Since the importance of migrants emerged at the later phase of fieldwork, I relied more 
on participant observations and informal conversations, rather than structured interviews. 
I had numerous opportunities to interact with them without making particular efforts, 
such as in parent meetings, at flea markets among migrants, and at seminars about Jeju 
Island and alternative lives. Through observing and interaction with migrants, I 
emphasized finding out their motivations for migration, attitudes for Jeju nature and 
people, and means for livelihoods.   
 I recorded data derived from the participant observations through a series of field 
notes, and later digitized it for data analysis. 
 
Archival Research 
Archival research is also a considerable data source in this research. I performed 
archival research from the Aweol library and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
Library on Jeju Island. From the libraries, data regarding Jeju history and regional 
development such as regional statistics, government reports and research results about 
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regional development, rural village development case studies, and institutional trajectory 
and current operations of JSSGP state agencies. I also visited the National Assembly 
Library located in Seoul in order to determine research trends from academic/non-
academic publications about the Jeju Olle Trail since its inception in 2007. Lastly, 
archival research data also included two books that the Jeju Olle Foundation leader 
authored, the Jeju Olle Foundation website, tourists’ blogs, various leaflets and reports 
published by central/Jeju provincial state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation, policy 
reports published by public and private think-tanks such as the Jeju Development 
Institute, and South Korean national and Jeju local level media including their digital 
archives.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
I analyzed the data through the three stages of qualitative inquiry, which are 
description, analysis and interpretation. I first digitized data from interviews, 
participation observations and coded the data without any limitation about themes 
following the “open coding” phase that Charmaz (2006:11) suggested. Then I took 
“initial memos” of my ideas that link the open coding results. I then identified recurring 
themes to find out regularity of the themes in the focused coding phase. Lastly, I located 
the result of focused coding in the research topic, i.e., multi-scalar power struggles 
among the actors over political and economic benefits from the Jeju Olle Trail. I also 
reflected how the result of the focused coding is related to the data collected through 
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archival research, such as the history of Jeju Island and its regional development, other 
researcher’s findings about the Jeju Olle Trail, and newspaper articles and government 
published reports about the Jeju Olle Trail. This way, the analysis of data demonstrated 
how things and people were discursively and materially configured in a way that a 
regional development program called the Jeju Olle Trail becomes a regime of political 
economy. In the process of adapting to the shifted political economy, this configuration 
generated complicated and multi-scalar tensions among JSSGP state agencies, the Jeju 
Olle Foundation, tourists, migrants, and long-term Jeju rural residents. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TERRITORIALIZING STATE: 
SCALAR STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL OF THE JEJU OLLE TRAIL 
 
Introduction 
 
In South Korea, ecotourism is one of South Korean state agencies’ leading 
strategies for regional development, based on the successful Jeju Olle Trail. This chapter 
will examine how states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) struggle over 
controlling an ecotourism project to capture the political and economic benefits deriving 
from an ecotourism development project in South Korea. In doing so, I will rely on scale 
theories for analysis. Working definitions of scale9 in this chapter are (1) 
upward/downward levels of state agencies, such as county, city, state, and nation and (2) 
the geographic boundary of political economy where sociospatial power is materially 
and discursively established and exercised through contentious social processes. The 
chapter will demonstrate how the state and non-state actors deploy scalar politics to 
create new scales of capital accumulation, resulting in marginalization of those who 
expect benefits from the ecotourism project. It aims to contribute to scale literature by 
                                                
9 I am aware of the debate on the ontology of scale in scale theories literature, particularly 
between Brenner (2001) and Marston and Smith (2001). However, the chapter focuses more on 
state behavior related to non-state actors through scalar politics, rather than on the concept of 
scale in and of itself. Considering that scholars adopting scale theories use both definitions of 
scale, I rely on both definitions in the chapter.  
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elaborating on the ways that state authority is reinforced through simultaneous and 
responsive scalar politics between state and non-state actors.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I examine the 
literature on neoliberal state restructuring and pose a research question specifically based 
on Perreault’s (2005) argument. In the second section, I define the state restructuring and 
establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail by the Jeju provincial government as neoliberal 
experiments based on Peck and Tickell’s (2002) thesis on neoliberal space. In the third 
section, I demonstrate the discursive and material processes by which Jeju local state 
agencies and non-state actors created a new scale of political economy through strategic 
conflicts and collaborations. In doing so, I emphasize how the state established and 
reinforced its authority in prioritizing the interests of tourists and non-state actors. The 
fourth section specifically focuses on a scalar strategy called “jumping scales” (Smith 
1993), deployed by both state and non-state actors. These actors cross scales to reach the 
national and global scales, respectively, in order to further their interests at the local 
level by deploying resources from broader scales. This section will show that both state 
and non-state actors actively and simultaneously cross scales to increase political power 
in environmental governance. In the fifth section, I examine capital accumulation as a 
result of the struggles among state and non-state actors to control the Jeju Olle Trail. The 
sixth section is a conclusion.  
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Neoliberal Scalar Politics Between State and Non-state Actors 
 
Neoliberal Scalar Configuration of the State 
 Scholars interested in both ontology and epistemology of scale are concerned 
more about the processes by which scales are constructed and institutionalized through 
power struggles rather than about established scales per se (Brenner 2001, Marston 
2000). The literature on “politics of scale” (Smith 2008) has proliferated since the 
beginning of the 21st century. Scale theorists maintain the constructivist perspective 
rather than assuming scale is ontologically pre-given (Smith 2008; 1993, Swyngedouw 
1997, Brenner 2001, Marston 2000). They argue that scale and its spatial arrangements 
are socially produced through interactions among various actors (See Smith 1993 and 
Jessop et al. 2008 for a discussion about the relation between scale and other 
geographical concepts such as space and place, etc.) The actors struggle in the process of 
achieving desired goals through social interactions. The resultant scale and spatial 
attributes reflect power struggles. As Swyngedouw puts it, “scaled places are the 
embodiment of social relations of empowerment and disempowerment and the arena 
through and in which they operate” (1997:169). Because socially produced scale benefits 
only certain actors, it is inherently unstable, contentious, and subject to be challenged 
(Smith 1993). McCarthy, focusing on instability of scale, calls for more attention to 
ideology and cultural politics in examining politics of scale because they have been 
much discussed in scale literature (2005: 737). I view the Jeju Olle Trail as a social-
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spatial scale where the state and non-state actors discursively and materially struggle to 
channel benefits toward particular actors in the ecotourism project.  
  State behaviors are much examined among scholars involved in the politics of 
scale, as state institutions have gone through extensive neoliberal restructuring, namely 
decentralization (Brenner 2004, Perreault 2005, Cox 2002). Applying scale theories to 
the state, Brenner (2004) suggests that scalar arrangement of state agencies (such as 
national, regional, and local) and their authority is neither pre-given nor fixed. Instead, 
the state’s spatiality, including scalar configuration, is produced through social relations, 
reflecting “ongoing processes of political-economic regulation and sociopolitical 
contestation” (Brenner 2004: 81). Gough (2004) particularly views scalar contestation as 
class struggles focusing on the state’s role. Shifting scales reflect contradictions of 
capitalist reproduction where the state opens up possibilities for channeling capitalist 
accumulation toward a particular class. Classes cope with or resist political and 
economic arrangement within the shifted scales in order to achieve specific class goals. 
In this way, shifting scale turns into class struggles.  
Incorporating these views into the neoliberal transition of scale, transitioning 
from the spatial logic of the Keynesian era to the new spatiality in the postKeynesian 
era10 is not an inherently given process. It reflects class struggles. The state under the 
                                                
10 Keynes, an economist in the 1930s, emphasized strong state leadership in all government 
affairs, including boosting the national economy and providing social welfare to citizens. The 
US got past the suffering economy of the Great Depression by incorporating Keynes’ ideas 
(Keynesian era). As the world began to suffer from a dwindling economy again in the late 1970s, 
Thatcher in England and Reagan in the US significantly shrank the state’s role in government 
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Keynesian era redistributed resources across citizens using centrally focused state 
authority on the national-level political economy. As the state’s role as an arbitrator of 
political economy is minimized under neoliberalism, centrally focused state authority is 
devolved to lower levels of state agencies. Decentralized state agencies increasingly 
compete among each other, particularly as city-regions to increase competitiveness in 
the global market. In order to increase competitiveness, decentralized state agencies 
restructure spatial arrangement of economic activities. Even though decentralized state 
agencies claim limited intervention to markets, they turn to a stance of stronger 
involvement, channeling capital flow only to certain classes (Peck and Tickell 2002). 
The restructuring shifts political economy of capital accumulation, creating class 
struggles (Harvey 1982).  
State restructuring and subsequent rearrangement of economic spatiality can be 
explained as the state’s efforts to create a new regime of capital accumulation through 
territorialization by rescaled state agencies. Sack defines territorialization as “the attempt 
to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things, and 
relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographical area” 
(1983:55). Simply put, territorialization refers to controlling land-based resources, 
people who use the resources, and the relationships among resource users. Tying the 
concept of territorialization with the state’s rescaling and city-region establishment, state 
authority is rescaled to increase its power over resources and relations within a 
                                                                                                                                           
affairs. They embraced Hayek’s argument that strongly advocated free market economy. The 
collectivist approach from the Keynesian era was most avoided (postKeynesian era).  
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geographic boundary of a decentralized state; and state authority aims to establish a 
competitive city-region, as Jessop notes, “to create, restructure or reinforce – as far as it 
is economically and politically feasible to do so – the competitive advantages of its 
territory, population, built environment, social institutions and economic agents” 
(2002:96 from Brenner 2004:173) for creating a new regime of accumulation. The 
social, political, and economic conditions that require state restructuring vary temporally 
and geographically. Thus, state spatial strategies should be investigated, focusing on the 
“historicity” and “malleability” of state institutional organizations and political struggles 
within and among particular scales (Ibid.).  
 The downward rescaling of state institutional organizations (decentralization) 
emphasizing city-regions coincides with the emergence of neoliberalism across the globe 
(Brenner 2001: 594). Neoliberals combine logics of market extension and 
competitiveness, rejecting any kind of Keynesian and collectivist developmental 
strategies (Harvey 2005). Relying on Harvey’s (1989) urban entrepreneurialism, Peck 
and Tickell (2002) argue that city-regions are involved in interurban competitions. On 
neoliberal space, they note, “neoliberalism licenses an extrospective, reflective, and 
aggressive posture on the part of local elites and states, in contrast to the inward-oriented 
concerns with social welfare and infrastructure provision under the Keynesian era. 
Today, cities must actively scan the horizon for investment and promotion opportunities, 
monitoring ‘competitors’ and emulating ‘best practice’ lest they be left behind in this 
intensifying competitive struggle for the kinds of resources that neoliberalism has helped 
make mobile” (Ibid.:394). Funds from national and international organizations flow only 
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to those city-regions that demonstrate potential for economic growth, ignoring social 
needs. The selective allocation of resources reinforces uneven development across city-
regions, intensifying intra-urban competitions. The fund flows and intensified 
competition among city-regions often result in strengthening or consolidating state 
authority (MacLeod 2002, Smith 2008).  
Just like scale, forms and conditions of city-regions and their spatial strategies for 
economic growth are historically and locally contingent, and thus, unstable. Neoliberal 
spaces are characterized as “constantly shifting landscapes of experimentation, 
restructuring, (anti)social learning, technocratic policy transfer, and partial emulation” 
(Peck and Tickell 2002: 396). The resultant types of neoliberal spaces are “variegated11” 
despite the general characteristics of neoliberalized city-regions, such as intensified 
interurban competition, races to the bottom, and political construction of markets. Thus, 
place-specific and scale-specific investigations are required to determine power struggles 
in establishing neoliberal spaces (Peck and Tickell 2002: 383).  
This chapter explores the variegated neoliberal state restructuring in South 
Korea, where strong leadership of the developmental state has led rapid economic 
growth since the 1960s. The developmental state refers to a state agency that strongly 
intervenes in the private sector of the national economy using centralized state 
authorities, as shown by Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, etc12. These newly industrialized 
                                                
11 Brenner et al. (2010) discuss neoliberalization processes as variegated, as they systematically 
produce “geoinstitutional differentiation” (page 184). 
12 Harvey (2003:74) in New Imperialism discusses developmental states channeling capital 
accumulation through strong state intervention in the market (“particularly through East and 
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countries (NICs) have achieved remarkable economic growth since the 1960s, attributed 
to the strong leadership of the developmental state. In South Korea, the centralized 
strong state authority intervened in a wide range of economic activities within the 
country, from finance and industry to regional development (Kim 2010:103). For 
example, the Saemaul movement was a rural developmental program strongly initiated 
by the South Korean government in the 1970s. The central government mobilized rural 
labor and land for rural modernization projects and rewarded those initiatives by village. 
The central state authority during that time was strong enough to stretch out to the 
village level and led successful modernization of rural villages. As such, the South 
Korean developmental state achieved economic growth and modernization of the 
country by using strong and centralized state authority.  
While the South Korean developmental state strived for economic growth, it also 
deployed strong state authority for political oppression of the citizens. The violent and 
authoritarian control of South Korea’s developmental state encountered strong citizen 
resistance beginning in the 1980s, as well as the international imperatives of economic 
liberalization and state decentralization.  
Responding to domestic and international imperatives, the South Korean 
government embarked on state decentralization with the introduction of the Local 
Autonomy System in 1991. It aimed to devolve state authority to local-level state 
                                                                                                                                           
Southeast Asia, that state policies and politics (consider the case of Singapore) have played a 
critical role in defining both the intensity and the paths of new forms of capital accumulation. 
The role of the ‘developmental state’ in recent phases of capital accumulation has therefore been 
the subject of intense scrutiny.  
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agencies in order to increase the effectiveness of local-level projects while promoting 
democracy through local citizen participation. To achieve the goal, the system stipulated 
to establish councils in local administrative units at the provincial level: nine provinces, 
one special city, and four metropolitan cities (Figure 3.1). Lower administrative units at 
the municipal level, such as city, county, and district (urban) and town, township, and 
village (rural), also established councils. These local administrative units began to have 
elected representatives like governor and mayor in 1995. Despite these initiatives, many 
South Koreans criticized that local state agencies had yet to achieve actual local state 
autonomy. 
 
In an effort to facilitate establishing local autonomy, the South Korean state 
designated Jeju province as the first special self-governing province in 2006 (among 
         Figure 3.1 Administrative System of South Korea (2014) 
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nine provinces) (Figure 3.1). Another important goal of designating Jeju Special Self-
Governing Province (JSSGP) was to provide momentum for the provincial 
developmental plan, called Jeju International Free City. Jeju province had difficulties 
realizing its plan to establish a globally competitive city-region because the provincial 
government authority was limited to deregulating movement of people, goods, and 
capital on Jeju Island. Devolving state authority to the provincial level was expected to 
expedite the envisioned plan (Boo 2009:35). 
This study examines the processes by which a provincial government, JSSGP, 
institutionally evolved as an exemplary decentralization model in South Korea through 
regulatory experiments and political struggles. In doing so, it emphasizes (1) how a 
rescaled state agency gained state authority in controlling resources, people, and 
relationships among resource users through an ecotourism project and (2) how the 
entrepreneurialism of JSSGP to establish a global city-region has inscribed channels for 
capital accumulation in its territory in the process of producing a scale of territoriality 
called the Jeju Olle Trail.  
Determining the processes and outcomes by which a decentralized state agency 
established and reinforced state authority in South Korea contributes to scale theories 
literature by providing a variegated neoliberalism case from an NIC. The drastic shift of 
power geometry between highly centralized state authority and highly decentralized state 
authority creates particularities of variegated neoliberalism in NICs. This chapter 
explores these particularities generated in the processes by which NIC decentralized 
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state agencies (1) implemented regional development programs and (2) gained and 
exercised state authority by implementing developmental programs. 
 
Dynamic Scalar Politics between State and Non-state Actors 
 Scholars interested in the social actor role in neoliberal state restructuring beyond 
the state have explored non-state actor behaviors in production of scale, along with those 
of the state. Neoliberal state rescaling is responsible for emergence of these actors, as 
partnership (Jessop 2002, from Brenner 2004) or governance (McCarthy 2005) is 
emphasized in state decentralization. Like the neoliberal state, unions (Perreault 2005), 
progressive social movements (Miller 2000), political parties (Agnew 1997), and 
environmental NGOs (McCarthy 2005) actively deploy scale in resisting the state’s 
neoliberal restructuring. Their strategies include the following (from Brenner 2001: 594 
and McCarthy 2005): 
(1) Jumping scales to curtail the political influence of the neoliberal state while 
extending non-state actor power to other scales. Jumping scales is the notion that 
Smith suggested in his discussion about the Homeless Vehicles in New York 
(Smith 1993:60), implying activities “at a higher scale” (Smith added “over a 
wider geographical field” for clarification about scale) aiming for political 
empowerment. Applying the concept, Perreault (2005) and McCarthy (2005) 
demonstrate that non-state actors cross to higher scales (i.e., national and global) 
for political mobilization in achieving goals on local levels. 
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(2) Reconfiguring relations on local scales, such as socializing local capital through 
active cooperation among the state, private party, labor, and residents (Cox 1998, 
Eisenschitz and Gough 1996, McCarthy 2005). 
(3) Envisioning radically different scalar arrangement from neoliberal logic of 
capital accumulation (McCarthy 2005). 
(4) Defending and deploying established scales (McCarthy 2005). 
These strategies demonstrate that non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs and 
resource users, have strategically mobilized social relations within and among scales—
e.g., business coalitions to stimulate local economy (Cox 1998) on a local level and 
environmental NGOs stretching toward the global level (McCarthy 2005). The specific 
purposes vary, yet harnessing scales aims to increase political power in common, 
resisting, or sometimes contributing neoliberal restructuring of the state. Scales are 
unstable and are contested as a result.  
 Perreault’s (2005) analysis of social mobilization resisting neoliberal institutional 
fix in water governance illustrates well the inherent instability, contestation, and 
contradiction of scale. He demonstrates that although Bolivian neoliberal restructuring 
appeared to encourage public participation by facilitating administrative decentralization 
of state agencies, the state authority as the arbitrator of political economy of water 
resources was concentrated on the central government. State authority over water rights 
remained with the central government in order for it to easily privatize water resources. 
This confusion derived from the questions of struggles for power between localized and 
centralized state authority. In fact, scalar contradiction is a generic finding among works 
  35 
exploring the relationship between environmental governance and state neoliberal 
restructuring. The work demonstrates that state restructuring often fails to empower local 
actors, sometimes because the higher level of government tends to retain state authority 
in environmental governance by insufficiently supporting finances and authorities 
required for lower-level agencies (local governments, NGOs, or local communities) 
(Brannstrom et al. 2004, Norman and Bakker 2009). Local empowerment is also 
hampered because higher levels of government retain instead of transfer state authorities 
that are critical for environmental governance at the higher level of government (Ribot et 
al. 2006), as the finding of Perreault points out.  
Nonetheless, Perreault’s work differs from other works in that the failure of local 
empowerment is the beginning point where he begins an investigation of non-state 
actors, while others examine decentralization processes. Perrault shows that the 
confusion and subsequent uncertainty motivated local irrigators to organize at the 
national level in order to achieve locally based water governance by defending 
traditional customary practices. The irrigators could negotiate how and by whom water 
resources were governed by “jumping scales” (page 280), i.e., the social mobilization of 
local, national, and global networks. Thus, the Bolivian water governance has been 
reconfigured through scalar politics caused by neoliberal state restructuring. Here, both 
state and non-state actors deployed scales: state institutions transformed toward 
decentralization in a contradictory way to establish particular regimes of capital 
accumulation; and non-state actors mobilized relations within and among scales to resist 
state restructuring. However, when Perreault examines irrigator resistance through 
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strategic mobilization of scale among non-state actors, he seems to assume that the state 
was inactive in its institutional arrangements. Only non-state actor scalar politics are 
examined in “negotiating” water rights: “The formation of translocal networks linking 
peasant irrigators with national and international NGOs, scholars, and political activists 
allows irrigators to jump scales organizationally, while asserting the importance of the 
local. This process is bolstered conceptually by the discursive and legal emphasis on 
usos y costumbres in legitimating peasant claims to water rights. In this way, peasant 
irrigators are contesting the reregulation of state and market institutions under 
neoliberalism, thereby negotiating the rescaling of environmental governance” (Perreault 
2005:280).  
In this negotiation in which irrigators attempted to increase bargaining power by 
deploying scale, the state remained static in terms of scalar arrangement after active 
decentralization processes ceased. Perreault provides insight about scalar politics 
between state and non-state actors in environmental governance by extending the scope 
of examination to post-decentralization responses among non-state actors. However, our 
understanding of state behavior in responding local resistance deploying scalar politics is 
still lacking. The assumption about static states takes fixed decentralization for granted. 
Yet in reality, I would argue that the state also mobilizes relations within and among 
scales like non-state actors for maintaining or expanding its power, even when it 
achieves decentralization. Perreault’s overlooking simultaneous behavior on the state in 
response to non-state actors is all the more problematic considering that one of his 
central theses is “inherent instability and contradiction of institutional arrangements 
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under neoliberalism” (2005:268), which assumes inherent dynamics in scalar politics. 
Thus, the scalar politics between state and non-state agencies need to be examined based 
on the scalar dynamics of the two parties. The responsive scalar politics of the state are 
expected to reinforce state regulatory authorities in fostering marketization of economy 
while retreating from its responsibility for social welfare and environment (Peck and 
Tickell 2002).  
The Jeju Olle Trail project on Jeju Island is emblematic of dynamic scalar 
politics between state and non-state actors after neoliberal state rescaling. This chapter 
explores the processes by which the Jeju Olle Foundation (a non-state actor) and JSSGP 
state agencies (the state) have struggled over controlling the Jeju Olle Trail. In doing so, 
the study employs the lens of scalar politics, in which both state and non-state actors 
reach to the national and global scale to achieve their own goals, sometimes through 
collaboration and other times through strategic tensions.  
By examining interactive scalar politics of state and non-state actors involved in 
the Jeju Olle Trail, the chapter aims to contribute to scalar politics literature by 
examining how the state and non-state agencies have struggled with simultaneously 
mobilizing scales. I argue that the state also mobilizes relations within and among scales 
like non-state actors for maintaining or expanding its power, even when it achieves 
decentralization. Bringing state actors into relation with non-state actors is critical for 
understanding how the state’s authority is reinforced during the “roll-back13” of the state 
(Peck and Tickell 2002). Relying on McCarthy’s (2005) contribution to the politics of 
                                                
13 Retreat of the state from playing the role as an arbitrator of political economy. 
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scale literature by identifying environmental NGO behavior in the politics of scale, the 
study examines the scalar politics between the state and environmental NGOs14. In doing 
so, the study will illuminate new dynamism to interactive scalar politics.  
 
A Neoliberal Experiment: Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
 
Jeju Island: A Test Board for Neoliberal State Restructuring 
The attempts of the South Korean government to decentralize by adopting the 
Local Autonomy System in 1991 failed to achieve local autonomy. The central 
government still reserved substantial authority in terms of administration, regulation, and 
finance. Local government discretion was limited as a result, as was civil participation in 
decision-making processes of local governments (Park 2008: 47).  
The inauguration of President Roh Moo-Hyun in 2002 provided momentum for 
decentralization in South Korea. The Roh administration set “devolution” and 
"diffusion” as the new paradigm for national development (Boo 2012: 27, The 
Committee of Decentralization for Government Innovation, 2005: 7-8; 19). 
Decentralization was a relatively unfamiliar concept to South Koreans who were used to 
being controlled by the strong leadership of the central government. The authoritarian 
developmental state made efforts for administrative decentralization in South Korea, but 
                                                
14 I broadly define “environmental NGO” here. Environmental NGO refers to nongovernmental 
organizations that explicitly seek to achieve environmental goals. Yet, the environmental goal 
does not necessarily have to be the only main goal. An environmental NGO as defined here can 
pursue multiple goals as long as environmental goals are explicitly proclaimed as one of those 
goals.  
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insufficient devolution of state authorities and finances resulted in incomplete 
decentralization efforts.   
Jeju Island emerged as an experimental case for decentralization under the Roh 
administration. For the Roh administration, Jeju Island was a strong candidate with 
which to experiment with decentralization considering its physical conditions, i.e., 
geographic isolation and relatively small population (Boo 2009:28-29). The Roh 
administration designated Jeju Island as the first self-governing province in the country 
in 2006, calling it Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP)15. The designation 
aimed to establish an exemplary model for decentralization with actual devolution of 
authority and autonomy from the central government. To achieve the goal, JSSGP 
requested the central government to transfer its authority. By 2014, JSSGP reserved all 
state authority except military and national security.  
Designation of JSSGP also enabled the South Korean central government to use 
Jeju Island as a test board for economic liberalization in South Korea. With the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loans to the 
South Korean government and began to pressure the government to restructure the 
national economy by removing regulations for global capital. Jeju Island can be regarded 
as the foreground for gradual adoption of neoliberalism by the South Korean 
government because Jeju province had already adopted a drive for economic 
liberalization in development policies by implementing Jeju International Free City in 
2002 (Boo 2012: 136).  
                                                
15 The first and the only self-governing province in South Korea so far (as of 2014). 
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Designating Jeju province as the first special self-governing province in South 
Korea made Jeju Island a test board for economic liberalization at the national level for 
the South Korean government. If Jeju province were successful in establishing Jeju 
International Free City, the national economy would benefit from the foreign exchange 
earned by Jeju Island. Further, economic liberalization could be adopted by other 
provinces on the mainland. If it failed, its negative impact on the national economy 
would be relatively limited compared with the mainland provinces considering the 
geographic isolation of Jeju Island.  
Jeju Island also needed new momentum to revitalize its stagnant regional 
economy (Kim 2001:13). Jeju Island had struggled with a dwindling tourism industry 
since the beginning of the 1990s. Its tourism industry was dependent on domestic 
tourists, yet South Koreans preferred foreign countries (partly because regulation on 
foreign travel was removed at the beginning of the 1990s). The South Korean public 
increasingly found Jeju Island less attractive because it was relatively inexpensive to 
travel to adjacent countries, especially Southeast Asian countries. Jeju province 
differentiated Jeju International Free City from other globally competitive cities. For 
tourism, it emphasized nature-based tourism and leisure based on the island’s natural 
resources, such as scenic beauty and unique geographical features (Boo 2009:33). The 
plan to establish Jeju International Free City was thus expected to revitalize the stagnant 
tourism economy at the local level. 
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Jeju International Free City & Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
Jeju International Free City aimed to establish Jeju Island as a central and 
competitive city of Northeast Asia by deregulating the movement of people, goods, and 
capital in order to improve the economic and social welfare of the Jeju people (Jeju 
Province 2003:49).  
Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan sought to improve the economic 
and social welfare of the Jeju people through implementing Jeju International Free City 
with seven categories of plans: City of International Exchange, City of Culture and 
Tourism, City of Knowledge-Base, City of Environmentally Friendly Industry, Welfare 
City, City of Green Residence, and City of Ecology. The plans were established 
benchmarking Singapore and Hong Kong and considering the physical geographic 
features, such as island and location at the center of China, Japan, and Korea. While 
Singapore and Hong Kong emphasized logistics and finance in establishing global city-
regions, Jeju International Free City focused on nature-based tourism development (Kim 
2001:14).  
The plans aimed to facilitate international economic exchange through 
infrastructure development (such as increasing air stops among international airlines at 
Jeju International Airport, establishing the International Logistic complex at the Free 
Trade Zone, and establishing high-quality foreigner residential zones) and international 
marketing of Jeju Island (such as allowing visa-free countries to visit Jeju Island, 
establishing the International Exchange Foundation and Fund, establishing Regulation-
Free International Meetings, and reducing taxes and regulations for Zone of Education 
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tourism facilities). Particularly, the plan emphasized developing Jeju Island as an 
International Tourism City through, for example, establishing an organization to attract 
foreign capital for tourism development.  
 
      Figure 3.2 The Vision of JSSGP in Facilitating Establishment  
                                        of Jeju International Free City 
 
 
 
                    Source: The Ministry of Construction and Transportation (2005:2) 
 
 
While Jeju International Free City was implemented to heed regional as well as 
national calls, its status as a globally competitive city like Singapore and Hong Kong 
was far from established because Jeju province had insufficient state authority to 
implement deregulation policies for attracting domestic and foreign private capital (Boo 
2009:34). The designation of JSSGP thus aimed to provide momentum for establishing 
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Jeju International Free City as a globally competitive city-region (Boo 2009) (see Figure 
3.2) by strengthening state authority at the provincial level.  
 
Table 3.1 Comprehensive Developmental Plans: Periods and Final Approval  
                 Authorities 
Plan Period 
Planning Final Approval 
Agency Level Agency Level 
Jeju Tourism 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
1973–
1981 
Minister of 
Construction 
Central  President Central  
The First Jeju-Specific 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
1985–
1991 
Minister of 
Construction 
Central  President Central  
Jeju Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
1994–
2001 
Governor of 
Jeju Province 
Local  President Central  
Jeju International Free City 
Comprehensive Plan 
2002–
2011 
Governor of 
Jeju Province 
Local  President Central  
The First Jeju Local 
Innovative Development 
Five-Year Plan  
2004–
2008 
Governor of 
Jeju Province 
Local  Governor of 
Jeju Province 
Local  
Jeju Special Economy Zone 
Development Plan 
2009–
2013 
Committee of 
Jeju Special 
Economy Zone 
Development 
Local  
Committee of 
Jeju Special 
Economy 
Zone 
Development 
Local  
The Second Jeju 
International Free City 
Comprehensive Plan 
2012–
2021 
JSSGP 
Governor 
Local  
JSSGP 
Governor  
Local  
Source: Based on Boo 2012: 183 
 
The designation increased JSSGP’s discretions over provincial affairs. The 
trajectory of the regional development of Jeju Island in Table 3.1 demonstrates that state 
authorities on regional development planning and final approval were gradually 
transferred from the central government to JSSGP when it was established in 2006.  
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The JSSGP governor’s discretion therefore also increased to expedite the 
establishment of Jeju International Free City. Detailed areas of increasing the JSSGP 
governor’s authority aiming for deregulation included “promoting tourism”; “fostering 
educational environment for Jeju International Free City”; “improving medical service 
for globalization”; “fostering agriculture, forestry, livestock, and fisheries”; “increasing 
discretion over land use and development”; “reinforcing the Jeju International Free City 
Development Center”; and “gradually implementing regulation-free zones” (Boo 
2009:196-200). Taking one of the transferred authorities regarding tourism promotion, 
the JSSGP governor was bestowed the authority to allow foreigners’ investment on 
casinos, which was under the discretion of a central government agency, the Minister of 
Culture, Sports, and Tourism (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2 Authority Transfer Regarding Tourism Promotion For Jeju  
                 International Free City 
Tourism Promotion Details South Korea JSSGP 
Establishment of local public 
corporation for tourism 
promotion 
The Law of Local Public 
Corporation 
JSSGP 
Tourism business, i.e., casinos 
and tourist accommodations 
Minister of the Ministry of 
Culture, Sports, and Tourism 
JSSGP governor 
International conference city Limited  Allowed to be 
designated 
Foreign investment  The Law of Tourism 
Business Promotion 
JSSGP governor 
Tourist attraction Duty free, not allowed for 
domestic tourists 
Duty free, allowed for 
domestic tourists on 
Jeju Island 
Source: Boo (2009: 196-197) 
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These institutional changes demonstrate that the designation of JSSGP increased 
provincial state authority for accelerating its neoliberal drive to establish a globally 
competitive city-region, called the Jeju International Free City. 
 
Jeju International Free City: Targeting Chinese Tourists and Investors  
After designating JSSGP, the Jeju provincial government explicitly targeted 
China in revising the Jeju International Free City Comprehensive Plan to the 2nd Jeju 
International Free City Comprehensive Plan (2012). To realize the vision of “Jeju, 
maximizing values of businesses and trade by removing boundaries, and providing 
satisfaction in tourism, shopping, and lives” the main strategy was “Targeting China” 
(JSSGP 2011:110). Thus, detailed strategies included tourist attractions for Chinese 
tourists, such as medical and cosmetic markets (e.g., the Beauty Care Village), reflecting 
the increasing popularity of Korean cosmetic products and cosmetic surgery among the 
Chinese.  
JSSGP also particularly focused on attracting tourists and investors from China 
in working to establish Jeju Free International City through the following policies: 
(1)  Property Investment Immigration Policy. Since February 2010, JSSGP has 
endowed South Korean citizenship to foreigners who invested more than 500 
million KRW (450,000 USD) on Jeju Island. Foreign investors and their families 
become eligible for public education and public medical care like South Korean 
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citizens once they obtain citizenship through investment16. As of December 2014, 
1,007 foreigners obtained South Korean citizenship, with Chinese accounting for 
99%17. 
(2) Visa-Exempt Policy. Foreign tourists staying less than 30 days on Jeju Island do 
not need visas. When Jeju Province first established plans for Jeju International 
Free City in 2002, the Ministry of Law exempted visas for JSSGP for 169 
countries. The policy was implemented to enhance movement of people and 
goods among countries on Jeju Island, thereby facilitating the Jeju International 
Free City establishment. When Jeju province was designated JSSGP in 2006, the 
Ministry of Law increased visa-exempt countries to 180, including China. The 
increase aimed to give impetus to Jeju International Free City, particularly from 
China. The Korea Immigration Bureau expected that including China in the visa-
exempt program would increase foreign tourists on Jeju Island, based on China’s 
rapid economic growth and increasing demand for tourism (Korea Immigration 
Bureau 2006).  
Other than the policies implemented to facilitate the Jeju International Free City 
establishment, economic and cultural situations also contributed to increasing Chinese 
tourists and investments: South Korean television shows had been increasingly filmed on 
Jeju Island; the Chinese currency, yuen, increased its value relative to the Korean won; 
                                                
16 The Department of Investment Attraction, Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. 
17 JSSGP and the Korea Immigration Service. 
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and geographical proximity from China became attractive—one-hour flight from 
Shanghai and two and a half-hour flight from Beijing. 
In summary, the designation of JSSGP implied that Jeju Island was used as a test 
board for state restructuring of the South Korean government through the devolution of 
state authority to a provincial level for accelerating economic liberalization pursued 
through Jeju International Free City. The decentralized state agency thus attained 
increased state authority to pursue its goal to establish a globally competitive city-region 
by attracting domestic and foreign tourists and investments.  
 
Creating A Scale of Political Economy 
 
JSSGP became involved in the Jeju Olle Trail establishment in 2007 right after 
its designation in 2006. Based on JSSGP’s plan to emphasize nature-based tourism in 
establishing Jeju International Free City, JSSGP implemented the Shintamra Tourism 
Resource Development Policy. It aimed to identify environmental assets and cultural 
heritages unique to Jeju Island and to develop them as tourism resources. The Division 
of Tourism Policy in JSSGP was searching for a non-state initiative that could contribute 
to achieving the goal. Around that time, the leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation was 
meeting with local leaders to consult about establishing a trail on Jeju Island. She 
established the foundation in June 2007 to facilitate the establishment process of the trail 
and opened the first route after three months in September 2007. The Division of 
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Tourism Policy provided the Jeju Olle Foundation with financial support of 9 million 
KRW (8,200 USD) for covering costs of route establishment.  
 
Bottom-up Approach 
The Jeju Olle Trail establishment aimed to develop a tourism project that brought 
minimal impact to the environment and economic benefits to local people living adjacent 
to the trail. As tourists rapidly increased on Jeju Island (Figure 3.3), the Jeju Olle Trail 
became an exemplary program for regional development across South Korea.  
 
                     Figure 3.3 Number of Jeju Olle Trail Tourists 
 
                   Data Source: Seogwipo City b 
 
Another reason for its popularity (important for the purposes of this chapter) was 
that the Jeju Olle Trail was established with a bottom-up approach.  
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In recent history, South Koreans were forced to keep silent about regional 
developmental projects by the authoritarian control of the developmental state. After 
South Korean citizens achieved democracy through the June Civil Resistance in 1987, 
they began to speak out for their interests in regional developmental programs. 
Responding to the demands, South Korean state agencies began to attempt to increase 
public participation in developmental projects (Jeong 2008:3) under a slogan of 
collaboration between min (grassroots) and gwan (government)18.  
Jeju province had also experienced citizen resistance against a series of large 
development projects19 implemented by central and local governments (details in 
Chapter 4). Boo explains the reasons for Jeju citizen resistance as threefold: (1) Jeju 
people tended to be excluded from the decision-making process of developmental 
projects; (2) regional developmental programs caused negative impacts on Jeju people 
such as encroachment of property rights (i.e., land/building ownership or environmental 
destruction was not compensated appropriately; and (3) developmental projects that state 
agencies initiated tended to accompany spatial restructuring of Jeju Island in ways 
favorable only to the South Korean capital from the mainland while ignoring local 
people’s benefits (Boo 2012:403-404). As citizen resistance increased, their demand for 
                                                
18 Widely used Korean terms among South Koreans to represent state and non-state initiatives, 
with English translation in parentheses (not exclusive): 
• Government: Gwan (government), Gookga (the state), Haengjong (administration), Nara (the 
state), Jeongbu (government) 
• Citizens:  Min (grassroots), Mingan (grassroots), Gookmin (national citizens) 
 
19 The number of cases where Jeju citizens resisted regional developmental projects was 20 for 
three years after the June Civil Resistance in 1987. 
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a democratic approach to developmental programs also increased, i.e., participating in 
decision-making processes in order to direct programs to benefit local people (Ibid.).  
JSSGP’s promotion for the Jeju Olle Trail as a bottom-up approach can be 
understood in the context that JSSGP state agencies accepted the demands of Jeju 
citizens. A report from Seogwipo City emphasized that the trail was established through 
the governance between the public and private sector, in which non-state actors led the 
project and state agencies merely supported it (Seogwipo City 2011). Government 
officials at the provincial and municipal level whom I interviewed echoed the non-state 
initiative emphasis. A municipal official said, “The foundation began in the first 
place….the mingan (non-state actors) [established and maintain the trail] at their own 
discretion…the foundation employees are considerably knowledgeable [about the Jeju 
Olle Trail], so we are just in a position to learn [from them] (I90-G1220)”. The 
foundation director, a main contributor to the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail, also 
wrote an article arguing that the success of the Jeju Olle Trail would be determined by 
the contributions of three actors21: those who establish the trail (the Jeju Olle 
                                                
20 Throughout the dissertation, I use this form of citation for interview data. The former part 
denotes interview number from the total interviews. The latter part indicates actors groups and 
numbers within each group: “V” – villagers; “G” – government officials; “F” – the Jeju Olle 
Foundation employees; “M” – migrants; “T” – tourists; “O” – others. For example, I90-G12 
shows that the data is the 90th among total interviews and the 12th among government official 
interviews.  
21 The actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project examined by the dissertation include Jeju local 
residents and tourists, as the Jeju Olle Foundation director mentioned. However, this chapter 
focuses only on the conflicts and cooperation between state agencies in the trail establishment 
and management and their impacts on Jeju local people living adjacent to the trail. Power 
dynamics with local residents and tourists will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Moreover, as the chapter reveals, state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation indeed both made 
decisions about the Jeju Olle Trail. Thus, the bottom-up approach in the Jeju Olle Trail project 
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Foundation), those who live on the trail, and those who walk along the trail (Ahn 
2009:1-9). JSSGP state agencies were excluded as contributors. Both state agencies and 
the Jeju Olle Foundation agreed that the foundation was the key decision maker in Jeju 
Olle Trail-related affairs—it exercised the leadership regarding Jeju Olle Trail affairs, 
and JSSGP state agencies acknowledged its leadership. The agreed leadership, 
nonetheless, was contested and became a struggle between JSSGP state agencies and the 
Jeju Olle Foundation, which I discuss in the following section.  
 
Non-state Initiative for the Jeju Olle Foundation  
Financial independence and lacking resources 
The strategies by which the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed its leadership in 
establishing and managing the Jeju Olle Trail22 included emphasizing its financial 
independence from JSSGP state agencies. The foundation leader claimed that the trail 
was established and maintained only through the “min” (grassroots) effort, without 
intervention from the “gwan” (government) (Seo 2008). The Jeju Olle Foundation 
refused state financial support for running the Jeju Olle Trail, even though it suffered 
from chronic financial difficulties, including providing monthly salaries for a dozen 
employees (Ibid.). The leader explained that the foundation chose to take this difficult 
path because she believed that maintaining the foundation’s independence was the only 
                                                                                                                                           
implies that a single non-state actor, the Jeju Olle Foundation, led the project rather than JSSGP 
state agencies.  
22 The Jeju Olle Foundation largely claimed its leadership over JSSGP state agencies through 
environmental considerations in tourism development (Chapters 4 and 5) and financial 
independence from the state. The latter is the focus of this chapter.	
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way to adhere to the Jeju Olle Trail philosophy (Ibid.). Satisfaction among tourists 
(discussed in Chapter 5 in detail) was the first priority of the philosophy according to 
foundation employees, including the director, the previous exploring team leader, and 
the education team leader. To reach the goal, the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed that it 
strived to maintain Jeju nature and to identify places with scenic beauty and cultural 
attractions without state intervention.  
The Jeju Olle Foundation’s claim about its financial independence from the state 
assumes three things: (1) financial independence could assure its independence from 
JSSGP state agencies in making decisions about the Jeju Olle Trail; (2) state intervention 
would run counter to the Jeju Olle Trail philosophy, somehow making tourists unhappy, 
including environmental destruction; and (3) only a non-state actor, the Jeju Olle 
Foundation, could achieve the goal of satisfying those on the trail23.  
More background knowledge is needed to better understand the second 
assumption about state intervention. The Jeju Olle Foundation began trail establishment 
by criticizing the ways in which central and provincial governments incorporated 
tourism on Jeju Island through infrastructure building since the 1960s with little 
environmental consideration (Chapter 4). The Jeju Olle Foundation differentiated its way 
of tourism development from that of the state by adopting principles for minimum 
impact to the Jeju environment. Also, the term for state in Korean (Goockga [국가]) 
evokes images of state authoritarianism (Choi 2002). Antagonism with the state was 
                                                
23 From the keynote speaker of the Jeju Olle Foundation leader at the World Trail Conference in 
2012 (www.worldtrail.org/conference/confrerence2012.php). 
  53 
shaped while South Korea achieved rapid growth beginning in the 1960s, and it lasted 
even after the military government lost power in a democratic election held in 1992. The 
Jeju Olle Foundation drew on the sentiment by highlighting its independence from the 
state through nationwide media. The state that the foundation resisted was imagined as 
an authoritarian developmental state in the discourse of the Jeju Olle Trail.  
 
Multi-scalar politics for financial and administrative support 
At the local scale, the claim of lacking resources seemed to be well received 
among Jeju villagers, as the foundation leader actively spoke about the foundation’s 
financial independence and lack of resources, particularly among village leaders who 
had opportunities to speak with her. A Shinhungli villager, who was the village leader 
when the Jeju Olle Trail was established, met with the foundation leader many times in 
person in the process of establishing the first route. He said: 
 
Ms. Seo Myongsuk explained, she requests aids from corporations as far as I 
understand. [She says] I am conducting such and such projects, and please help 
me, then [corporations] give some money, then she provides salaries for the 
employees ‘cause there’s nothing that makes money there. The city doesn’t give 
money either. Employees were about a dozen…the foundation has financial 
difficulties…but her achievement is incredible. With [the Jeju Olle Trail, she] 
goes to Japan, Italy, and earns royalty, and export (I40-V19). 
 
A village leader of Woodo and the vice head of Woodo county reported similar 
experiences about the Jeju Olle Foundation and its leader. The foundation sent an 
official letter to the county notifying that the foundation would remove Route 1-1 of the 
trail when the safety of tourists continued to be threatened by motorcycles along the trail. 
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Three Woodo representatives met with the foundation leader to negotiate the issue. I 
interviewed a county official in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail, a village leader, and the 
vice head of the county in order to learn about the process and outcomes of the 
negotiation and about the Jeju Olle Trail in Woodo in general. The vice county head and 
a village leader said: 
The foundation leader was indeed great…[she said] the cost for running the 
organization is covered by donation…she was making different efforts to 
establish and develop the trail (I186-G16). 
 
I was surprised that [the Jeju Olle Foundation] was run by donation. The amount 
of donation, of course, is often short of even giving salaries to employees there. 
She does it with the sense of duty, which is not possible for us normal people. I 
couldn’t say anything after I heard that [about her]. We originally planned to 
establish our own trail in Woodo [if the foundation removed the trail]…that 
small lady’s skin got tanned in trying hard [to improve the trail]…We went to 
persuade, yet came back to be persuaded [by the foundation leader] (I107-V70). 
 
 
 My impression was that Woodo representatives were impressed by the 
foundation leader’s efforts, despite financial difficulties, and therefore wanted to give me 
a positive image of the foundation leader. These quotes demonstrate that the Jeju Olle 
Foundation leader actively appealed to the actors at the local level about financial 
independence and difficulties. The appeal tended to be more emotional than rational. In 
other words, the foundation leader built an image that the foundation (and she) strived 
only for public interest without taking care of their own conditions. The image of 
enduring difficulties for public interest provoked sympathy among Jeju people. The Jeju 
Olle Foundation could therefore increase its bargaining power at the local level.   
National-scale discourse was established through media. South Korean media 
applauded the Jeju Olle Trail for its non-state initiative: 
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The walking fever that brought about the groundbreaking turning point of the 
South Korean tourism industry was possible only through the min’s [grassroots] 
efforts without the aid from the government (2014 May 8, Joong-Ang Daily). 
 
It would not be able to establish a 100 percent satisfactory rest area since the min 
initiated the gil [walking trails] (a citizen’s comment on the Jeju Olle Foundation 
webpage). 
 
 
These quotes illustrate the belief among the South Korean public that the Jeju Olle 
Foundation would be unable to provide quality of facilities for tourists. It lacks resources 
for establishing facilities because it is financially and administratively independent from 
the government. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation’s alleged lack of resources made the South Korean 
public urge JSSGP to support the foundation. A renowned novelist said in an interview 
that the JSSGP should take the Jeju Olle Foundation’s burden of establishing and 
maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail (2009 June 27, No Cut News). His urge appears to 
counter to the foundation’s claim about its financial independence. However, it in fact 
echoes the Jeju Olle Foundation’s press release upon Route 1 opening ceremony in 
2007: 
 
The Jeju Olle Foundation needs utmost support from the Jeju Special Self-
Governing Province, since the Jeju Olle Trail will be established based on the 
collaboration with the JSSGP. The JSSGP [should] absorb the cost for 
establishing the Jeju Olle Trail” (Jeju Olle Foundation press release, 2007).  
 
The coincidence implies that the foundation wanted financial and administrative aid 
from JSSGP state agencies. The foundation thus deployed multi-scalar public opinion to 
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pressure and elicit administrative and financial support from a local-scale government, 
JSSGP, while still emphasizing its financial independence.  
Financial independence was critical for the Jeju Olle Foundation because it was 
the way to defend its control over the trail from JSSGP state agencies while at the same 
time receiving financial and administrative support from them. In 2010, a department of 
the Seogwipo City established steps on one of the Jeju Olle Trail routes. The Jeju Olle 
Foundation made this public through national-scale media by blaming the department 
(nuanced as the state as a whole rather than an individual department of a municipality) 
for destroying Jeju nature. The municipality soon removed the steps after facing wide 
public criticism. The incident established an image for the South Korean public about 
the Jeju Olle Foundation as striving to adhere to environmental principles against the 
continuing state effort to increase its control in making decisions about the Jeju Olle 
Trail. Resisting the state rather than receiving its support implies democratic 
management of the Jeju Olle Trail for the South Korean public. A quote from the Jeju 
Olle Foundation website concisely demonstrates how it frames its relationship with the 
state: 
 
We still defend this gil [walking trails] through wholehearted member donations 
and revenues from souvenir selling” (source: http://www.jejuolle.org; italics are 
mine).  
 
By financial independence, the Jeju Olle Foundation did not mean it wanted 
resources—it wanted control over resources provided by JSSGP state agencies. State 
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encroachment was being resisted through the rhetoric of financial independence rather 
than actual financial and administrative support for establishing the Jeju Olle Trail.  
Administrative and financial support from the JSSGP received growing 
momentum as Jeju Olle Trail tourists rapidly increased beginning in 2010. 
 
Institutionalization  
JSSGP support was insignificant (9 million KRW) when the Jeju Olle 
Foundation leader began to establish the Jeju Olle Trail, considering the amount of 
financial support later and the negligible recognition among government officials in the 
JSSGP tourism division24. Nonetheless, the success of the Jeju Olle Trail in attracting 
tourists to Jeju Island (Figure 3.4, page 49) and subsequent public pressure led to the 
institutionalization of the Jeju Olle Trail in municipal and provincial state agencies, 
namely Seogwipo City, Jeju City, and JSSGP. 
 
Seogwipo City 
Seogwipo City actively invested financial and administrative resources to the 
Jeju Olle Trail project because it utilized it for its own social and economic 
development. Seogwipo City’s support began in 2008 when Mayor Park, Yongbu 
actively adopted the Jeju Olle Trail in order to boost Seogwipo City’s dwindling tourism 
industry. The mayor met with the provincial governor and brought in 800 million KRW 
(7 million USD) for exclusively supporting the Jeju Olle Trail. With the budget, the Jeju 
                                                
24 Only a few provincial officials attended the opening ceremony on September 5, 2007.	
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Olle Foundation could embark on projects delayed due to lacking financial resources: 
printing leaflets in foreign languages, training volunteers to be Jeju Olle Trail guides, 
establishing restrooms, and implementing regional development programs at the village 
level such as the Grandmother25’s Lodge program.  
Seogwipo City showed particular interest in implementing regional development 
programs through the Jeju Olle Trail. Rural development through the Jeju Olle Trail 
began with the Halmang Minbak (Grandmother’s Lodge) program, and other 
development programs followed, such as training Jeju islanders as hired guides for 
individual tourists and hiring local people as part-time safeguards and guides through the 
Olle Keepers program (see Appendix 1 for a complete list). Other than these regular and 
official programs related to the Jeju Olle Trail, Seogwipo City and JSSGP provided rural 
villages adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail with funding for village development. Also, 
Seogwipo City won a competition for regional development projects held by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs and a regional development committee 
(2.5 million USD). In 2014, Seogwipo City, along with Jeju City and the Jeju Olle 
Foundation, began supporting villages on Jeju Island to build cafés in the villages 
adjacent to the trail through the Jeju Olle Residents’ Satisfaction Project. These 
examples demonstrate that Seogwipo City helped the Jeju Olle Foundation initiate and 
                                                
25 Grandmother—halmony (할머니)’ in Korean and halmang (할망) in Jeju dialect—is 
extensively used in Korea. It refers to (1) the mother of one’s parents; (2) an elderly lady; and (3) 
an appellation of an elderly lady, equivalent to “ma’am.” Based on the second usage, 
grandmother in Korean does not necessarily imply respect. The Grandmother’s Lodge program 
in this dissertation refers to the second definition, an elderly lady, therefore meaning a local 
lodge run by a village elderly lady. 
  59 
implement developmental programs related to the Jeju Olle Trail. A foundation 
employee said that it had been interesting for them to find out about many rural 
development programs titled “ – Olle” of which the foundation had not even been aware. 
This demonstrates that Jeju local stage agencies deployed the Jeju Olle Trail title with 
and without consultation with the Jeju Olle Foundation. Seogwipo City not only 
supported the Jeju Olle Foundation through funding trail-related development programs, 
but also through their own business of regional development by carrying the Jeju Olle 
Trail’s title.  
Along with financial support, the Seogwipo mayor also institutionalized support 
for the Jeju Olle Foundation within the municipal organization. He established the Slow 
City Tourism Promotion Team under the Division of Local Economy (today called the 
Division of Economy, Tourism, and Industry) in 2009 to increase overnight tourists on 
Jeju Island. The team included Health Specialized Promotion and Slow Commodity 
Development groups. The latter had three governmental officials who exclusively took 
care of affairs to support the Jeju Olle Foundation. In 2010, the Slow City Tourism 
Promotion Team was absorbed into the Department of Tourism Promotion when the 
next appointed mayor restructured the organization after taking office. Since then, Jeju 
Olle Trail-related affairs have remained in the Department of Tourism Promotion, with 
at least two municipal officials assigned for exclusive support of the Jeju Olle 
Foundation.  
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Seogwipo municipality provided full support for Jeju Olle Trail establishment. 
Support was as trivial as introducing village leaders to the foundation exploring team26 
and providing contact information for landowners. The exploring team established routes 
and began by exploring villages and mountains multiple times, asking village leaders or 
seniors to find old village lanes that were not often used and had been forgotten with 
transportation development. As routes were established gradually, the team received 
contact information for the municipal officials responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related 
affairs and asked village representatives to contact private landowners for permission for 
tourist passage of private land when landowners were not from Jeju Island27. For South 
Korean citizens, checking landownership of a land parcel costs 1,000 KRW (0.90 USD). 
The process of identifying landowners and their phone numbers would have been 
onerous for the Jeju Olle Foundation without support from government agencies. As 
such, the Jeju Olle Foundation support system institutionalized in Seogwipo 
municipality facilitated Jeju Olle Trail establishment. The institutionalization enabled 
the Jeju Olle Foundation to secure needed government support from the very start of trail 
establishment, with things as simple as establishing whose land the trail could be built 
on.  
The Jeju Olle Foundation and the Department of Tourism Promotion maintained 
a close and favorable relationship as the interests of both parties coincided. In summer 
                                                
26 A team on the Jeju Olle Foundation working for establishment and management of the Jeju 
Olle Trail. 
27 The Jeju Olle Foundation exploring team directly asked Jeju Island landowners. 
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2011, I interviewed one of the three municipal officials charged with supporting the Jeju 
Olle Foundation. Discussing the relationship with the foundation, he said: 
 
Yes, very good. I talk with the people from the foundation several times a day 
either on the phone or in person. I’ve just talked with them on the phone (I17-
G63). 
 
 
As of 2015, two municipal officials on the Tourism Commodity Team take care 
of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs (one of whom exclusively takes care of the affairs). The 
Tourism Commodity Team is situated in the Seogwipo municipality28 under the 
Department of Tourism Promotion, which is under the Division of Economy, Tourism, 
and Industry (Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4 Structure of the Division of Economy, Tourism, and Industry in    
                  Seogwipo City 
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* are mine, representing departments that have taken charge of Jeju Olle Trail – related 
affairs 
Source: Seogwipo City c, Organizational Structure  
                                                
28 Seogwipo City has four divisions and 35 departments. 
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The affairs of the two officials are as follows: “To implement the Jeju Olle Residents’ 
Satisfaction Project”; “To support Jeju Olle relevant events and festival”; and “To 
implement Olle relevant projects.”29    
The above processes demonstrate that financial and administrative support was 
actively institutionalized in Seogwipo City through the leadership of the municipality. 
The institutions created at the establishment phase of the Jeju Olle Trail still remain in 
the municipal structure. In the institutionalization process, the Jeju Olle Foundation and 
the Seogwipo municipality maintained a favorable relationship.  
 
Jeju City 
After the Jeju Olle Foundation finished establishing the Jeju Olle Trail in the 
southern part of Jeju Island from the east to the west, the foundation began developing 
the trail in Jeju City in 2009, at which time Jeju Olle Foundation support was 
institutionalized in Jeju City.  
Unlike in Seogwipo City, the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City struggled over 
institutionalization. A Jeju City official in charge Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs explained 
the tension to me in 2013. He said that the economy of Jeju City was less dependent on 
tourism in the first place. In addition, Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs did not fit with his 
other duties. The affairs were also somewhat irrelevant within the departments carrying 
unique functions in the municipality (I90-G12). Another official in the same position 
                                                
29 Source: www.seogwipo.go.kr 
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(municipal officials rotate their positions in Jeju City) provided me with another reason 
for the tension between the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City. He said: 
I personally think that the Jeju Olle Foundation takes too much pride…We are 
under the situation where the Jeju Olle Foundation has the property rights on the 
‘Jeju Olle’ that the gwan [government] cannot publish leaflets to promote the 
Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation takes all the leadership, and the gwan is 
passive (I16-G2). 
 
 
The official was disgruntled through the whole 30-minute interview. These interviews 
demonstrate that Jeju City officials had maintained an uncomfortable relationship with 
the Jeju Olle Foundation because of inconsistency in affairs and the dominant attitude of 
the foundation. 
This uncomfortable relationship resulted in Jeju City’s reluctance to support the 
Jeju Olle Foundation. Municipal officials and departments avoided Jeju Olle Trail-
related affairs, tossing them throughout the municipality. An official on the Village-
Making Team (under the Department of Autonomy Administration) had taken care of 
Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs, along with other responsibilities. The affairs were also 
transferred to the Department of Urban Landscape and then back to the Village-Making 
Team by 2013 when I conducted an interview with the municipal official in charge of 
the Jeju Olle Trail. As such, the tension between the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju City 
brought about complicated trajectories for institutionalizing support for the Jeju Olle in 
Jeju City. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation was also dissatisfied with the support from Jeju City. 
The foundation’s understanding about the reason for tension coincided with Jeju 
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municipal officials: the Jeju Olle Trail brought less benefit to Jeju City’s local economy. 
The foundation director was disgruntled enough to say to me:  
Jeju City does only what [the Jeju Olle Foundation] asks. [The foundation] says 
this, then [Jeju City] does this, and [the foundation] says that, then [Jeju City] 
does that (I78-F3).  
 
 
She explained that the Jeju Olle Foundation was dissatisfied because Jeju City was not 
actively supporting the foundation. She took the example of Seogwipo City, which 
provided support with at least two municipal officials taking exclusive charge of Jeju 
Olle Trail affairs in the Department of Tourism Promotion with administrative financial 
power in the organization. In order to elicit more active support, the Jeju Olle 
Foundation met with Jeju City’s mayor at the end of 2012 and complained about the 
“lack of infrastructure [administrative and financial government support] that an 
administration should have (I78-F3)” for supporting the Jeju Olle Foundation. The 
foundation continued that it would remove all routes located in Jeju City. In response, 
the mayor gave the Jeju Olle Foundation what it asked: to transfer Jeju Olle Trail-related 
affairs to the Department of Tourism Promotion and to designate a municipal official 
with exclusive charge of the trail. The request was officially granted when Jeju City 
conducted organizational restructuring in 2013. These struggles show that the Jeju Olle 
Foundation attempted an institutional shift to elicit more financial and administrative 
support from Jeju City and exercised power over Jeju City for institutionalizing the Jeju 
Olle Trail. 
As of 2015, Jeju City has seven divisions and 39 departments. The Department of 
Tourism Promotion (under the Division of Culture, Tourism, and Sports) and the 
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Department of Local Economy (under the Division of Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Livestock) are responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs. Three municipal officials 
take charge of the affairs in each department. Their responsibilities include the 
following: “To implement the Jeju Olle Residents’ Satisfaction Project,” “To support 
[the Jeju Olle Foundation] administratively30 and to implement Olle Keepers”; and “To 
establish and maintain facilities on the Jeju Olle Trail” (http://www.jejusi.go.kr). 
 
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 
The JSSGP provincial government began supporting the Jeju Olle Foundation in 
December 2010. Institutionalization aimed to arbitrate between organizations 
responsible for Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs in Seogwipo City and Jeju City. More 
importantly, 2010 was when tourists of Jeju Island and the Jeju Olle Trail increased 
rapidly (the number of tourists visited Jeju Island increased from 26,4359 in 2009 to 
78,7708 in 2010, a 198% increase; see Figure 3.6). Thus, the JSSGP provincial 
government embarked on institutionalization responding to (1) the need to arbitrate Jeju 
Olle Trail-related affairs among provincial agencies and (2) the Jeju Island tourist 
increase, aiming to facilitate it further. 
The provincial government first established a Task Force (T/F) team composed 
of chiefs of relevant provincial departments, such as Urban Landscape, Agriculture 
Distribution, and Transportation, in order to facilitate JSSGP support for Jeju Olle 
                                                
30 Administrative support also implies financial support when it comes to state agency support in 
South Korea. 
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Foundation from all possible directions. For example, the department taking care of 
transportation increased public transportation facilities near the Jeju Olle Trail by 
establishing bus stops or arranging bus routes to pass the trail. The T/F team held 
meetings quarterly with participants including chiefs of JSSGP, the Jeju Olle 
Foundation, and a provincial official in charge of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs from the 
Department of Environmental Resources. 
 
Figure 3.5 Annual Increases of Jeju Island Tourists (%) 
 
                       Data Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism       
                                      Association, Total visitor volume by month 
 
The provincial official exclusively in charge of Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs was 
designated by JSSGP to support the Jeju Olle Foundation at the beginning of its 
institutionalization process. Along with participating in the T/F team, provincial officials 
implemented various projects to support the Jeju Olle Foundation even after the team 
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was restructured. Projects included establishing the Olle Call Center31, running a Jeju 
Olle Trail information booth at Jeju International Airport, providing funds for the Jeju 
Olle Academy,32 etc. JSSGP provincial government support over a wide range 
demonstrates that the government actively institutionalized supports for the Jeju Olle 
Foundation in its organizations. 
The support system in JSSGP remained in the Department of Environmental 
Resources under the Division of Clean Environment until marketing affairs were 
transferred to the Department of Tourism Promotion. The Jeju Olle Foundation insisted 
on being supported through the Department of Environmental Resources, even when a 
newly elected governor suggested transfer to the Department of Tourism Promotion in 
2012. The foundation found, however, that the Department of Environmental Resources 
lacked power and finances, so it requested transfer to the Department of Tourism 
Promotion. The Jeju Olle Foundation director said:  
We made organizational arrangements [about how Jeju Olle Trail-related affairs 
were taken care of among different agencies] at the end of last year. Before, it 
was in the Environmental Resources Department. So, its voices were little heard 
in terms of [marketing the Jeju Olle Trail]. The Tourism [Department] has lots of 
budgets, but the Environment [Resources Department] has little. It was not 
powerful in the provincial government. So, the programs that we implemented 
showed little progress (I78-F3). 
 
 
                                                
31 As the Jeju Olle Trail became increasingly popular, Jeju Olle Foundation employees had to 
answer many phone calls from tourists inquiring about the trail. As continuing calls interrupted 
Jeju Olle Foundation employee work, JSSGP established the Olle Call Center for exclusively 
answering tourists’ questions.  
32 The Jeju Olle Academy is an educational program that the Jeju Olle Foundation implemented. 
Anyone who wants to learn about Jeju Island (i.e., history, language, nature, food, flora, and 
fauna) can participate in the program. 
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JSSGP accepted the request from the Jeju Olle Foundation. When the provincial 
government restructured in July 2013, the Department of Tourism Policy (under the 
Division of Culture, Tourism, and Sports) took responsibility for domestic and 
international marketing while the Department of Environmental Resource Management 
(under the Division of World Environmental Hub Promotion) maintained such supports 
as facility establishment and maintenance33. Making “organizational arrangements” for 
the Jeju Olle Foundation in the JSSGP provincial government and in Jeju City shows 
that the Jeju Olle Foundation actively expanded its power in JSSGP state agencies by 
deploying institutionalization processes. Thus, the support system for the Jeju Olle 
Foundation was institutionalized in JSSGP state agencies through tensions and 
collaborations between state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation, depending on 
conflicting or coinciding interests.  
Jeju local state agencies’ wide range of involvement (Figure 3.6) shows that the 
Jeju Olle Foundation support system was institutionalized so that the state became 
inextricably intertwined with the Jeju Olle Trail project through financial and 
administrative state support. The institutionalization process naturalized state agency 
involvement in creating the political, economic, and material scale of the Jeju Olle Trail. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation received needed support to establish and maintain the 
organization and landscapes, and JSSGP state agencies facilitated tourism and regional 
development through involvement in the Jeju Olle Trail project. Thus, both the Jeju Olle 
                                                
33 The JSSGP provincial government had 13 divisions and 44 departments.  
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Foundation and JSSGP state agencies attained political and economic gain by being 
involved in the new scale of the Jeju Olle Trail.  
 
Figure 3.6 Supports of JSSGP State Agencies 
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34 The 9 million KRW was the beginning of Establishment Cost Reimbursement. Since then, Jeju 
City and Seogwipo City have provided 50 million KRW (45,000 USD) per route to cover 
establishment costs.   
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Reproducing the Non-state Initiative Discourse  
In the institutionalization process, JSSGP provincial agencies began to 
discursively embrace Jeju Olle Foundation’s resistance against the state. Municipal- and 
provincial-level officials that I interviewed invariably said that the Jeju Olle Foundation 
takes the leadership and the state agencies only provide financial and administrative 
support to facilitate the Jeju Olle Trail project:   
In [Jeju] Olle [Trail] history, the foundation has developed [the trail], and [the 
state] has only supported (I10-G1) 
 
The Jeju Olle [Foundation] does everything like route establishment. As it 
became popular, and honestly tourists of the trail are also tourists visiting Jeju 
Island, so the Jeju provincial agencies have taken care of the Jeju Olle Trail 
related affairs in the form of administrative support. Actual programs and such is 
a non-state initiative” (I43-G7).  
 
 
A Seogwipo City-published report (2011) also said, “lead from a non-state actor, and 
mere support from the state35.” Thus, JSSGP state agencies reproduced the non-state 
initiative that the Jeju Olle Foundation strived to claim while actively institutionalizing 
the support system in governmental organizations.  
The Jeju Olle Foundation made decisions about Jeju Olle Trail establishment, 
maintenance, and marketing as a result, despite JSSGP state agencies’ financial and 
administrative contributions. This attitude corresponds with the description of the state 
as “mere supporter instead of leader” from the above-mentioned Seogwipo City report 
(2011). For example, Seogwipo City built four Jeju Olle Information Centers on the Jeju 
Olle Trail and employed local residents. The employees were recommended by and 
                                                
35 2011 Report of Seogwipo City 
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worked with the Jeju Olle Foundation; the only time throughout a year when the 
employees worked with Seogwipo City was when they renewed their annual contracts 
with the city. Evidence suggests that the Jeju Olle Foundation ran the Jeju Olle Trail-
related agencies that were established and financed by JSSGP state agencies—or at least 
closely supervised the direction of them.  
 In sum, JSSGP state agencies have become inextricably intertwined with the Jeju 
Olle Trail through institutionalization of financial and administrative support for the Jeju 
Olle Foundation. Even though local state agencies have gone through power struggles 
with the Jeju Olle Foundation, they ended up embracing the leadership of the foundation, 
including its resistance to the state. In addition, JSSGP agencies discursively deployed 
the non-state initiative in promoting its Jeju Olle Trail-related businesses. In this way, 
JSSGP state agencies became allegedly a “mere supporter” to the South Korean public.  
 
A Scale of Territorialization 
 
A Non-state Initiative  
Setting a non-state actor at front through emphasizing the non-state initiative 
(mingan judo in Korean) eased the financial and administrative burden of the JSSGP in 
the following ways: 
First, South Korean private landowners tended to allow public access when a 
non-state actor, such as NGOs and rural villagers, requested it rather than when state 
agencies did. It was because South Korean citizens experienced and witnessed the 
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developmental state’s inadequate compensation for buying lands to be used for 
infrastructure development decades ago. They became sensitive about state implemented 
developmental projects and shifting property rights related to the projects. Setting a non-
state agency at the forefront enabled JSSGP state agencies to avoid confrontation with 
the resistance from property owners in receiving permits for public access. A JSSGP 
official said:  
Village owned land or individually owned land is included in the olle-gil [the 
Jeju Olle Foundation]. If the Hangjeong [administration, or the state] did it, 
people would have asked money. But as a nongovernmental party did it, people 
here generously allowed public access to the lands (I10-G1). 
 
 
Negotiating property rights with private property owners would have been an 
onerous or even impossible task for the state, considering the development history of 
South Korea.  
Second, compensation from the state is costly and administratively complicated, 
whereas a nongovernmental party can avoid or provide at a minimal level. As Jeju Olle 
Trail tourists increased, some farmers suffered losses and harms to their crops by passing 
tourists (Chapter 5). The Jeju Olle Foundation compensated the estimated loss for the 
fields used for subsistence, according to the foundation. On the matter, a provincial 
government official said:  
Those kind of compensation [do not have to be] based on laws…At the 
beginning [of the Jeju Olle Trail], [tourists] picked many oranges and [the Jeju 
Olle Foundation] compensated some then. The shi [city] could not do it. [The 
foundation] did it using its own money gained through donation. It is because 
compensation in civil cases should be based on precise estimates and legal 
judgment. There is no such thing for a government official to make an arbitrary 
compensation…we explained the foundation about the situation, and the 
foundation said that they’re going to do it then (I10-G1). 
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It is possible for a nongovernmental party to provide arbitrary, orally agreed, minimal 
compensation for crop loss in return for public access to the land. When it comes to the 
state, however, the process of compensation turns administratively more complicated 
and financially more burdensome. Thus, a non-state actor, the Jeju Olle Foundation, 
negotiated with landowners and farmers in order to enable public access for free or with 
minimal compensation. In fact, few farmers seemed to be compensated, although the 
compensation provided for subsistence farming was mentioned in an article by the 
foundation director (Ahn 2009).  
Thus, the Jeju Olle Foundation and local state agencies used the non-state 
initiative strategy to relieve the state’s burden in negotiation and compensation for the 
public access to privately owned land. Thus, the non-state actors’ involvement in the 
scale of the Jeju Olle Trail enabled the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies to 
apply a non-state standard to the compensation of granting public access to privately 
owned lands. As a result, the non-state initiative facilitated on the one hand and obscured 
on the other hand the state territorialization of local state agencies, which I discuss in the 
following section.  
 
State Authority Over Jeju People and Land 
Once created by a non-state initiative and states’ institutionalizing support, the 
Jeju Olle Trail became the site where JSSGP state agencies exercised state authority on 
Jeju people.  
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A restaurant owner’s story well illustrates the state’s increasing control over 
resources and people. During my preliminary fieldwork in summer 2011, I visited a 
noodle restaurant located at the end of Route 1 because a tourist I had spoken with 
reported that he saw a sign to block Jeju Olle Trail tourists there. “Private Property. Not 
the Jeju Olle Trail” was written in blue paint on the road passing by the restaurant. When 
I entered the restaurant and explained that I was researching the Jeju Olle Trail, the 
restaurant owner welcomed me with a chair and a cup of coffee. He had built the 
building on his land and opened a restaurant. He was unhappy that he had not been 
consulted when the trail was established on the land that he owned. He was afraid that 
his property became public (either state property or a public road) when he left his land 
to be used for people on the trail. He wrote the sign in blue paint in order to draw 
attention from Seogwipo City and the Jeju Olle Foundation and force a negotiation. His 
claims included (1) to ensure his property rights on the land and (2) to provide incentives 
for using the private property. He said:  
I’m the one who is taking costs…the Jeju Olle Foundation benefits a lot from the 
Jeju Olle Trail as the state does this and that. They are not paying anything for 
using the land that are not their own…the foundation should come to find me 
first, and the municipality…the foundation began [the Jeju Olle Trail], but as the 
trail gained popularity, Gwan manages it. Gwan does everything eventually. I’m 
sticking to [Seogwipo City] because I know that (I8-V6). 
 
 
The restaurant owner cared more about Seogwipo City than about the Jeju Olle 
Foundation because he assumed that his ownership could be threatened by the state, and 
it was capable of ensuring the property ownership and providing incentives. Moreover, 
as his behavior caused inconvenience for tourists and some villagers, a local police chief 
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visited the restaurant owner and said that an individual could not block the Jeju Olle 
Trail like that, according to the property owner. Later the police chief apologized for his 
comment after finding out that it was a private property.  
The case of the restaurant owner has the following implications: Jeju people 
perceived that (1) private property rights could be threatened, as this property was 
included in the Jeju Olle Trail; (2) the state could threaten private property, yet it played 
the role of arbitrator with the authority to prevent loss and compensate for it; and (3) 
even though the Jeju Olle Foundation implemented the Jeju Olle Trail, JSSGP state 
agencies were deeply and actively involved in controlling the Jeju Olle Trail, possibly 
more influentially than the Jeju Olle Foundation. Similarly, JSSGP state agencies 
perceived that roads included in the Jeju Olle Trail became public beyond individual 
control. Then the state became the most likely arbitrator on the land included in the trail, 
as it turned de facto public. The perceptions of Jeju people and JSSGP state agencies 
demonstrate that the state increased its control over the lands along the Jeju Olle Trail 
and over the people on it, which is defined as “territorialization” by Sack (1983).  
The case of the restaurant owner also illuminates the ways in which JSSGP state 
agencies achieved territorialization. In the process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, 
landowners sometimes changed their mind in allowing public access to their land (or 
later realized that their lands were included in the Jeju Olle Trail, like the restaurant 
owner). The landowners asked for either detours or economic/ administrative incentives. 
When I interviewed the provincial official taking charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in JSSGP, 
I asked his opinion about the restaurant owner’s case. He answered:  
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It seems that he asks [state agencies] and [the Jeju Olle Foundation] to come [for 
negotiation], but when [state agencies] got to be involved, they necessarily ask 
benefits in return [for using private lands] such as to establish decks or 
something…When [state agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation] noticed those 
signs, we make detours (I10-G1). 
 
 
JSSGP state agencies understood that most landowners claim that their lands aim for 
economic benefits. In those instances, they declined the requests from private 
landowners and detoured the trail without any exception. The previous Jeju Olle 
Foundation exploring team leader explained the reason:  
If it appears that we complain even slightly about a private landowner’s blocking 
his land, other landowners, without having any issues, become nervous. ‘I 
shouldn’t have allowed [public passage on the land]?’, something like that. So 
we retreat [detour] whenever landowners say 'no' in order not to establish a 
precedent. And we also detour when they ask some [incentives] too for the same 
reason…if we do not defend our principle, and allow even a little bit of it, we 
cannot handle [the requests] later (I77-F2). 
 
 
Maintaining a strict attitude in negotiating with landowners about property rights 
enabled the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies to reduce financial and 
administrative burden. It particularly relieved the burden of JSSGP state agencies 
because they were expected to take responsibilities for financial and administrative 
burden as an arbitrator for lands along the Jeju Olle Trail. The reduced burden of state 
agencies also implies that landowners shouldered the cost of using private lands for 
public use. In other words, landowners were indirectly asked by state authorities to allow 
public access to their lands without any return for tourists to enjoy the scenic beauty of 
Jeju Island. The state exercised its authority in resolving land disputes to prioritize the 
interests of the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists over Jeju landowners.  
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JSSGP state agencies likewise exercised authority in politically curtailing 
decision-making rights at the village level. In 2011, the Jeju Olle Trail exploring team 
visited a village leader to discuss the Jeju Olle Trail passing through the village. The 
village leader refused it because his first condition to implement a program in the village 
was villager benefits. The village leader said:  
I refused without telling why and asked them what the benefits were for the 
village, [then they answered] ‘Nothing,’ then what these people [tourists] would 
leave here, [then they answered] ‘Nothing.’ There was no reason to accept it 
(I46-V21). 
 
 
His stance was unusual compared to other village leaders who competed to bring the 
Jeju Olle Trail to their villages because they sought economic benefits from tourist 
spending. The village leader also refused the offer because he or the village wanted to be 
out of the framework of the Jeju Olle Trail in promoting regional development. He 
continued:  
[The Jeju Olle Trail] becomes the property of the foundation and the leader 
named Seo Myongsuk or something. [Then the village lanes] would end up 
becoming her private property. Probably that was the foremost reason why I 
disagreed having it here. I did not want [village lanes] to be under the ownership 
of the foundation (Ibid.). 
 
 
The village leader wanted to ensure that the village would receive credit for the regional 
development, rather than becoming one of many villages under the control of the Jeju 
Olle Foundation.  
The village leader confessed that he experienced significant external pressure for 
refusing the Jeju Olle Foundation’ offer. People in higher positions called him to ask 
about the reasons. The village organization even received an official letter from the eup 
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(the smallest administrative unit over village) where the village belonged. The letter 
requested that the village organization conduct a survey among villagers to ask about 
agreement/disagreement on adopting the Jeju Olle Trail. The village leader insisted on 
not adopting the Jeju Olle Trail without conducting the survey. The trail route ended up 
passing through a neighboring village.  
This village had been known for its wetland. The village leader sought to 
establish something unique to the village using the wetland. His efforts bore fruits: in 
2013, the Ramsar Convention designated the village as the first example village of the 
Ramsar wetland in the world36. A central government official from the Ministry of 
Environment told the leader that he did the right thing to defend the wetland against the 
Jeju Olle Trail (and the Jeju Olle Foundation). The village leader’s story demonstrates 
that JSSGP state agencies focused on completing a new scale to attract tourists through 
the Jeju Olle Trail using their authority. Environmental and cultural assets of villages 
were considered to promote the Jeju Olle Trail for the Jeju Olle Foundation and tourists 
and were not considered based on the aspirations and political rights of villagers to make 
use of those assets on their own.  
In sum, political and economic struggles took place in the newly created scale, 
the Jeju Olle Trail. Jeju local state agencies played a role of arbitrator among 
themselves, the Jeju Olle Foundation, local residents who sought benefit from the Jeju 
Olle Trail, and domestic and international tourists, and thereby, channeled political and 
economic benefits using state authority. While prioritizing the interests of tourists and 
                                                
36 An international treaty establish in 1971 to facilitate ecological sustainability of wetlands.    
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the Jeju Olle Foundation at the expense of the interests of Jeju local people, JSSGP state 
agencies reinforced their authority within the newly created scale of the Jeju Olle Trail.  
 
Crossing Scales of State and Non-state Actors 
 
Jumping to the National Scale 
  The Jeju Olle Foundation strived to reinforce financial and administrative 
support from JSSGP state agencies while checking them for exercising control over the 
Jeju Olle Trail. In other words, the main control of the Jeju Olle Trail remained with the 
foundation even though the foundation and JSSGP state agencies collaborated for 
establishing and maintaining the trail.   
Then, a murder of a female tourist provided a chance for the Jeju provincial 
government to increase its control over the trail. In summer 2012, a female tourist in her 
40s left a guesthouse located at the beginning point of a Jeju Olle Trail route early in the 
morning by herself. She was found murdered a few days later. Police found that a village 
man living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail murdered her. The South Korean public was 
terrified by the fact that the murder happened on the most popular trail in the country. 
Moreover, female tourists often visited the trail alone because an increasing number of 
guesthouses on Jeju Island provided affordable and safe tourist accommodations, unlike 
other provinces in South Korea. The South Korean public also believed that the Jeju Olle 
Trail was safe somehow, possibly because the Jeju Olle Foundation promoted it as a site 
for nature-based mediation. 
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The family of the victim sued the Jeju Olle Foundation for not having provided 
tourists with crime warnings when it promoted the trail. The family also sued JSSGP for 
insufficient institutional support for tourists’ safety. The family’s rationale for the 
indictment was that the Jeju Olle Trail became a public space, for which the Jeju Olle 
Foundation and JSSGP had responsibility regarding tourists’ safety (2014 November 7, 
Halla Daily). The court decided that neither the Jeju Olle Foundation nor JSSGP had 
responsibility for the accident. The family appealed the court’s decision, but lost the suit 
again because a public road’s safety is determined by its physical condition, such as a 
fissure on the road, and the murder was not caused by such defects (Ibid.).  
JSSGP, though, began to claim responsibility for tourist safety after the murder. 
The Jeju Olle Trail passes through small mountains and agricultural fields where 
population traffic is very low, so tourists began to feel insecure walking along the Jeju 
Olle Trail after the murder, particularly female tourists walking alone. Responding to the 
growing concern in November 2012, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Council 
(JSSGPC) launched a motion for the “Ordinance on Trail Management including the 
Jeju Olle Trail.” It aimed to (1) reinforce ecology-based tourism in JSSGP and (2) 
provide tourists with quality service (JSSGPC 2012:2). The ordinance identified JSSGP 
as manager of the Jeju Olle Trail, giving the governor the most discretionary power, 
including establishing and changing trail routes (Act 3, 5 & 6) (Ibid.:5-6).  
The Jeju Olle Foundation and its advocates strongly criticized JSSGPC’s motion. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation submitted an official opinion opposing the ordinance. In a 
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letter that attached the results of a legal consultation on the motion, the foundation 
accused JSSGP of unilaterally taking the control from the Jeju Olle Foundation:  
…it means that the Jeju Olle Foundation transfers the control over the Jeju Olle 
Trail, for which the Jeju Olle Foundation have strived in establishment, 
management and marketing, to the Jeju Governor. It not only violates the 
principle of legal delegation but also impinge the basic right of the Jeju Olle 
Foundation (The opposition letter submitted to the JSSGPC, 2012: 4) 
 
 
Jeju Olle Trail advocates at the national level, as well as local-level media, heavily 
criticized the JSSGPC motion, comparing the attempts to “theft.”37 
I went to the JSSGPC in order to find out its response to the public criticism and 
the status of the legislation. I interviewed a researcher who had charge of the legislation 
process in his office. When I asked him about the criticism, he shook his head, saying:  
We (the JSSGPC) were frightened about how [the Jeju Olle Foundation] 
responded, even with legal consultation. We’re not going to proceed the 
ordinance further for now because it’s unnecessary (I42-G6). 
 
Then he began to explain about a motion of the National Assembly. Since 2010 when 
the Jeju Olle Trail gained popularity across the country, about 500 other trails had been 
established through 2012 following the Jeju Olle Trail’s example. The rapid increase of 
trails and concentration of budget spending solicited the need for managing trails in 
systematic and consistent ways. Responding to the need, 15 members of the National 
Assembly proposed a motion about the state’s management of walking trails. As the 
JSSGPC encountered public criticism, it investigated the similarities between the 
                                                
37 www.jejuolle.org; also see http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/989004; 
http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201212162154315&code=950313 
for similar criticisms. 
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motions of the JSSGPC and the National Assembly. The JSSGPC found that the motions 
significantly overlapped in terms of the definition of walking trails, responsibility of the 
central and provincial governments, planning, establishment of committees, and support 
for nongovernmental actors (JSSGP 2012:1). Facing strong opposition against its own 
ordinance, the JSSGPC decided to wait because it did not have to independently legislate 
the ordinance. The motion of the National Assembly would be applied at the provincial 
level based on the umbrella power of legislations passed through the National Assembly 
when it became effective in the near future. 
The political struggle over controlling the Jeju Olle Trail illustrates that both the 
state and non-state actors interactively and simultaneously crossed scales to expand their 
power in controlling the trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation crossed scales to reach the 
national-scale South Korean public and media in seeking public pressure on the Jeju 
provincial government. The Jeju provincial government, on the other hand, jumped 
scales upward to reach the National Assembly to legislate the state’s control and expand 
its territorialization of the newly created scale, the Jeju Olle Trail. However, its jumping 
scale differs from that of the Jeju Olle Foundation and the irrigator’s union described by 
Perreault (2005). The latter actively worked to reach higher scales, such as the national 
and global scale. On the other hand, the Jeju provincial government did not act; rather it 
decided to simply wait until the decision from the national-scale government became 
effective to reach the provincial scale.  
JSSGP’s institutionalization of the Jeju Olle Foundation support system can be 
understood in the context of its continuing efforts to reinforce state authority at the 
  83 
provincial level in establishing Jeju International Free City, as the following section 
demonstrates.  
 
Jumping to the Global Scale 
 The Jeju Olle Foundation’s continuing efforts to internationally promote the Jeju 
Olle Trail coincided with JSSGP’s long struggle to establish a competitive city-region 
since it adopted the Jeju International Free City Plan in 2002. Thus, the JSSGP 
government further reached the global scale by deploying the Jeju Olle Foundation. 
 
Globalization as a goal 
The Jeju Olle Foundation targeted the global market even though it had gained 
popularity among the South Korean public with the aid of local and national media. The 
foundation says on its webpage: 
Even though it’s somewhat inconvenient for the trail walkers, the spirit of the 
Jeju Olle, which conserves the environment and interacts with people 
continuously spreads out to the whole country, and the world (Source: Jeju Olle 
Foundation a). 
 
Reaching the global market has been one of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s critical goals 
from the beginning of the Jeju Olle Trail establishment. 
The foundation director also remarked on the Jeju Olle Foundation’s contribution 
to JSSGP: 
[The Jeju Olle Foundation] is preparing for selling Jeju Island in earnest this 
time. Actually [JSSGP] shouts out [Jeju International Free City and] the capital 
of something, actually Jeju Island is little known [globally]…[Jeju Island] was 
absolutely far from being prepared to [attract and host] foreigners. Through the 
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success of the Jeju Olle Trail, the JSSGP realized the problems and began to 
prepare for attracting foreign tourists…. (I78-F3) 
 
 
The director went on to the rationale of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s attempt to reach the 
global market saying: 
This trail is [too beautiful] to enjoy only among South Koreans. That’s why [we 
strive for] globalization…Foreigners, that’s the idea we’ve had since the very 
beginning [of the trail establishment] (Ibid.). 
 
The director’s comment reflects her belief that the Jeju Olle Foundation’s strive for 
globalization would not only sustain itself, but would also facilitate JSSGP’s 
globalization initiative that had been implemented through provincial development plans 
such as Jeju Free International City and the World’s Environmental Capital.  
 
Endeavors for globalization 
The Jeju Olle Foundation initiated international events in an attempt to expand to 
the global market (Table 3.3). For example, the foundation began to annually hold the 
World Trail Conference in 2010. The conference aimed to share knowledge about trail 
management among international trail organizations. The conference is an example of 
the foundation’s strongly pursuing strategies to facilitate knowledge sharing and 
promotion of member trails among international organizations.  
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Another example is the Jeju Olle Foundation’s establishment of the World Trails 
Network, with 44 trail organizations from 18 countries including South Korea38, as well 
as the establishment of the Asia Trails Network in 2013 with members from China, 
                                                
38Aiming for “growing to a sustainable ethos for trails and the promotion of a walking culture 
which connects communities and walkers to both culture and nature,” from 
http://www.worldtrail.org/network/network.php, accessed 11/21/2014. 
  Table 3.3 Jeju Olle Foundation’s Endeavors For Globalization 
Title of 
Endeavors 
Since Goals Financial Sources Accomplishments for 
globalization 
World Trail 
Conference 
2010 
(Fifth 
in 
2014) 
To share 
knowledge 
about trail 
management 
among 
international 
trail 
organizations 
- 2010–2015: Ministry of 
Trade, Industry & Energy 
(MTIE); Korea Institute for 
Advancement of Technology; 
JSSGP; Jeju Leading Industry 
Development for Economic 
Region 
- 2016: JSSGP (expected) 
- 2013: ATN  
- 2015: Expected 
establishment of the WTN 
 
Jeju Olle 
Walking 
Festival 
2010 
(Fifth 
in 
2014) 
To promote 
the Jeju Olle 
Trail among 
people from all 
over the world 
- Ministry of Culture, Tourism, 
and Sports; JSSGP; Seogwipo 
City; Jeju Tourism 
Organization; Jeju Tourism 
University (2014)  
The Asia Walking 
Festival (2014) 
Friendship 
Trail 
2011 To facilitate 
trail 
knowledge and 
tourists among 
different 
countries 
Not applicable 
Established relationships 
with trails in six other 
countries including 
Australia and Canada. A 
sign of one trail was 
posted to another trail to 
show an established 
relationship. 
Affiliated 
Trail 
2012 To provide 
consultation 
for 
establishing 
other trails 
domestically 
/internationally 
Not applicable 
Based on Jeju Olle 
Foundation's consultation, 
Kyushu Province in Japan 
opened 12 routes; royalty 
of 20 million KRW 
(18,000 USD) was paid to 
the Jeju Olle Foundation.  
  86 
Japan, and South Korea39 (this network was the stepping stone for the international trail 
organization). The Jeju Olle Foundation envisioned the headquarters of an international 
trail organization on Jeju Island and playing the role of first chairman of the 
organization. These examples demonstrate that the Jeju Olle Foundation strived to reach 
the global market by deploying the Jeju Olle Trail. 
 
Leveraging Local Financial Support through Globalization 
The Jeju Olle Foundation sought to expand Jeju provincial government’s 
financial support by promoting the Jeju Olle Trail in the global market. A JSSGP 
provincial official who took charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in the Department of Tourism 
Policy informed me that the Jeju Olle Foundation had requested that the department 
cover the cost for hosting the World Trail Conference40 in 2016. The Department of 
Tourism Policy positively considered supporting the cost, along with providing costs for 
managing the headquarters of the international trail organization envisioned by the Jeju 
Olle Foundation. In South Korea, state agencies cover costs for startup and management 
of international organizations established within the country. Thus, the Jeju Olle 
Foundation is likely to receive governmental funds to run the organization’s 
headquarters. 
                                                
39 Organization’s countries of origin: Japan (3); China (1); South Korea (11)	
40 I will continue using the example of the World Trail Conference, as it shows well the Jeju Olle 
Foundation deploying global-scale efforts to elicit financial/administrative support, and it is the 
most notable globalization program implemented by the Jeju Olle Foundation. 	
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Receiving governmental support for organization management was critical to 
decision-making of the Jeju Olle Foundation because the foundation actively and 
discursively claimed its independence (based on financial independence) in controlling 
the Jeju Olle Trail without intervention from state agencies. Here the foundation showed 
paradoxical behavior: it insisted on financial independence from state agencies for 
organization management when it established and promoted the trail at the national 
scale; yet it solicited costs for the same purpose when it came to reaching the global 
scale. The paradox depending on scale can be derived from conflicting/coinciding 
interests between the Jeju Olle Foundation and JSSGP state agencies. At the national 
scale, the foundation strived to defend its decision-making rights, particularly focusing 
on environmental considerations in the establishment process. In doing so, it claimed 
that state involvement would encroach on its decision-making rights regarding 
environmental impact. The foundation also elicited financial and administrative support 
from JSSGP state agencies using this discourse. At the global scale on the other hand, 
trail establishment was already completed, so concerns about state control negatively 
impacting the environment could no longer be influential. Whether JSSGP state agencies 
were mere supporters or key players in promoting the Jeju Olle Trail was not important 
at the global scale. There was no media to circulate discourse at the global level in the 
first place. Reaching the global market, moreover, was the priority for JSSGP’s regional 
development plans (e.g., Jeju Free International City and the World’s Environmental 
Capital). Thus, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s endeavor for globalization could be 
understood as a contribution to JSSGP’s development drive to reach the global market. 
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As both parties’ goal coincided, which was to “sell the Jeju Olle Trail to the global 
market,” as the foundation director said, they could exchange financial support for 
running the international organization and promoting Jeju Island, along with the Jeju 
Olle Trail, at the global scale. Thus, reaching out to attract the global scale (1) gave the 
Jeju Olle Trail an international presence; (2) established a regional organization on Jeju; 
and (3) brought JSSGP and the Jeju Olle Foundation together. 
 
Channeling Capital Accumulation 
 
Urban Entrepreneurs 
 In the establishment process of the Jeju Olle Trail, the Jeju Olle Foundation and 
JSSGP state agencies collaborated, particularly when implementing rural developmental 
programs (detailed in Chapter 4). The initiative for rural development drew many rural 
villages to compete to participate in the programs by running local lodges and 
restaurants along the Jeju Olle Trail. The participants did generate additional income for 
about a year in 2010. Tourists subscribed to discourse that the Jeju Olle Foundation 
produced and rushed to the Jeju Olle Trail, attracted by natural scenic beauty and 
progressive ideas embedded in it, such as environmentalism and democratic 
management of the trail. 
Mainlanders further migrated to Jeju Island seeking alternative lives. Figure 3.7 
shows that Jeju Island’s immigration rate notably increased after the 2007 establishment 
of the Jeju Olle Trail, compared to other provinces in South Korea. Urban residents 
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migrated more to Jeju Island than rural residents (Figure 3.8). Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 
implies that JSSGP receives rapidly increasing immigrants from urban areas in other 
provinces located on the South Korean mainland. Jeju migrants increasingly began 
tourist businesses along the Jeju Olle Trail, such as guesthouses and cafés. Jeju Olle 
Trail tourists chose to stay in those accommodations instead of local lodges since 
migrants catered to the tastes of the urban middle class. Thus, capital accumulation was 
channeled to urban entrepreneurs instead of Jeju local people, who were the intended 
beneficiaries of the Jeju Olle Trail project (detailed in Chapter 4).  
 
 Figure 3.7 Annual Trends of Immigration from Other Provinces: 
Other Provinces vs. JSSGP, 2008 - 2014 
 
                Data Source: Korean Statistical Information Service  
 
 
 
 
-10.0% 
-5.0% 
0.0% 
5.0% 
10.0% 
15.0% 
20.0% 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
An
nu
al
 in
cr
ea
se
 fr
om
 p
re
vi
oi
us
 y
ea
rs
 
Jeju Provinces in total 
  90 
Figure 3.8 Number of Migrants from South Korean Mainland to 
              Jeju Island by Origin: Urban vs. Rural 
 
 
                Data Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
 
Chinese Capital on Jeju Island 
 Foreign tourists visiting Jeju Island increased by more than five times after the 
Jeju Olle Foundation established the Jeju Olle Trail41 (from 54,1274 in 2007 to 
3,328,316 in 201442). Among them, the increase of Chinese tourists is particularly 
notable. The number of Chinese tourists increased by more than 15 times in seven years 
(176,878 in 2007 to 2,859,092 in 2014). What is interesting (Figure 3.9) is that the 
increase in domestic tourists began to slow down after the 2012 murder of the female 
tourist on the Jeju Olle Trail, while the total tourist increase rate maintained. The rapidly 
                                                
41 South Korean scholars, JSSGP, and media agree that the Jeju Olle Trail contributed to the 
increase of foreign tourists (2013 October 9, Chosun Daily; Shin and Jeong 2014; 2012 February 
6, Newspaper of Travel).  
42 Source: The Jeju Tourism Association 
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growing number of Chinese tourists43 filled the widening gap between the number of 
total and domestic tourists. As a result, the tourism industry of JSSGP continued 
growing. While Jeju tourism industry’s annual growth rate was 1.9% in 2008, it jumped 
to 10.2% in 2013. The tourism industry also increasingly contributed to the growth of 
the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) of JSSGP, from 7.3% in 2007 to 41.1% in 
201344 (Jeju Division, The Bank of Korea 2014:38). 
 
             Figure 3.9 Number of Jeju Tourists by Origin: 2001 – 2014  
 
             Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Tourism Association 
                                                
43 The countries of origin among foreign tourists are categorized as Japan, China, Hong Kona, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, other Asian countries, the US, and other 
western countries. Among these countries of origin, China is singled out because (1) Chinese 
tourists account for 86% of total foreign tourists and are therefore the most influential on the Jeju 
economy; (2) JSSGP’s regional developmental plans particularly targeted Chinese tourists, so 
the Chinese tourist increase could be understood as the outcome of JSSGP’s development 
initiatives; (3) examining the relationship between (1) and (2) is one of the main goals in 
demonstrating scalar politics of JSSGP for territorialization. 
44 The rate of an industry’s contribution to GRDP growth refers to how much an industry’s 
change contributed to a change in GRDP. The rate of all regional industry contribution to the 
GRDP sums up to 100. The annual GRDP growth of JSSGP was 0.5% in 2007 and 1.6% in 2013.  
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Chinese investment also rapidly increased around this time while the contribution 
from other foreign countries remained constant. Foreigners own 16.4 km2, accounting 
for 0.89% of the total area of Jeju Island. JSSGP argued that the percentage of foreign 
ownership was too minimal to shift the Jeju economy. However, critics from academia 
and civil society demonstrated growing concerns about the rapid increase of foreign land 
ownership on Jeju Island. Their concern was derived from the following: (1) the total 
area of Jeju Island, including mountains and public roads, cannot be traded at the 
market; (2) recent land purchase by Chinese capital was very selective to represent the 
scenic beauty of Jeju Island; and (3) the aggressiveness of Chinese capital in purchasing 
lands and building tourist facilities generated perceptions among the South Korean 
public that Chinese capital threatens overall landownership on Jeju Island.  
Chinese-owned land on Jeju Island increased from 1,415,657 m2 in 2011 to 
8,338,532 m2 in 2014 (Table 3.4). What is notable in Table 3.4 is the growth. Other 
countries like the US have significant size, but it is steady. On the purchased land, 
Chinese investors began building large resorts targeting tourists on Jeju Island (Figure 
3.10). Among 38 tourism development projects on Jeju Island as of March 2015, nine 
projects were implemented by foreigners, mostly from Chinese capital. The amount of 
projects implemented by foreigners accounts for 37.8% (Table 3.5).   
South Korean scholars and media expect the increase of Chinese tourists and 
investment to result in marginalization of Jeju residents, including recent migrants, 
because Chinese tourists visit Jeju Island in particular patterns. A majority (75%) of 
Chinese tourists visit Jeju Island in groups (Seo et al. 2013). A South Korean weekly  
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Table 3.4 Foreigner Land Ownership on Jeju Island, 2011 – 2014 (m2) 
Regions/Countries 2011 2012 2013 2014 
US 3,940,496 3,693,663 3,741,114 3,723,934 
Americas except the 
US 405,486 394,441 352,849 313,805 
UK, France, 
Germany 138,170 138,760 140,409 145,489 
Other European 
countries 385,913 385,602 380,093 379,569 
Japan 2,224,712 2,214,396 2,140,055 2,337,233 
China 1,415,657 1,929,408 3,149,791 8,338,532 
Other Asian 
countries 825,119 827,822 841,098 1,085,480 
Others 180,885 224,306 225,372 302,844 
Total 9,516,438 9,808,398 10,970,781 16,626,886 
Source: The Department of Tourism Industry, JSSGP 	
 
Table 3.5 Foreigner Tourist Facilities Development, 2015 
Project Area 
(km2) 
Project Amount 
(100 million 
KRW) 
Corporation Countries of 
Origin 
Teddy Valley Golf 
& Resort 97 1,353 
China Teddy Ltd. China; 
Singapore 
Legend History 
Park 2,319 18,451 
Ramjeong 
Development Ltd.  
Hong Kong; 
Singapore 
Moosoo Creek 
Park 451 2,537 
Jeju China 
Development China 
Yerae Leisure-
Type Residential 
Zone 
741 25,144 
Berzaya Jeju Resort 
Ltd. 
Malaysia 
Polo Horse Riding 
Resort 213 535 
Korea Polo 
Country Club Singapore 
Iho Park 276 4,212 Jeju Bunma Iho Land Ltd. China 
Jeju Health Care 
Town 1,539 10,130 
Chinese Green 
Land Group China 
Ocean Star 37 1,100 Gokwang Jeju Ltd. China 
Baek 
Communication 
Jeju Resort 
549 2,432 
Baek 
Communication 
Ltd. China 
Source: The Department of Tourism Policy, JSSGP 
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Figure 3.10 The Blue Print of Resort World Jeju Built on Jeju Island by Chinese  
                    Capital 
 
Source: Image provided by Landing Jeju Development Co., Ltd. 
 
magazine on current issues criticized this tourist behavior on Jeju Island in an article 
titled “10,000 Chinese tourists a day on Jeju Island, nothing but window dressing” (2013 
July, Hankyorae 21). A larger majority (80%) of the group tourists travel Jeju Island 
through Chinese travel agencies: large travel agencies attract tourists in China and send 
them to small Chinese travel agencies45 located on Jeju Island. Chinese travel agencies 
on Jeju Island hire Chinese tour guides fluent in Korean, who are a Chinese minority 
having originated from Korea (called chosunjok in Korean). The travel agencies also 
make itineraries for the Chinese tourists to stay at hotels run by Chinese. This pattern 
                                                
45 There were more than 20 travel agencies owned and run by Chinese in Jeju Island (Total: 165 
in 2013). 
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exacerbates the chronic problem of the Jeju tourism industry in which 62% of business 
interests among hotels is leaked out to the South Korean mainland and foreign countries 
(Seo et al. 2013:30). Itineraries also include shopping centers and duty-free shops where 
Chinese tourists spend 40% of total costs for Jeju travel. The duty-free shops on Jeju 
Island are dominated by a few large South Korean corporations such as Samsung. Their 
business interests remarkably surged in recent years: 63 (2007) to 83 (2008) to 122 
(2009) to 107 (2010) to 169 (2011) to 260 (2012) (numbers are in million USD) (Seo et 
al. 2013:30). Also, Chinese capital has increasingly purchased shopping centers and 
hotels on Jeju Island. Chinese tourists on Jeju Island use tourist facilities dominantly 
owned and run by Chinese because they feel more comfortable in those facilities than in 
others run by South Koreans (Chosun.com Economy, September 2014). At the same 
time, some tourist business owners avoid Chinese tourists because of the wide 
perception that Chinese tourists are noisy. As a result, benefits from Chinese tourists 
visiting Jeju Island tend to be directed at Chinese capital and South Korean large 
corporations instead of local businesses such as travel agencies, souvenir shops, and 
lodges.  
Local businesses that cannot access benefits include tourism businesses started 
by recent migrants to Jeju Island. The urban entrepreneurs already experienced 
difficulties in their businesses because of a decrease in South Korean tourists. In 
addition, a new wave of tourists from China has brought little benefit to the urban 
entrepreneurs. Lee (2013; in 2015 January 27 Pressian) points out that increasing 
tourism revenue accrued from Chinese tourist increase is likely to benefit Chinese 
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investors. He argues that the increasing revenue from Chinese tourists benefits Chinese 
investors while marginalizing South Korean urban entrepreneurs who recently migrated 
to Jeju Island. As such, JSSGP has strived to attract Chinese tourists and investors in its 
attempt to establish Jeju International Free City on Jeju Island. JSSGP’s globalization 
endeavor, however, resulted in benefitting only Chinese investors and a few large South 
Korean corporations, when the Jeju Olle Foundation claimed to have strived to revitalize 
the Jeju local economy, whether beneficiaries ended up being Jeju villagers or urban 
entrepreneurs.  
Tying JSSGP’s endeavor for establishing Jeju International Free City with the 
Jeju Olle Foundation’s goal of reaching the global market, JSSGP support for the Jeju 
Olle Foundation can be understood in the context of JSSGP’s globalization drive. A 
JSSGP official said that contributing to Jeju Olle Trail establishment is one of the ways 
in which JSSGP strived to establish the World’s Environmental Capital46. The comment 
implies that JSSGP viewed the Jeju Olle Trail as competitive in the global market. Thus, 
when JSSGP restructured its organization with a new governor taking office in 2014, it 
maintained support for Jeju Olle Foundation marketing in the Department of Tourism 
Policy while removing support for Jeju Olle Trail cleaning from the Department of 
Natural Resources. In doing so, JSSGP reinforced the global marketing of the Jeju Olle 
Trail, including the Jeju Olle Foundation’s globalization initiatives listed in Table 2. The 
institutional shift of JSSGP and the JSSGP official’s comment, demonstrate that JSSGP 
                                                
46 Another version of the global city-region that the JSSGP envisions, emphasizing on natural 
resources on Jeju Island (2011 – 2014). 
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actively supported the globalization initiative of the Jeju Olle Foundation, which 
coincides with JSSGP’s endeavor for globalization.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter aims to determine the processes by which decentralized state 
agencies reinforced authority while emphasizing the rollback of the state under 
neoliberalism by examining an ecotourism project on Jeju Island, South Korea. In 
examining the behavior of a decentralized state, the study relies on scale theories, as well 
as level and boundary struggles of political economy. 
 Through simultaneous and interactive scalar politics in a non-state-initiated 
project, the state consolidated the scale of political economy in a way to reinforce state 
control rather than passively waiting for the political and economic outcomes that a non-
state actor would bring about. The highly political and complicated process both 
confirms and advances Perreault’s argument. On one hand, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s 
upward reaching toward a national scale coincides with the finding of Perreault in which 
non-state actors at the provincial scale rely on knowledge and organizational power at 
the (inter-) national scale. Both reach upward scales, seeking to resolve local issues by 
leveraging power from higher scales. On the other hand, JSSGP’s strategic scale-
crossing toward the national-level government advances Perreault’s finding in which the 
state remains static about non-state actors’ resistance to it after the active 
decentralization process ceases. The findings of this chapter demonstrate that the state is 
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also simultaneously jumping scales (Smith 1993) in response to non-state actors’ 
resistance to it.  
The processes of collaborations and tensions between state/non-state actors, 
including jumping scales, are complicated and nuanced because of the particularities of 
NICs. The chapter examines a regional development program implemented by a unique 
form of neoliberal state on Jeju Island: hybridization of NIC’s developmental state and 
the decentralized state agency with a generic feature of neoliberal downward rescaling. 
This chapter thus provides a case for place-specific and scale-specific “variegated 
neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell 2002).  
The way in which JSSGP consolidated the scale of the Jeju Olle Trail through 
territorialization reflects the behavioral pattern of an NIC developmental state in 
pursuing regional development, i.e., strong leadership of the state in regional 
development (Park 2008). More specifically, when the Jeju Olle Foundation established 
the trail, the Jeju provincial government sometimes intervened in the process to urge 
rural residents to participate in the project, promoting it as a regional development 
program. Once the trail was completed, JSSGP state agencies arbitrated conflicts on the 
trail, particularly land disputes because the South Korean public began to regard the trail 
as public property. In addition, the state facilitated its authority in reinforcing process in 
the trail by providing regional developmental funds for rural villages adjacent to the Jeju 
Olle Trail, just like the way the South Korean developmental state pursued rural 
development in the 1970s. Then, the JSSGP could be called a “decentralized 
developmental state.” This behavioral pattern suggests that NICs might face difficulties 
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in realizing citizens’ participation in resource management, even when they desire it, 
because of already established institutions that reflect strong intervention of the state in 
resource management. 
However, the process of reinforcing state authority differs between the 
centralized and decentralized developmental state. The centralized developmental state 
alone took a strong and authoritarian leadership position in regional development 
programs in the 1970s. The Jeju provincial government, on the other hand, used tactics 
such as deploying non-state actors in initiating the Jeju Olle Trail and jumping scales for 
reinforcing state authority instead of directly taking the leadership like the 
developmental state. The difference might have been caused by the global imperative for 
a democratic approach to resource management and a growing criticism among South 
Korean citizens about state authority.  
The jumping scales of a decentralized developmental state and setting non-state 
actors at the front of developmental programs matter. They reveal that decentralized 
state agencies seek to reinforce state authority under the influence of neoliberalism, just 
like what was believed and criticized about the centralized state authority of the 
developmental state. In doing so, decentralized developmental states claim the opposite, 
i.e., devolution of state power and public participation at the local level. Decentralized 
state agencies rather actively (yet subtly) utilize non-state actors, such as NGOs and 
citizens, for initiating neoliberal developmental goals. Then they take the controlling 
power, reinforcing state authority in pursuing neoliberal developmental goals. However, 
a decentralized state agency’s attempt for jumping scales implies that neoliberal 
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downward state restructuring provides insufficient political power for it to handle local 
resistance and to increase control over natural resources and people in a way to 
implement its developmental goals. Even the most decentralized province in South 
Korea, JSSGP, suffered from lacking state authority when the central government 
devolved a wide range of specific state authorities based on special laws established for 
its designation. In sum, the case of the Jeju Olle Trail illustrates that decentralized 
developmental states seek to reinforce state authority just as centralized developmental 
states did. When decentralized state agencies encountered local resistance, they deployed 
power from higher scales, further reinforcing their authority.  
The comparison of centralized and decentralized developmental states 
demonstrates that the state continues to reinforce its authority for implementing 
developmental goals as it claims either centralized or decentralized authority.  
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY, ECO-SCALAR FIX, AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores how particular ways of rescaling nature contribute to 
capital accumulation for the urban middle class, deepening historical marginalization of 
local people. It emphasizes how simultaneous production of scale and nature in the 
process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail shifted the power dynamics of environmental 
governance in ways that channeled capital flow to particular social groups. 
Recently, political ecology has become engaged with scale literature. In 
examining the Jeju Olle Trail, this chapter relies on studies about the production of 
nature and the simultaneous production of scale, particularly the eco-scalar fix. In doing 
so, it suggests longitudinal examinations of the coproduction of scale and nature in order 
to determine persistent structural threads of capitalist political economy. 
The chapter begins by elaborating on key ideas of the production of nature and 
scale in political ecology. Next, it discusses the history of Jeju Island, focusing on how 
nature had been used in the relationship between Jeju people and outsiders from the 
South Korean mainland. Third, the chapter examines the Jeju Olle Trail establishment as 
a rescaling process of Jeju nature, resulting in reconfiguration of political economy. 
Fourth, the chapter shows capital flow shifting due to an influx of migrants on Jeju 
  102 
Island, resulting in an emerging landscape of neoliberal capitalism. The conclusion is the 
final element of this chapter. 
 
Simultaneous Production of Nature and Scale 
 
Production of First Nature 
There is no first nature in a capitalist society (Smith 2008). “First nature" refers 
to nature unaltered by human activity (nature altered by human activity is called “second 
nature”). Smith’s (2008) thesis is that first nature is only produced as untouched by 
humans for capital accumulation. For Smith (2008), first nature can be differentiated 
from second nature only in its resultant form of human alteration. He states, “If we must, 
we can let this inaccessible nature support our notions of nature as Edenic, but this is 
always an ideal, abstract nature of the imagination, one that we will never know in 
reality. Human beings have produced whatever nature became accessible to them” 
(Ibid.:81). Thus, first nature untouched by humans does not actually exist; it is only 
produced. 
Human remnants and intentions in producing first nature are discursively and 
materially hidden in order to elicit consumption from those who imagine produced 
nature as untouched. In other words, first nature is produced as part of second nature to 
generate profit (Ibid.:78). Smith takes Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks as 
examples of “supposedly unproduced nature,” which are in fact produced “in every 
conceivable sense” (Ibid.:80). He goes on to describe them as “neatly packaged cultural 
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experiences of environment on which substantial profits are recorded each year” 
(Ibid.:81). The purpose of producing first nature is capital accumulation in the capitalist 
mode of social production, according to Smith. 
Social institutions such as state, market, and classes are configured for the 
combined control of first nature production and class-selective distribution of the capital 
generated there from. In a capitalist society, these institutions determine a structure of 
political economy that sustains and facilitates capital accumulation for the higher classes 
at the expense of the laboring class. If first nature is produced to serve interests 
selectively among classes, it becomes a concept of political action (Smith 2008:90). 
Examining produced first nature from a political perspective, then, begs the questions of 
“how we produce nature” as “socially necessary” and “who controls this production of 
nature” (Ibid.:89, emphasis in original). The struggle over the production of first nature 
is thus involved in defining what nature could do to compensate for social deprivation. 
Relying on these ideas about the production of first nature and examining its material 
and discursive power struggles will enable us to determine particular social 
arrangements of institutions for resource use that facilitate capital accumulation.  
Based on Smith’s (2008) thesis of the social production of first nature, this 
chapter investigates how the state, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and Jeju people have politically struggled in framing47 nature on Jeju Island. In 
doing so, the chapter focuses on examining how Jeju Island’s nature is produced as first 
                                                
47 I use framing interchangeably with producing, meaning both material and discursive 
arrangement of nature made by social groups who seek political and economic benefits from 
particular forms of nature. 
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nature in relation to social and economic contexts at the regional and national levels, 
along with who benefits from the produced first nature. The chapter will answer the 
following questions: (1) What is deemed “deprivable” in the social and economic 
development of South Korea and Jeju Island?; (2) How is nature on Jeju Island framed in 
a way to remove social deprivation?; (3) Who controls the production of Jeju nature in 
particular ways? 
Questions remain, though, regarding the mechanisms and forms of producing 
nature and channeling capital derived from nature in particular ways. To answer them, I 
turn to scale theories. Spatial frameworks suggested by scale theories deepen our 
understanding of nature production under capitalism, as the following section describes.  
 
Historical Eco-scalar Fix of Produced First Nature 
 “Scale” is defined in this chapter as a spatial boundary of political economy in 
the production of nature. I am aware of the criticisms about the term’s fuzziness, as some 
scholars use it as levels of political economy, interchangeable with administrative levels 
such as local, regional, provincial, national, and global (e.g., Perreault 2005), while 
others employ the term to refer to a spatial boundary (e.g., Cohen and Bakker 2014). 
Marston et al. (2005) criticize the former use because of its lacking contribution to our 
understanding about mechanisms of political economy beyond the level provided. The 
latter use has also been criticized because scale as a spatial boundary contributes little to 
our understanding beyond other spatial concepts such as space and place.  
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Despite these criticisms, I argue that scale does contribute beyond those 
“replaceable” concepts like level, space, and place when we focus on the “continuous” 
“shift” of administrative levels and spatial boundaries in the process of political and 
economic struggles. For example, crossing “levels” might be interchangeable with 
crossing “scales.” However, when we choose the latter, we are able to emphasize the 
tactics of continuously shifting levels of administration as an expression of ongoing 
political and economic struggles over the production of nature. A similar goal would be 
achieved when we use scale to refer to spatial boundaries over space, where we would 
emphasize that the boundaries of a particular space of political economy are changing 
rather than assuming a static boundary. Considering the dynamics implied by the term 
“scale,” I employ it in examining spatial shifts of political economy in the Jeju tourism 
industry through the production of nature. 
In an effort to untangle complicated socioeconomic and political processes of 
producing nature, many political ecologists have examined sociospatial scalar 
configurations of nature (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003, Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; 
McCarthy 2005). They examined Smith’s (2008) capitalist social institutions that 
produce nature through the lens of scalar politics. These works accept generic 
characteristics of scale agreed upon by scalar theorists: scale is socially constructed 
(Smith 1993); thus, it is unstable and contested (Marston 2000, Brenner 2001); and 
various entities such as state (Brenner 2001; 2004, Cox 1998) and non-state (Perreault 
2005; Agnew 1997; McCarthy 2005) actors struggle to drive the construction process in 
ways to meet the demands of particular class groups while decreasing others’ political 
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and economic benefit proportions. In these generic characteristics of scale, political 
ecologists incorporate nature48 to examine how it complicates and nuances scalar 
politics. Neumann argues that incorporating “the environment – environmental politics, 
non-human actors, and biophysical processes49”—is the unique contribution of political 
ecology to scale theory literature (2009: 2) because scale literature often emphasizes 
scalar politics solely belonging to humans without accounting for the role of nonhuman 
actors, such as agencies, in determining the processes and outcomes of political struggles 
among human actors. Thus, McCarthy argues the inseparability of society and nature in 
explaining scalar politics, saying, “the ‘scalar dimensions of social spatiality’ are 
thoroughly enmeshed with, and enabled and constrained by” the “contested production 
of socionatures” (2005:735). Here, nature and scale are simultaneously produced 
through struggles to determine political economy. This simultaneous production of scale 
and nature provides valuable analytical insight to the case of the Jeju Olle Trail project. 
Relying on this idea, this chapter determines the political and economic processes and 
outcomes that the spatial shifts (the production of scale) resulting from the Jeju Olle 
Trail brought about in the Jeju tourism industry through deploying particularly framed 
Jeju nature (the production of nature).  
Recent work by Cohen and Bakker (2014) is especially illuminating in this 
regard because it specifically describes the processes and outcomes in which scalar 
politics are rendered ecological using a concept called the “ecological-scalar fix.” The 
                                                
48 Nature, in whatever form, usually refers to socially produced nature among political ecologists. 
49 Among different uses of nature Neumann listed, the chapter focuses on environmental politics 
rather than environmental agencies. 
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eco-scalar fix is defined as “a process of rescaling and reorganizing externalities, or 
both, and thereby displacing conflicts and crises, often through the construction of 
(purportedly ‘natural’) ecological scales, which simultaneously depoliticize and 
repoliticize governance” (Cohen and Bakker 2014:5). Cohen and Bakker adopt the 
concept of the eco-scalar fix to a recent land use rescaling suggested by the provincial 
government of Alberta. Alberta implemented the Land Use Framework that rescaled 
administrative decision-making units to seven regions, aligning them to fit with 12 
watersheds in the province. At the time, Alberta suffered from pollution, poor 
coordination among governmental agencies, and rapid population change related to 
uneven development among industries (manufacturing and oil extraction) and regions 
(central and northern). By deploying an ecological scale in rescaling the structure of the 
regions’ political economy, the provincial government discursively rendered the scalar 
shift to appear as an environmental innovation rather than as a response to social and 
environmental crises caused by the particular pattern of capitalist production. Rendering 
the problems of political economy as ecological was possible because nature 
“depoliticizes” the deeply political process of rescaling by obscuring politics within it.  
Even though the rescaling was promoted as an environmental innovation, its 
outcomes turned out to be deeply political. Asymmetric power among water and land 
regulatory agencies resulted in prioritizing economy over the environment. 
Environmental degradation and uneven development were discursively reduced to be 
resolvable through the scalar shift, which was naturalized because a scale of political 
economy was aligned to a scale of ecology; and as a result, the state reterritorialized 
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Alberta through the eco-scalar fix. Based on the perspective to view scale and routes of 
capital mobility following Swyngedouw (2000), Cohen and Bakker argue that politics 
can be controlled by rendering them ecological through “the creation of ‘new’ and 
‘natural’ governance scales designed to solve political or economic crises” (2014:15).  
Cohen and Bakker’s (2014) eco-scalar fix resembles Smith’s (2008) thesis of the 
production of nature, in that nature (the “ideology of nature” to use Smith’s term) is used 
for resolving social and economic problems resulting from the capitalist mode of 
production. I discuss above that produced first nature is imagined as supplementing 
social deprivations caused by the capitalist mode of production, as described by Smith. 
Cohen and Bakker (2014) also demonstrate that the Alberta provincial government 
increased its political and economic control over its territory by aligning a scale of 
political economy to a scale of ecology. In this way, the provincial government also 
internalized ecological and social crises caused by capital accumulation. So Cohen and 
Bakker and Smith agree on the role of nature in obscuring crises caused by the capitalist 
mode of production.  
However, the ontology of nature differs between Smith and Cohen and Bakker. 
For Smith nature is imagined, while for Cohen and Bakker nature is material based on 
ecology. Smith has little concern for ecology, and Cohen and Bakker show little interest 
in ideas embedded in water basins. Thus, nature in the former is representational, and 
nature in the latter is material, although clear demarcation cannot be made. Smith’s 
nature could be called “ideal nature” while that of Cohen and Bakker could be called 
“ecological nature.”  
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This difference provides the Jeju Olle Trail case with room to determine how 
scale and nature are coproduced when nature is defined by idea rather than being based 
on ecology. In the Cohen and Bakker (2014) research, scale provides a useful framework 
to understand spatial circulation of capital derived from ecology-emphasized nature. 
Considering the usefulness of scale as an analytical tool to examine capital mobility 
related to the production of “ecological nature,” the concept of scale could also 
contribute to revealing the capital mobility derived from the production of “ideal 
nature.” The coproduction of scale and nature and resultant capital mobility are by no 
means confined to ecology-emphasized nature. However, the scholarship interested in 
the coproduction of scale50 and nature mostly examines it with ecologies (Swyngedouw 
1997)51, leaving the relationship between scale and ideologies of socially produced 
nature poorly understood. This chapter fills the void by applying the concept of scale to 
the production of first nature in a tourism project on Jeju Island.  
This chapter incorporates history (lacking from the Cohen and Bakker piece) to 
better understand the complicated dynamics of political economic struggles resulting 
from rescaling the nature-based tourism on Jeju Island. Batterbury and Bebbington 
(1999) remind us that expanding temporal scales is useful in examining how human and 
environment interactions have evolved under a particular social context. Smith similarly 
                                                
50 Scale is used in this chapter as a spatial boundary.  
51 The trend of examining social nature based on material nature, like ecology, reflects the 
material and institutional turn in political ecology in the early 2000s from the focus on 
representational and cultural politics (environmental imaginaries) in determining access and 
control of nature. The first and second edition of Peet and Watts in 1996 and 2004 provides 
approximate timing of the turn. 
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emphasizes incorporating history in explaining the social process of nature production, 
saying, “…when this immediate appearance of nature is placed in historical context, the 
development of material landscape presents itself as a process of the production of 
nature” (2008:50).” Both political ecologists52 and Smith argue the significance of 
examining the history of resource uses.  
Of course, a fragmented piece of history has its own merit. For example, 
Swyngedouw (2003) examined the processes in which the Spanish government 
reproduced state territory through a nationwide hydrological project during its 
modernization period (early 20th Century). The eco-scalar fix nicely fits this work 
because the Spanish government sought to resolve environmental (limited water 
resources) and social (decay of Imperialism and growing social tensions) crises through 
establishing scaled waterscape, facilitating hydraulic technocrats to gain power. The 
work is illuminating in that it demonstrates how the process of the coproduction of scale 
and nature consolidates power among national elites and hydrological technocrats on the 
ground in permanent ways.  
Nonetheless, a snapshot examination of resource uses at a single historical time 
segment might be incapable of capturing slowly and sporadically evolving human-
environment interactions through the coproduction of scale and nature. Understanding 
the evolution of scale and nature is significant because it enables us to identify key 
factors in resource use by comparing different policy impacts on resources across 
different time periods. Batterbury and Bebbington note that a historical approach to 
                                                
52 Hollander (2005) for example. 
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resource management brings the environment as an agent in economic development 
processes instead of being a mere byproduct of the processes (1999:284). Linking the 
environmental agency with history, many political ecologists have proved that historical 
analysis is a viable and fruitful approach to resource use when the environment is 
located at the center of examination (Hollander 2005, Robbins 2006). I argue that 
incorporating historical resource use and related uneven development into examining the 
eco-scalar fix enhances its potential as an analytical framework for environmental 
governance.  
This chapter will contribute to the coproduction of scale and nature scholarship 
by following a longitudinal process of eco-scalar fix over time. It will achieve this by 
examining the eco-scalar fix of the Jeju Olle Trail determining the use of Jeju nature at 
one segment in a time period. It will then locate it historically to identify how the 
particular way of simultaneously producing scale and nature is different from another 
way of production in terms of resource use and resultant benefit distribution. 
 
Environmental History and Tourism Incorporation 
 
Exploitation from the Mainland: 12 CE to 19 CE  
Jeju Island was an independent country called Tamna until 1105 CE, when the 
Koryo Dynasty (10 to 14 CE, located on today’s South Korean mainland) annexed it. 
Since then, nature on Jeju Island had been historically used for agriculture and fisheries 
production for Jeju residents and the central government on the mainland. The Koryo 
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and Chosun (14 to 19 CE) Dynasties on the mainland had harnessed the differences 
within the natural environments. Because the temperature of Jeju Island is higher than 
the mainland, the dynasties received special products, such as seafood and horses, 
through tax duties levied on Jeju residents. Other than receiving special products, people 
on the mainland (mainlanders hereafter) regarded Jeju Island as a remote, abandoned, 
and isolated place to send political exiles. While paying taxes to the mainland dynasties, 
Jeju residents struggled to survive on the island. The environment was harsh because 
volcanic ash soil stretched to agricultural land, and strong winds blew year-round. To 
combat the wind, Jeju farmers removed stones from barren agricultural fields mixed with 
basalt before and after planting crop seeds; they used the removed stones to build walls 
and fences around fields, houses, and fishing areas. The physical and location conditions 
of Jeju Island restricted islanders’ economic and political opportunities, which was 
already limited because of the island’s harsh natural environment. Meanwhile, 
mainlanders economically exploited Jeju Island’s nature and people by taking the fruits 
of the islanders’ work. The natural environment on Jeju Island was the only the source of 
special products and was at the same time the obstacle to their production.  
 
Genocide: The Jeju April 3 Incident, 1947 – 1954  
Jeju people’s feeling of marginalization relative to mainlanders was reinforced 
due to genocide, occurred from 1947 – 1954. After being decolonized by Japan in 1945, 
Korea became an ideological battle site between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Koreans 
were divided among followers of the respective ideologies. On April 3 1948, 350 
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communists on Jeju Island attacked police stations and the government sympathizers 
across Jeju Island. The attack was to resist the repression of the South Korean 
government. The troops sent from the mainland launched counterinsurgency operations 
that turned into the genocide on Jeju Island. Jeju people witnessed that the troops asked 
non-armed Jeju citizens if they knew particular suspected communists who lived nearby. 
Jeju villagers who were either hesitant in answering or said they did know communists 
were killed. The genocide that swept Jeju Island for eight years killed one tenth53 of the 
Jeju Island population in the 1950s. The uprisings and resulting massacre are called the 
Jeju 4.3 Incident (sasam sakon in Korean). 
The Jeju 4.3 Incident has been largely ignored and forgotten in mainland South 
Korean society (Kim 2000:461)54. It was because the Conservative party had been 
dominant in the country since the government establishment after the Korean War (1950 
– 1953). Thus, the anti-Communist ideology had been dominant in South Korea. In 
2000, the President Kim Daejoong from the Democratic Party legislated a special law. 
The law aimed to investigate the Jeju 4.3 Incident and thereby recover impaired 
reputations of victims. Based on the investigation, in 2003, the South Korean President, 
Roh Moohyun, acknowledged state responsibility for the massive massacre and 
officially apologized to bereaved families and Jeju citizens.  
                                                
53 The victim numbers significant differ among sources ranging from 15,000 to 65,000 (the 
National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Incident: 364). The 
National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incidents (NCITJA3I) 
assessed the number as 25,000 – 30,000 (The Report of the Jeju 4.3 Incident Truth Investigation: 
367).  
54	Seong-Nae, K. (2000). Mourning Korean modernity in the memory of the Cheju April Third 
Incident. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 1(3), 461-476.	
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Due to experiences and memories about the brutal genocide committed by 
“outsiders,” Jeju people became afraid of speaking with strangers, particularly 
mainlanders. A Jeju mother wrote in a poem in the 1980s, “Son/just say that you don’t 
know/when a stranger asks about anything/just say that you don’t know.” The poetry 
shows how the trauma from the genocide was inscribed on Jeju people. Since the 
tragedy, Jeju Islanders have called mainlanders as “Yukjigut (a mainland thing),” turning 
extremely exclusive against mainlanders. Jeju villagers are still very cautious and 
reluctant to talk about themselves to mainlanders. 
Within ten years of the genocide, Jeju people experienced ironic changes of their 
identity relative to mainlanders. The changes were caused by Jeju Island’s rapidly 
shifting socioeconomic conditions. The central government strategically incorporated 
tourism on Jeju Island since 1963. At this time, Jeju people predominantly depended on 
agriculture and fisheries for their livelihoods. Jeju Island later became the most-visited 
tourist destination in South Korea as mentioned above. Incorporating tourism on Jeju 
Island was ironic because Jeju people were put in a position to host mainlanders 
regardless of their feelings of isolation, inferiority, fear, and marginalization that were 
accumulated through history. It was ironic also because mainlanders were encouraged to 
enjoy Jeju Island as tourists after an historical period of natural and cultural destruction 
wrought by the mainland government. And the Jeju Olle Trail project continued and 
even strengthened the paradox, as the chapter will show.  
The violent upheaval of the Jeju 4.3 Incident might have eased the central 
government’s tourism incorporation on Jeju Island. A record shows that the U.S. military 
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estimated at the early phase of counterinsurgency operations that 70% of the Jeju 
population was leftists (Hq. 6th inf Div, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 512, March 14, 1947 
from NCITJAI3: 120). In less than a decade after the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the central 
government of rightists selected Jeju Island as one of the very first regions for 
developmental program implementation. Counterinsurgency theories demonstrate that 
counterinsurgency operations often work for political control (Galua 2006; Hippler 
2006). Relying on this thesis, the counterinsurgency operations during the Jeju 4.3 
Incident indiscriminately cleared leftists, their families, and their sympathizers from Jeju 
Island and thereby could have contributed to the central government’s tourism 
incorporation on Jeju Island without much resistance.  
 
The Developmental State–incorporated Tourism: 1960s to 2006   
Developmental state–led industrialization  
Beginning in the 1960s, the South Korean developmental state established and 
implemented regional development plans based on strong leadership of the central 
government. The developmental programs aimed to expedite industrialization and 
economic development of the country (Kim 1998:270). In order to effectively achieve 
this goal, the developmental state established industrial zones in the regions where 
existing regional specificities were expected to contribute to industrial development in 
the country. For example, the developmental state established the Gumi Export Industrial 
Zone under the Law for Facilitating Export Industrial Zone Development (1964) because 
the southern coastal city Gumi had a location advantage for export. The developmental 
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state, however, could deploy only limited resources to invest in regions across the 
country, so it focused investment only on three categories of region based on 
developmental potential: those with existing infrastructure; those with industrial 
potential for export; and those with rich natural resources, including Jeju Island. 
Through these strategies, the developmental state expected that growth would spread to 
neighboring regions (called the “growth pole strategy”55), even though the state had only 
limited resources. 
The developmental state also actively deployed the private sector to compensate 
for the lack of financial resources for industrialization (Kim 2010). Samsung, Hyundai, 
and other corporations rapidly grew as they implemented industrialization projects with 
various privileges provided by the developmental state (i.e., tax exemption or regulation 
exceptions). The South Korean developmental state exercised strong leadership in 
selective regional development to facilitate national industrial development. In doing so, 
it harnessed resources from the private sector, resulting in capital accumulation for large 
corporations.  
 
 
 
                                                
55 The growth pole strategy refers to a developmental strategy in which limited resources are 
invested on a specific area such that the developmental effect could spread to neighboring areas. 
States of developing countries typically employ the strategy in order to maximize effectiveness 
of limited resource use. Even though the growth pole strategy is known as an effective way of 
achieving rapid economic growth through a systematic and hierarchical approach, it is criticized 
for bringing about inequality among regions and for lacking diversities among regions after 
development.  
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Tourism incorporation on Jeju Island 
The developmental state took the leadership position for regionally developing 
Jeju Island by strategically incorporating tourism in order to utilize its rich and unique 
natural resources. The initial goal of tourism incorporation was to contribute to national 
industrialization by earning foreign capital from tourists (Lee 1987:45). The 
developmental state was the explicit control tower of tourism development on Jeju 
Island: state agencies from the central government, such as the Ministry of Construction 
and the Blue House56 Tourism Development Board, made decisions about whether or not 
and how natural resources on Jeju Island were used for regional development and which 
strategies and infrastructure were used. The strong leadership of the developmental state 
in tourism development on Jeju Island continued through sequential developmental plans 
until the beginning of the 2000s. 
The developmental state established sparsely distributed tourist destinations 
across Jeju Island. Seven locales with natural and cultural tourism assets57 were 
designated as tourism zones under the Jejudo Tourism Comprehensive Development 
Plan in the 1970s. These sparsely distributed tourism zones were collaboratively 
established by the public and private sector, although the developmental state took the 
leadership role. Upon designating the tourism zones, the developmental state established 
tourism infrastructure across the island to improve access to it, such as Jeju International 
Airport, ports for domestic and international ferries, and roads encircling and running 
                                                
56 Equivalent to the US White House 
57 Tourism zones included Jungmoon International, Jeju City, Seogwipo City, Mountainous, 
Marine, Cave, and Cultural. 
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through the island and tourism zones. After establishing tourism infrastructure 
emphasizing sparsely distributed tourism zones, the developmental state attracted the 
private sector to establish commercial tourist facilities, such as hotels and golf resorts.  
 
Table 4.1 Capital Investments for Establishing the Joongmoon Tourism Zone:  
                 1978 – 1994 
Categories of 
Development 
Initiative 
Development Capital 
Investment 
(USD) 
Capital 
Investment 
(%) 
Government Road, electricity and communication, 
water supply 3,775,579 1.6 
Korea Tourism 
Corporation 
Land acquisition, golf course and rest 
facilities  55,375,444 23.7 
Private Sector Tourism marine village, botanic 
garden, tourism facilities including 
hotels and restaurants 
 
173,905,800 74.6 
Source: Revised from Korea Tourism Organization (2007:253) 
 
For example, in establishing the Joongmoon Tourism Zone58 located in Seogwipo City, 
state agencies59 (25.3% of total investment) established infrastructure such as roads and 
water supply systems to facilitate tourism development in the zone. Private capital 
(74.6% of total investment), on the other hand, built hotels and facilities to attract 
tourists to the zone (Table 4.1). In order to attract private capital investment, the 
developmental state provided investors with financial and administrative privileges such 
as tax exemptions or government loans from the Tourism Promotion and Development 
Fund. 
                                                
58 The most popular tourism zone on Jeju Island. 
59 Korea Tourism Corporation was a government agency in South Korea until the 1990s. 
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Differentiating roles of the public and private sectors in spatially establishing 
tourism zones aimed that private capital compensated for the limited financial capability 
of the developmental state60. More importantly, private investment was expected to 
spread developmental effects from the tourism zones to surrounding regions. The idea, 
based on the growth pole strategy, was that tourist facilities established by the private 
sector would induce economic activities such as creating jobs, not only in the tourism 
zones but also in neighboring regions. The developmental effects would thus contribute 
to the larger regional economy of Jeju Island rather than being contained to the zones. 
Economic activities derived from the private sector also implied that capital was 
accumulated by running tourism business in the zones with financial and administrative 
privileges provided by the developmental state. In sum, sparsely distributed tourist 
destinations were collaboratively established by the developmental state and the private 
sector. The developmental state contributed to the private sector’s capital accumulation 
by setting up financial and administrative privileges and by establishing the 
infrastructure used for tourism development on Jeju Island. 
The developmental state’s plans for tourism incorporation were well received by 
Jeju residents. Jeju Island had historically been on the margin of central government 
attention until the South Korean developmental state began tourism incorporation, 
                                                
60 Regarding financing developmental funds, investment from the private sector significantly 
contributed to implementing developmental plans. For example, in implementing the new Jejudo 
Tourism Comprehensive Development Plan (1973 to 1981), the central government, the Jeju 
local government, and the private sector invested 48.5%, 4.4%, and 47.1% (respectively) of the 
total budget need for implementation (The Institute of National Territory Development 1983).  
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making the investment from the central government exceptional to Jeju residents. The 
Jeju governor at that time expressed his excitement in a newspaper article: 
 Jeju residents believed that the central government had ignored Jeju Island for 
thirteen years since the establishment of the South Korean government [after the 
Korean War, 1950 to 1953]. We are witnessing now that the revolutionary 
government is resolutely excavating numerous hidden secrets. Indeed, Jeju 
citizens are unprecedentedly watching the revolutionary government. The 
tourism industry will be the most important industry on Jeju Island along with 
fisheries (1962 October 16, Kyonghyang Newspaper) 
 
 
Jeju residents welcomed the investment for regional development from the state. The 
investment was particularly meaningful to Jeju residents because the island had long been 
socially and politically marginalized compared to the mainland.  
 
Nature: from agriculture and fisheries to tourism 
Jeju Island reserves unique natural and cultural landscapes as it has been socially 
and geographically excluded from the mainland for centuries. In designating tourism 
zones, the developmental state emphasized the exoticness of Jeju nature and culture. A 
newspaper article described Jeju Island in this way: 
Jeju Island is an island, known with three abundances: women, stones, and wind. 
And it is a particularly unique island as it is also known with three absences, 
which mean no beggars, no thieves, and no gates to houses wherever you go. 
[Jeju Island], isolated to the far South from the mainland, contains exotic natural 
and cultural characteristics, and thus looks unlike our country’s landscape. The 
mountaintop of the Halla Mountain covered with snow…looks like one from 
Switzerland…and large prairies remind us of a ranch in the Southern USA rather 
than Korea (1969 August 23, Daily Economy). 
 
 
This excerpt was published in 1969 after the developmental state began tourism 
incorporation on Jeju Island (1964). It reflects the perspective that nature and culture on 
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Jeju Island were foreign to mainland tourists. Jeju natural landscapes were compared 
with western countries like Switzerland and the southern US, where a majority of South 
Korean citizens in the 1960s had never been. The cultural aspects of abundances and 
absences were also unfamiliar to mainlanders. Through this type of imagery, Jeju Island 
was marketed as exotic and unique to South Korean citizens. Once on the island, tourists 
stayed at hotels and resorts and enjoyed the natural and cultural exoticness in the 
sparsely distributed tourism zones, such as caves, traditional villages, and mountains.  
However, the natural and cultural attractions on Jeju Island were exotic only for 
tourists and investors from the mainland. For Jeju people who had lived on the island for 
generations, the natural environment was mundane, part of everyday life. For example, 
removing numerous whinstones out of agricultural fields was purposeful, not exotic. 
Farmers used the removed stones for various purposes such as building fences (Figure 
4.1A) and making grain grinders. On the other hand, whinstone was unique in shape and 
material for mainlanders. After collecting local stories about whinstone, mainland 
investors used it to promote tourist facilities (e.g., souvenirs or hotel-entrance statues; 
Figure 4.1B), thereby generating value from marketing something mundane as exotic. 
As such, Jeju nature began to be regarded as the source of capital because of its 
exoticness to mainland tourists and investors. For decades since the incorporation of 
tourism, Jeju people have felt relative deprivation in witnessing mainlanders turning 
nature into tourism resources61. Those living on Jeju Island for generations believe that 
                                                
61 I define “resource” as material subjects that create value, resulting in capital accumulation 
among social groups. 
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Figure 4.1 Whinstones Used For Different Purposes (Jeju people vs. Mainland    
                  Capitals) 
A. Fences On a Village Lane 
 
B. Jeju Tourism Symbol located in front of a Resort 
 
* Whinstones: Jeju whinestones are porous stones made out of volcanic activities that 
formed Jeju Island. Whinstones are one of the three representative symbols (stones, 
wind, and women) of the uniqueness of Jeju nature and culture. 
* White arrows: fences and Jeju symbols built using Jeju whinstones 
* Pictures were taken in Summer 2011 
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the created value from Jeju nature contributed to capital accumulation only for mainland 
investors because mainlanders own most hotels and tourists facilities on Jeju Island62. 
Despite this decades-long suspicion, the actual tourism leakage63 was estimated recently: 
Estimations show that 55% of Jeju tourism revenue (2005) and 62% of revenue from 
hotels (2010) were transferred out of Jeju Island (The Bank of Korea Jeju Branch 2014). 
I met many people on Jeju Island who talked about their anger or grief because of the 
tourism leakage. On a beautiful weekend, for example, I was waiting for my then four-
year-old son at a local library, where he was enrolled in a reading camp. A woman 
approached me and initiated conversation. She was a farmer, also waiting for her 
daughter, and I asked how tourism on Jeju Island impacted her: 
Honestly, there’s been nothing left for [Jeju people]. People from the mainland 
have very good eyes. They know how to make money—even out of stones 
rolling on the street here (I207-V158). 
 
 
This demonstrates the feeling of deprivation among Jeju people. She implied that Jeju 
people have always known the whinstone to be there and considered it simply an 
obstacle to agricultural production or a material to overcome natural challenges. They 
used the stones based only on how their material characteristics could contribute to 
production and living. But mainland investors saw beyond mere extraction of nature for 
agriculture and fisheries; they marketed uniqueness and exoticness and achieved capital 
accumulation from Jeju nature. Witnessing this, Jeju people felt relative deprivation. 
                                                
62 1990 October 14, Hankyorae  
63 Revenues from tourism businesses in a region are transferred to other regions rather than being 
circulated within the region of tourism to contribute to the region’s social and economic 
development. 
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The mainlanders’ capital accumulation from selling nature framed in a particular 
way, however, was insignificant compared to their capital accumulation from land 
speculation. 
 
Capital accumulation through land 
The private sector, mostly large corporations, began land speculation on Jeju 
Island as it participated in tourism development. Large corporations purchased land in 
and around tourism zones at low prices from Jeju farmers and Jeju local government 
agencies for establishing tourist facilities64. For example, the Korean Tourism 
Organization forced 11 Joongmoon households (whose residents lived there long before 
establishment of the tourism zone) to sell their land at 10,000 KRW/m2. Several years 
after the transfer of ownership, the land price soared to 28,000 KRW/m2 65, at which 
point (1988) the Korean Tourism Organization sold 13,265 m2 to Korean Condominium 
Ltd. at less than a half the property value in order to encourage private capital 
investment on the land66.  
Similarly, a coastal village farmer witnessed his neighbor selling land at a very 
low price because, being mixed with sand, the soil was almost useless to farmers. Soon 
after large corporations bought this type of land for its scenic beauty, the central 
government constructed roads or tourist destinations nearby. Property values then soared 
by tens and hundreds times in several years because coastal hotels and restaurants were 
                                                
64 1974 July 13, Kyonghayong Newspaper 
65 1991 November 11, Dong-A Daily 
66 1990 November 8, Kyonghyang Newspaper 
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built as the accessibility of the remote regions improved67. Less than half of purchased 
lands were reportedly used for tourism development while the other half were left idle68. 
Whether corporations established tourism facilities or not on the purchased lands, 
property values continued to increase as Jeju Island gained a reputation as one of the 
most visited tourist destinations in the country69. 
The property value increase due to tourism development demonstrates that large 
corporations in the private sector achieved capital accumulation as a result of being 
involved in tourism development on Jeju Island. The developmental state provided 
information about areas included in developmental plans in order to encourage private 
capital investment. Large corporations purchased land from farmers and state agencies. 
As the developmental state improved infrastructure around the land, property values 
rapidly increased, and large corporations achieved significant capital accumulation.  
Witnessing property value increase on Jeju Island, individual investors began to 
participate in intensive land speculation, culminating in late 1980s. Because property 
values increased when road or industrial zones were established nearby, property brokers 
strived to have information about city and county plans in advance of plan 
                                                
67 1983 February 5, Dong-A Daily 
68 The central government attempted to regulate large corporations’ land speculation. The 
Ministry of Transportation ordered large corporations to resell the purchased lands not yet used 
for tourist facilities to the farmers who previously owned the lands (1976 November 6 and 8, 
Kyonghayng Newspaper). In order to avoid government regulation on land speculation, 
purchased lands were often under the ownership of wives and children of capitalists. For 
example, 18 of 28 forest areas over 50,000 pyong (3.3 m2), which had changed landownership 
while tourism was incorporated on Jeju Island, was owned by a woman (1973 August 29, 
Kyonghyang Newspaper).  
69 The number of tourists on Jeju Island had increased by 10% annually since 1976 when Jeju 
Island had been completing tourism development through sequential plans (1993 June 16, Dong-
A Daily). 
  126 
implementation70. They illegally bought the information from architecture companies or 
government officials involved in planning processes before plans became public and 
attracted individual capitalists to invest for land speculation71. Jeju residents witnessed 
land prices rapidly increase while outside investors were continuously involved in land 
speculation. Since property trades were made only among brokers and investors, Jeju 
local residents often were ignorant about who bought properties and for how much. By 
the late 1980s, more than 19% of privately owned land was owned by mainlanders, 
either by large corporations or by Seoul-based elites such as doctors, judges, and highly 
positioned government officials72. 
While investors from the mainland purchased lands on Jeju Island based on 
future developmental plans, Jeju farmers sold their generation-owned lands without 
knowledge of the developmental plans. A leader of a village located close to one of the 
most popular tourism zones said, “The majority of village lands were sold to 
mainlanders. My father’s generation thoughtlessly sold it because they were ignorant 
then.” A woman diver at a coastal village offered me a similar story:   
You know the guy called **? He worked for the KBS [the largest broadcasting 
company in South Korea]. He might have been in a position to know about the 
sites targeted for development, so he bought the land along the coast here for 
almost nothing, and soon sold it for a half-million KRW. He then bought the land 
in Jeju City where the ** sauna is today. Yes, he’s made good money through 
land here, not like us (I100-V63). 
 
 
                                                
70 1991 April 29, Dong-A Daily 
71 1990 May 11, Kyonghyang Newspaper; 1990 June 14, Dong-A Daily 
72 1990 May 22, Daily Economy 
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These stories from Jeju rural villages demonstrate that Jeju people recognize the 
financial opportunity missed by their previous generation because they were not aware 
of future development plans. They regard that mainland investors had the information 
about development plans and were crafty enough to use it for capital accumulation. As a 
result, Jeju residents feel relative deprivation and anger. 
 
Local resistance for a local citizen–initiated development plan 
Jeju residents began to strongly resist the central government73–led regional 
development as a result of the accumulated dissatisfaction over the distribution of 
benefits from tourism development on Jeju Island. In 1991, local NGOs and the 
provincial government of Jeju Island conflicted over the Jejudo Development Special 
Law74. The central government attempted to legislate it to further develop tourism based 
on the provincial government–established developmental plans. Proponents of the law 
argued that the plan should be implemented because the Jeju provincial government 
established it. They assumed that the Jeju provincial government was in a better position 
than the central government to resolve uneven benefit distribution (mostly from property 
values) revealed through previous development plans. On the other hand, Jeju local 
                                                
73 I differentiate the central state from the developmental state, even though both terms refer to 
the South Korean central state. I differentiate the terms because the central government was no 
longer called the developmental state once the rapid economic growth of the country ceased by 
the late 1980s. Moreover, South Korea adopted decentralization in the mid-1990s, so the power 
of the central government in the national political economy relatively decreased compared to its 
power during the rapid economic growth period (mid-1960s to late 1980s). I call it the central 
state since the 1990s because the developmental state is a term specifically referring to the 
government leading the rapid economic growth of South Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s.  
74 The source of the description about the conflict: “Controversy on the Actual Jeju Land 
Ownerships,” 1993 April 23, Hankyorae.  
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NGOs argued that the plan focused only on tourism and ignored agriculture and 
fisheries, which about half of Jeju residents relied on. They went on that the tourism-
centered regional development destroyed the natural environment of Jeju Island, 
threatening the livelihood of local people and benefitting only large corporations and 
individual capital investors from the mainland as the values of acquired properties 
rapidly increased. Jeju local NGOs distrusted the Jeju governor to turn benefits to Jeju 
residents. The Jeju governor, who was given most discretion in the Jejudo 
Comprehensive Development Plan, was appointed by the central government. Local 
NGOs regarded that the Jeju governor would represent the interests of the central 
government and mainland investors instead of Jeju residents. They argued that 
discarding the established plan and creating a new one was essential for achieving 
regional development reflecting Jeju residents’ aspirations and benefits. 
Even though the point of contestation was with the provincial governor’s 
intention for benefitting Jeju residents, actual ownership of the properties included in the 
Jejudo Comprehensive Development Plan emerged as the key evidence to resolving the 
debate. Jeju local NGOs requested that the provincial government disclose land 
ownership information of the targeted development site to examine how benefits would 
be distributed from the plan. The provincial government refused because of private 
property protection75 and for fear of discouraging private capital investment on Jeju 
Island. Jeju local NGOs then investigated on their own the ownership of the properties 
included in the development plan. They found that about 100 mainlanders owned 100%, 
                                                
75 1993 April 23, Hankyorae 
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57.6%, and 63% of the three developmental zones designated for development76. 
Moreover, they found that some mainlanders had bought the land while the Jejudo 
Comprehensive Developmental Plan was being established77, lands on which further 
residential or commercial development was possible78. The rest of the land, that owned 
by Jeju residents, was designated a green zone, reserving natural amenities for 
surrounding residential or commercial zones. This spatial distribution implied that land 
owned by Jeju residents provided natural scenic beauty for the developed properties of 
the mainlanders. Jeju landowners expected to be excluded from the benefits of property 
value increase because their increase would be limited compared with the mainlander-
owned lands. This exclusion was enabled by state zoning because Jeju resident land was 
designated green, meaning the source of benefits instead of their destination. 
The central government decided to drastically revise the Jejudo Development 
Special Law. Because of strong resistance from Jeju residents, the beginning of Article 1 
in the section outlining the law’s purpose changed from, “In order to establish Jeju 
                                                
76 1993 May 4, Dong-A Daily 	
77 1993 May 1, Hankyorae  
78 Land Zoning Categories (Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport) 
 
Category Zone 
Urban Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Green 
Managerial Conservational 
Production-related 
Planning 
Agricultural Agricultural 
Natural  Environmental conservation 
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Island and surrounding areas as the world-class tourist destination through the Jejudo 
Comprehensive Development Plan, and to improve residents’ living conditions…” to 
“Regarding establishment and implementation of the Jejudo Comprehensive 
Development Plan through Jeju residents’ initiative toward improving residents’ 
welfare…” The revised Jejudo Development Special Law emphasized Jeju residents’ 
participation in establishing and implementing developmental plans to resolve uneven 
distribution of benefits and to mitigate environmental destruction because of tourism 
development.  
The processes in which tourism was incorporated on Jeju Island for regional 
development and industrialization had the following outcomes and implications. First, 
capital was accumulated from “rediscovered” Jeju nature. Before tourism incorporation, 
Jeju nature was considered a burden and limitation by Jeju people and was only 
economically exploited by mainlanders through taxes and natural products such as 
seafood and cattle. Mainlanders typically avoided visiting the isolated island because it 
was regarded to have a lower quality of life due to remoteness and consequent cultural 
and social lags compared with major cities. Jeju nature then turned into a tourism 
resource through the developmental state’s tourism incorporation on Jeju Island. 
Tourism incorporation provided an opportunity for mainland investors to view Jeju 
nature beyond agriculture and fisheries. They made use of the scenic beauty and exotic 
flora and fauna (a mainlander-specific perspective) to attract people to the tourist 
facilities they ran. Framing Jeju nature in this way—in a way that Jeju residents did not 
participate in—resulted in excluding them from benefitting from their own nature. 
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Second, the developmental state–led tourism established the industry to 
continuously transfer significant benefits outside the region for decades after tourism 
incorporation. As examined above, the developmental state supported mainlanders’ 
capital accumulation by providing infrastructure and various financial and administrative 
incentives in order to attract their investment to Jeju Island. Infrastructure and facilities 
were established by the state, but the private sector mostly owned the facilities 
generating capital from tourism. Tourism revenue was accumulated and transferred to 
mainland investors instead of being circulated on Jeju Island for social and economic 
development of the region. This tourism leakage has been a chronic problem in the Jeju 
tourism industry since the beginning. 
Third, structural and pervasive corruption related to land speculation expanded 
capital accumulation for mainland investors. Since the incorporation of tourism, Jeju 
residents were excluded from shared information about future developmental plans 
because they were in the position to sell land at low prices. Also, they lacked capital to 
participate in land speculation compared to mainland investors because Jeju Island was 
historically one of the least developed regions in the country.  
Fourth, about three decades after tourism incorporation on Jeju Island, Jeju 
regional developmental plans were contested on the basis of “development” and “just 
distribution of benefits.” Jeju residents first welcomed regional developmental plans 
because they expected to achieve social and economic development as Jeju Island 
received capital investment from the central government. However, they found after a 
couple of decades that Jeju nature and lands only benefitted investors outside the island. 
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Jeju residents therefore resisted the government-led developmental plans and claimed to 
participate in establishing and implementing plans in order to enjoy benefits derived 
from nature and culture on Jeju Island.  
As a result of these configurations of political economy, the developmental 
state’s tourism incorporation extended the historical relationship between the mainland 
and Jeju Island. Mainlanders continued to exploit Jeju nature and people, even though 
the forms and mechanisms of consuming nature changed.  
 
Eco-Scalar Fix: The Jeju Olle Trail 
 
Tourism has maintained its status as one of the main elements of Jeju Island’s 
regional economy since the central government’s incorporation. The tourism industry 
leaped in the late 2000s (tourism made up for 27% of gross regional domestic product in 
1994 and 32.8% in 2010, JSSGP79) through the momentum of the Jeju Olle Trail 
ecotourism project.  
 
Rediscovered Nature through a Scalar Shift 
Scale: from intermittent locales to a line 
In the process of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail, a non-state actor framed Jeju 
nature for tourism development instead of the developmental state. Before the trail was  
                                                
79 Annual Statistics from the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (http://www.jeju.go.kr); 
Percentage of the Product from tourism out of the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP). 
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Figure 4.2 Jeju Olle Trail Routes 
 
Source: www.daum.net, Kakao Corporation 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Jeju Tourism Map 
 
* Yellow circles: tourist destinations today; lines: government-established roads 
** Green circle at the center: Mt. Halla 
Source: http://www.ijto.or.k, Jeju Tourism Organization 
 
established in the late 2000s, the central state had planned and implemented tourism 
development programs for almost 50 years.  However, an NGO (the Jeju Olle 
Foundation) initiated and built the Jeju Olle Trail. Moreover, the Jeju Olle Foundation 
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emphasized that its initiator was a person from and familiar with Jeju Island. With Jeju 
Island being the home of the founder, trail establishment was regarded as a local 
initiative of tourism development, which set the Jeju Olle Trail apart from previous 
tourism development projects initiated by state actors. 
Spatial distribution of tourism development also differed between the Jeju Olle 
Foundation and the developmental state. The former established tourist destinations with 
spatial discontinuity (intermittent tourism zones) while the latter did it with continuity.  
The yellow circles on Figure 4.3 show intermittent tourist destinations, which have been 
expanded from the tourist zones established by the developmental state. The roads 
represented as lines on Figure 4.3 connect the intermittent locales. The island-encircling 
roads were established in order for driving tourists to enjoy sea views along the coast. 
The roads crossing through and around Mt. Halla, located in the middle of the island, 
were established to shorten tourists’ travel distance from Jeju International Airport to 
tourism zones and coastlines at Seogwipo City. Hotels and resorts were also established 
at intermittent locales along coastlines and on mountainous areas with scenic beauty. 
 Unlike the intermittent locales, the Jeju Olle Foundation designed the Jeju Olle 
Trail for tourists to walk along and enjoy unexplored nature and culture on Jeju Island 
(line encircling Jeju Island on Figure 4.2). The foundation strived to find representative 
locales with scenic beauty, mostly along the coast, and linked the locales to complete a 
trail line (Figure 4.2). The Jeju Olle Foundation describes the spatial distribution of the 
trail and its efforts to complete it on its webpage: 
[The Jeju Olle Foundation] linked disconnected roads, found forgotten lanes, and 
called disappeared lanes. The roads and lanes became the Jeju Olle Trail. While 
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driving a car is a tourism that sparse points on [tourist destinations], the Jeju Olle 
Trail is a tourism that links the spots through a long line. [Tourists] will discover 
the inner skin of Jeju when they walk the Jeju Olle Trail. They could not see [the 
inner skin of Jeju] when they hurriedly left [the island] after driving among 
sparse spots (http://www.jejuolle.org). 
 
 
 The Jeju Olle Foundation claimed that the spatial distribution shift from discontinuity to 
continuity (what they called “from the point-type to a line-type”) changed the tourism 
paradigm on Jeju Island and further across South Korea. By particularly contrasting 
continuity with discontinuity, the Jeju Olle Foundation implied that Jeju Olle Trail 
tourism differed from that developed by the state. In other words, changing the 
distribution of tourist destinations was a spatial expression of Jeju Olle Foundation 
resistance against the developmental state. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation further claimed that the change in spatial distribution 
shifted and expanded the scope in which Jeju residents economically benefited from 
tourism development. The developmental state established the political economy 
structure of the Jeju tourism industry to benefit mostly mainlanders and some involved 
Jeju residents. The state’s distribution of tourist spots was sparse, and tourists didn’t 
venture from them, meaning money was spent only where the state had set up locales. 
On the other hand, the spatial distribution of the trail actually caused people to expand 
their visits and spending to locales in more rural villages, like snack shops, restaurants, 
and lodges. The Jeju Olle Trail also shifted tourist behavior from driving to slowly 
walking, further encouraging spending along the trail. In order to ensure benefits for 
rural villagers, the Jeju Olle Foundation made sure to locate beginning and ending points 
of the trail on rural villages. This spatial change of tourist destinations and subsequent 
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capital circulation on Jeju Island was called the “revitalization of regional economy’s 
capillary80,” meaning smaller economies in rural villages benefit from tourist spending.  
 
Healing through nature 
In establishing the Jeju Olle Trail as a continuous and collective tourist 
destination, the Jeju Olle Foundation defined its role for environmental conservation 
along the trail line, criticizing the state’s environmental destruction in the process of 
tourism development. Before the trail was established, nature beyond the state-
designated tourism zones could be transformed in any way to improve access to tourist 
destinations (e.g., building roads and tourist facilities). The Jeju Olle Foundation 
strongly criticized construction-driven tourism development for having destroyed forests 
and natural coastlines on Jeju Island. The foundation leader called construction 
companies, committee members favorable to construction, and government employees 
the “triangle of construction mafia” (Seo 2010:244). She also called Jeju Special Self-
Governing Province (JSSGP) the “Construction Special Self-Governing Province,” 
saying that it reminded her of a “ceaselessly dashing terminator” (Ibid.:246-247), 
referring to the heartless, evil, inextinguishable film character. She lamented that the 
terminator was continuously covering Jeju Island with concrete at a “crazy speed” (Ibid.: 
252). The leader also wrote about her experience of the terminator during the 
establishment of Route 7: near completion of the route, she saw on it several red flags 
                                                
80 An Education Team Leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation at a lecture to introduce the Jeju Olle 
Trail to trainees of the 14th Intensive Course (November 17 2013). 
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along the coastline, meaning JSSGP was about to begin building a road there. She wrote 
the following response:  
…what the hell; a road on this quiet beach, which is interrupted by coastal cliffs? 
Isn’t this too much?...We are fighting against the Spanish Armada and there is no 
way for us to win (Ibid:250). 
 
 
She went on to say that the places not yet reached by development dirt were buried 
under heavy equipment such as “a couple dozen dump trucks (Ibid.: 247).” The writings 
of the foundation leader well demonstrate that the Jeju Olle Foundation blamed the 
developmental state for environmental destruction (Seo 2010). They also show that the 
leader took seriously how the developmental state had impacted Jeju nature. 
 From the Jeju Olle Foundation perspective, Jeju nature along the Jeju Olle Trail 
was seen as undestroyed by the state’s tourism development on Jeju Island. The 
foundation established imagery to connect unexplored natural and cultural attractions of 
Jeju Island, such as locales with scenic beauty beyond the existing tourist destinations 
and old lanes historically used by rural villagers. The quote above has new emphasis 
from this perspective: 
[The Jeju Olle Foundation] linked disconnected roads, found forgotten lanes and 
disappeared lanes. The roads and lanes became the Jeju Olle Trail. While driving 
a car is a tourism that sparsely points on [tourist destinations], the Jeju Olle Trail 
is a tourism project that links the spots through a long line. [Tourists] will 
discover the inner skin of Jeju when they walk the Jeju Olle Trail. They could not 
see [the inner skin of Jeju] when they hurriedly left [the island] after driving 
among sparse spots (http://www.jejuolle.org). 
 
 
The Jeju Olle Foundation suggested that the developmental state built roads 
disconnectedly, fragmenting the wholeness of Jeju nature. The roads also disconnected 
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people and nature, which used to be linked via lanes. Through the lanes, village women 
used to visit neighbors, village boys used to feed cows, and village kids used to plunge 
into the sea to play81. These lanes were forgotten and disappeared as the developmental 
state built roads everywhere. Losing the lanes meant losing the link between people and 
nature and the opportunity to enjoy the authentic nature of Jeju Island. “The inner skin of 
Jeju82” suggests that the Jeju Olle Trail demonstrates Jeju nature and culture beyond the 
typical images of Jeju Island. Describing the Jeju Olle Trail locales as unexplored and 
unknown by tourists implies that the Jeju Olle Foundation was not targeting tourism 
development and that nature and culture remained undestroyed. 
The Jeju Olle Foundation also claimed its efforts to minimize impacts of tourism 
development on Jeju nature. For example, the foundation adopted Environmentally-
Friendly Guidelines for Trailblazing and Maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail83 (Annex 2), 
which outline specific ways for the trail to avoid environmental impact, such as using 
only shovels rather than heavy equipment in leveling (Seo 2010:18). Through this 
document, the foundation indirectly criticized the ways in which state agencies 
developed tourism on Jeju Island. By contrasting heavy equipment (bad) with shovels 
(good), the Jeju Olle Foundation emphasized its guardian role of Jeju nature. 
Emphasizing the naturalness of the Jeju Olle Trail separate from state influence 
redefined what Jeju nature was expected to offer tourists. For several decades before the 
                                                
81 The description is based on the foundation leader’s book (Seo 2008; 2010). 
82 2009 March 19, dongA.com  
83 See Annex 2 for details about the Jeju Olle Foundation’s Environmentally-Friendly Guidelines 
for Trailblazing and Maintaining the Jeju Olle Trail. 
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Jeju Olle Trail was established, tourists consumed Jeju nature framed as exotic by the 
developmental state through images like tropical trees along the beach and whinstone 
statues. The Jeju Olle Foundation emphasized instead the mental healing of urban 
residents within Jeju nature. In an interview, the founder said the trail’s success was 
because: 
The South Korean society was too tired rather than the foundation did something 
to be praised. Isn’t it a ‘Fatigue Society8485’? We would not want to admit it, but 
we are pressured to live upon excessive competitiveness, standardization, and the 
gaze from others. The South Korean society successfully achieved rapid 
economic growth; yet, the mentality to respect diversity has not developed 
commensurate with it…On the Jeju Olle Trail, we could walk only on our own 
pace. No one is being chased by others or a crazy schedule. We then had a 
feeling that we had lost for a while. Nature soothes us…The Jeju Olle Trail is a 
trail of healing in a sense that it provides the energy of healing based on Jeju 
nature (2012 October 29, Hankyorae). 
 
 
The foundation leader diagnosed South Korean citizens with lost generosity toward 
others and selves because of single-minded pursuit of economic growth. She suggested 
that urban residents pause for a while to breathe and look around. She urged them to 
realize their tiredness in living amid intense competition, pointing out that fatigue is 
unnecessary, considering that South Koreans were presumably less tired—even never 
tired—when they lived slower lives before state-led developmental programs. 
Competition has gained intensity day by day since the rapid economic growth began, so 
the leader suggested that urban residents restore something lost by leaving urban settings 
and walking along the trail. Jeju nature (and the Jeju Olle Trail) was advertised as being 
                                                
84 A book titled Fatigue Society became popular among the South Korean public in 2012. A German-based 
philosopher argues that today’s individuals are extremely weary in the process of self-exploitation. The 
author argues that capitalist social structure caused the self-exploitation. 
85Han, BC. 2011. Fatigue Society. Moonji, ISBN 9788932023960.	
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able to reorient tourists tired of busy urban lives, to rescue wrecked urban residents, 
because it was untouched by the developmental state, the “terminator” of beautiful 
nature and peacefulness and slowness of life.  
 The discourse regarding Jeju nature illuminates one of the ways in which South 
Koreans perceive society, nature, and the relationship between them. Even though South 
Korean society achieved rapid economic growth, South Koreans lost nature and intimacy 
with others in the process. And nature along the Jeju Olle Trail offered compensation for 
this social deprivation. Nature along the Jeju Olle Trail is pure, having the capability for 
mental healing of urban residents because it is beyond the impacts of rapid economic 
growth. The developmental state caused the social deprivation, and the Jeju Olle 
Foundation restored the purity and wholeness of Jeju nature and people in it through the 
Jeju Olle Trail.  
The discourse was highly influential among urban residents. Tourists visited the 
trail expecting to access unmodified Jeju nature through the trail line:  
I wanted to reflect on what’s going on around me. Everything up there was so 
fast that I couldn’t focus” (I24-T3). 
 
“I just wanted to take some rest from work. My friend suggested me to visit [the 
Jeju Olle Trail] saying that Jeju nature would work for me” (I25-T4). 
 
One college student visited the Jeju Olle Trail because his mother suggested that he 
reflect on his tendency to emphasize only outcomes, ignoring the importance of 
processes. Another college student wanted to “pause” and consider “what kind of 
teacher” he wanted to be through walking in Jeju nature:  
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Having a chance to think deeply here [on the trail], I think I am getting what my 
mom wanted me to realize. I guess nature here helped me focus” (I12-T2). 
 
I read the book of the founder Seo Myongsuk. I’m graduating from a college of 
education soon. I wanted to pause for a while and wanted to think in Jeju nature 
about what kind of teacher I would want to be” (I32-T7). 
 
Like these two, some tourists expected to experience self-reflection in Jeju nature 
untouched by modernization. And some tourists sought companionship, wanting to find 
other “good people” in a place where “no one would be bad”:  
We all are good people here. No one would be bad when they want to walk along 
this beautiful nature” (I5-T1). 
 
What’s this noise on [the Jeju Olle Trail]?” (A woman in her 40s when a trainee 
of the Jeju Olle Academy complained about schedule delay to a Jeju Olle 
Foundation employee on Route 8).  
 
As the quotes show, tourists visit the Jeju Olle Trail imagining Jeju nature. The 
wholeness of Jeju nature along the trail is imagined to contribute to healing the weary 
mentality of the urban middle class86. Tourists expect that the trail will enable them to 
focus on self-reflection while walking without being interrupted from other tourists or 
noise, like hectic urban lives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
86 The urban middle class is defined as the main socioeconomic and demographic group of 
tourists determined by the MCST (2010:105). Details are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Migration to Jeju Island 
As Jeju nature was “rediscovered87” through the Jeju Olle Trail and thus gained 
popularity across the country, the mainland urban middle class increasingly migrated to 
Jeju Island looking for alternative ways of life. Migrants aspired to live and educate their 
children close to Jeju nature, which Jeju Olle Trail tourists had experienced and spread 
through personal blogs and other media.  
 
Figure 4.4 Population of Jeju City and Seogwipo City: 1985 – 2010 
 
                Source: Korean Statistical Information Service b. 
 
By the time the Jeju Olle Trail became popular, Seogwipo City had experienced 
a decreasing population and dwindling regional economy, unlike Jeju City (Figure 4.4). 
The tourism change boosted the population on Jeju Island, along with the advent of Low 
                                                
87 The Director of the Jeju Olle Foundation used the term “rediscovered” when she explained 
what the Jeju Olle Trail had achieved. 
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Cost Carriers influencing the popularity of Jeju nature (discussed in Chapter 5) and a 
celebrity singer’s migration to the island88.  
 JSSGP state agencies implemented policies to increase the rural population on 
Jeju Island in a way to revitalize the regional economy. Policies included providing 
funds for purchasing farming houses and fields with a 2% interest rate; providing 
information for settling down in Jeju rural villages; and financial support for children’s 
education, farming equipment purchase, and pensions. The Jeju Olle Foundation leader 
also explicitly encouraged migration.  In a chapter from her book titled “Why don’t you 
migrate to Tamna89?,” the leader discusses opinions of Jeju migrants she had met (Seo 
2008: 342-344), an artist and a white-collar middle class man from the mainland. They 
gave up well-established jobs and social relations and came to Jeju Island because they 
were tired of their hectic lives on the mainland. They described Jeju Island as a 
“paradise” (Seo 2008: 342). The artist continued his work based on Jeju nature while 
offering free art lessons to local children. The white-collar man ran a tourist 
accommodation along the coastline near Route 7. The leader wrote that she decided to 
move to Jeju Island after meeting these migrants, with advantages including the 
following:   
                                                
88 A South Korean celebrity migrated to a Jeju rural village. The singer was very popular and 
influential among younger generations through her songs, entertainment, and later social media. 
Images from her everyday life were often disclosed through media and social media, causing the 
younger urban middle class to migrate to Jeju Island for a lifestyle change to enjoy the bucolic 
life. 
89 The name of the independent ancient dynasty of Jeju Island before it was annexed to the 
mainland in 12 CE.  
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Housing costs are one tenth of Seoul’s, and fresh food is everywhere…a coastal 
trail is a free outdoor gym where you can enjoy the best landscape while doing 
weight training and walking. Hospitals, culture centers, health centers, and 
libraries can be reached within 10 to 20 minutes (Ibid.: 343).  
 
 
She ends the chapter by suggesting:  
Why don’t you migrate to Tamna? Why don’t you change your residence to 
heaven while you are still alive? (Ibid.: 344). 
 
 
As the imagery of Jeju nature shifted from exotic and unique to unexplored and 
healing, migration to Jeju Island rapidly increased (Figure 4.5), reinforced by state 
policies and celebrity migration. State agencies and the Jeju Olle Foundation leader 
aimed to increase the island’s population, particularly that of Seogwipo City, to boost the 
dwindling regional economy. 
 
              Figure 4.5 Number of Migration to Rural Areas, Jeju Island: 2008 – 2013 
          
                  Source: Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (2014:17) 
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Capital Flow Reconfiguration  
 
From Excitement to Disappointment 
 As the Jeju Olle Trail gained rapid popularity across the country, tourists rushed 
to Jeju Island to experience mental healing from Jeju nature, which was expected to 
revitalize the dwindling tourism industry of Jeju Island. The Ministry of Culture, Sports, 
and Tourism estimated the production inducement effect caused by the Jeju Olle Trail: 
the number of tourists would increase from 460,000 in 2010 to 1.7 million in 2015, and 
each tourist would bring 550,000 KRW (540 USD) to the economy (MCST 2010: 135-
139). This trend was expected to continue growing.  
 In an attempt to secure villager benefit from tourist spending, the Jeju Olle 
Foundation encouraged rural villagers to open local lodges and restaurants, keeping 
them modest. When the trail was first established, the leader visited a lodge run by a 
grandmother, who was worried that her house was too small and unadorned to host 
tourists. The foundation leader told her that, actually, the simpler the better in attracting 
tourists90. Her ideals on this matter are revealed in her writing: 
… we need to approach like Olle. Like Olle? In a nutshell, ‘as naturally as 
possible.’ Just as we did not construct the Jeju Olle Trail [through concrete and 
heavy equipment], we might as well leave houses untouched. Urban residents, 
tired of asphalt and commercial signs, had a crush on the Jeju Olle Trail that Jeju 
nature was left unrefined. If we open local lodges with Jeju people’s modest life 
styles as they are, tourists would feel much more comfortable…I witnessed 
favorable reactions among tourists about the Jeju Olle Trail, so I was certain that 
the authenticity of Jeju Island is the factor to attract tourists. (Seo 2010:213) 
 
                                                
90 The grandmother’s daughter (I113-V75) offered the story in August 2013. 
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The Jeju Olle Foundation leader applied the principle of naturalness to tourist 
businesses, believing that the plain authenticity of Jeju nature attracted tourists to the 
Jeju Olle Trail because they made them more comfortable, prompting memories about 
what they have lost since childhood and what they lack in their urban lives. To leave 
facilities unrefined and unprocessed, the Jeju Olle Foundation, in collaboration with 
Seogwipo City, only provided local lodges with new wallpaper, beddings, and curtains, 
which maintained old and traditional forms of houses.  
Rural villagers welcomed the Jeju Olle Trail going through their villages due to 
expected economic benefits. For example, village snack shop “S” became a popular 
place to go through mentions on tourist blogs as it was designated the ending point of 
Route 7. And with the rush of tourists, village residents living adjacent to the Jeju Olle 
Trail witnessed that local lodges were fully booked and began to open new businesses to 
benefit from the influx of tourists. Additional income was generated for the Jeju rural 
people who were mostly farmers and fishers. For example, before Route 1 began from 
Shihungli, there were no local lodges. The addition of the trail to the village caused 
seven village households to open lodges. In 2009, a rush of tourists came because a 
popular television program was filmed on the Jeju Olle Trail. Some village households 
renovated or built rooms in farming houses for tourist lodging. These lodges attracted 
tourists through low prices for accommodation and through sincere services. Tourists 
could stay one night with 15,000 KRW (14 USD). Lodge owners also served quality, 
local-style meals at very low prices. A Shihungli lodge owner said that he sometimes 
even took tourists to local karaoke to entertain them. With full lodges, owners sometimes 
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asked their neighbors to host tourists. Local business owners went well out of their way 
to attract Jeju Olle Trail tourists and enjoyed the additional income.  
The capital from tourists directed toward rural villages was enlarged by 
developmental funds from state agencies. Acknowledging the potential of the Jeju Olle 
Trail to boost the regional economy, JSSGP state agencies collaborated with the Jeju 
Olle Foundation to facilitate regional development through the Jeju Olle Trail. More 
specifically, they provided developmental funds for programs designed and implemented 
by the Jeju Olle Foundation (Annex 1). Rural villagers enjoyed the incoming capital 
from these funds as well as from tourist spending.  
The tourist rush had ceased by the time I first visited in summer 2011. Some 
villagers explained it as a result of the foot-and-mouth disease that caused several routes 
to be temporarily closed. Others said that most tourists who wanted to walk along the 
trail had walked the trail at least once since it gained popularity in early 2010. I 
continued visiting the village during summer 2012 and the whole of 2013, during which 
time business at the lodges only worsened. For example, a Village Women Association 
representative spent 20 million KRW (18,000 USD) to renovate a small building of her 
house to open a lodge, expecting to generate additional income as her neighbors had. 
However, by the time the lodge was ready for tourists, visits had declined. She had only 
hosted about 20 guests since opening the business several months before.  
In addition to local lodges, village snack shops also experienced decreasing sales, 
even those that existed before the Jeju Olle Trail was established. The Village Women 
Association representative also initiated a snack shop on the trail, beginning with 15 
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village investors and ending as the only investor. The other investors left bearing losses 
as the business became worse. Tourists’ tendency to spend little during their journey on 
the trail hit the snack shop businesses the worst. I found that six of seven village snack 
shops in the research site were inactive: two were closed (including the one run by the 
representative); and four failed to attract any tourist spending from my view91 (I only 
saw tourists taking rests on benches located in front of the snack shops while drinking 
water and sometimes having snacks that they had in their backpacks). Jeju residents 
complained about this behavior: 
[Olle tourists] are penny-pinchers. They never spend money here. They buy 
snack and water from big marts in the city and come here just to walk” (I40-
V19). 
 
These people [tourists] come to the island with snacks and drinks ready. They 
don’t spend money here” (I108-V71). 
 
The term “penny-pincher” demonstrates Jeju residents’ disappointment with tourists’ 
spending9293. Jeju residents expected tourists to spend generously in rural villages along 
the Jeju Olle Trail, but it turned out that tourists were thrifty enough to bring their own 
drinks and snacks to the trail. Tourists had a tendency to spend less while they walked 
along the trail partly because of the ways in which Jeju nature and villages along the trail 
were imagined. The Jeju Olle Foundation had discursively established an ideal of Jeju 
nature and rural villages as remote and untouched by development endeavors, so tourists 
                                                
91 The 7th snack shop was an exception in terms of worsening businesses among village snack 
shops. The shop became popular as Route 7 ended there. The Jeju Olle Foundation always took 
the shop as an example of the Jeju Olle Trail’s benefit to the regional economy. 
92 Many interviewees expressed this impression about tourists. 
93 The Jeju Olle Foundation has always emphasized a travel pattern that brings minimal impacts 
to the environment. 
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expected that they would not be able to find places to buy drinks or snacks on the trail. A 
previous village leader was disgruntled to report, “[Tourists] expect that there’s nothing 
on the trail. That’s why they prepare everything before they begin to walk.” And without 
tourists’ spending money on the trail, Jeju residents could not economically benefit: 
I can’t say how much [Olle tourists] contribute to my business here. It’s so little 
that almost impossible for me to count” (I52-V26). 
 
I may have to close this snack shop and the lodge that I run in the village (I108-
V71). 
 
 
The discrepancy between Jeju residents’ expectations about tourist spending and 
tourists’ actual spending resulted in disappointment among Jeju residents and posed 
threats to the businesses expecting to generate additional income. Another factor that 
Jeju rural villagers believed to contribute to the loss of their “good time” was the 
decreasing number of tourists visiting villages:  
Good time’s gone now (I86-V55) 
 
Tourists are not coming to the village anyway. About a year ago, they made a 
line to walk the Jeju Olle Trail. I don’t know where all tourists have gone. Maybe 
the days of the [Jeju Olle Trail] ended (I108-V71). 
 
Shifted Capital Accumulation 
While Jeju rural villagers believed that the number of tourists decreased, it 
actually at least maintained through 2013 during the fieldwork (Figure 4.6). In this 
section, I will explain the changing flows of tourists.  
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               Figure 4.6 Number of Jeju Olle Trail Tourists: 2007 – 2013  
 
               Source: Seogwipo City (2014) 
 
 
 Tourists from the mainland urban middle class were enthusiastic about staying at 
local lodges and eating at local restaurants when the Jeju Olle Trail first became popular. 
After that, though, they began to choose guesthouses and cafés located along the Jeju 
Olle Trail over local accommodations. These new forms of tourist accommodations on 
Jeju Island were the alternatives for making a living among migrants from the mainland. 
Since most migrants left their jobs from the mainland, they strived to find ways of 
making a living94. A JSSGP official estimated about 30% of the rapidly increasing 
                                                
94 Jeju migrants in general chose natural and cultural amenities of Jeju Island over economic 
prosperity in cities. Migrants tended to lower their economic expectation when they moved to 
Jeju Island because industrial structures differ between cities and Jeju Island. Jeju Island had a 
much lower proportion of the manufacturing industry and a higher one in the agriculture and 
fisheries industry, which was reversed in cities. Thus, it was difficult for migrants to find similar 
kind of job that they had from cities. Even when they found one, the salaries tended to be lower 
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migrants in Jeju rural areas chose agriculture while the rest ran business such as small 
hotels, guesthouses, and cafés95.  
The typical socio-demographic status of migrants who began new businesses on 
Jeju Island (hereafter “urban entrepreneurs”) was the urban middle class96 from the 
mainland of South Korea. For example, a female math teacher in her mid-30s migrated 
to Shihungli from a satellite city of Seoul with her husband. Other urban entrepreneurs 
whom I met were from mainland cities and had jobs like broadcasting producer, wife of 
a policeman, and cartoon artist. These migrants “moved to Jeju Island after quitting a 
promising job,97” making them white-collar or middle class individuals. 
Urban entrepreneurs typically bought farming houses in rural villages and built 
guesthouses with brand-new facilities, including dining halls and book cafés for tourists’ 
convenience. This form of guesthouse, a combination of guesthouse and café or western-
style restaurant, was increasingly common on Jeju Island by 2011 and more so in 2013. 
The math teacher migrant and her husband bought land on a village lane and built a 
guesthouse and an Italian restaurant. The guesthouse boasted nice facilities such as air 
conditioning, shower rooms, and clean beds and beddings. Another Shihungli guesthouse 
had two buildings used for dormitory-type accommodations for men and women. A café 
next to the guesthouse had a decent interior, although it was small with three or four 
tables in it. It was used a place for socializing among the tourists staying at the 
                                                                                                                                           
because overall income level was lower on Jeju Island than cities. Many migrants opened 
guesthouses and cafés that they could begin without particular skills. 
95 2015 February 6, Hangyerae  
96 Specific characteristics in Chapter 5. 
97 2015 March 28, OhMyNews 
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guesthouse. Tourists interacted with each other having breakfast or beer at the café, 
sharing their experiences and information about routes of the Jeju Olle Trail and 
acquiring company for walking the trail.  
Guesthouse owners and employees98 brought popular, often foreign, cultural 
trends from the mainland, mostly Seoul, to Jeju Island. They incorporated the trends in 
food, beverages, interiors, and services. Taking an example from my observation at a 
guesthouse, the walls of the guesthouse buildings were painted with characters from a 
western tale, the “Wizard of Oz.” The guesthouse provided continental-style breakfast 
and sometimes barbecue parties at night upon tourists’ demand. One morning, I stopped 
by the guesthouse gathering room before heading for the Jeju Olle Trail and saw two 
women tourists sitting on barstools at the café counter. A barista stood over the counter 
in a black shirt and black pants; he was explaining to the tourists about different kinds of 
coffee as they watched coffee brew from a Dutch device. Accommodations like this 
catered to the mainland urban middle class with decent facilities, tourist socialization, 
and opportunities for cultural exploration of foreign cultures99. 
Tourists were satisfied with the facilities and services provided by the 
guesthouses. They expressed satisfaction about the amenities provided; e.g., one female 
college student said:  
                                                
98 They used a Seoul accent and wore liberal styles such as short pants, long skirts, and tank tops 
that I would not expect to find in rural villages of Jeju Island. Rural villagers wore more 
conservative-style clothes, such as long sleeves and long pants convenient for agricultural and 
fisheries labor. Guesthouse workers’ ages ranged from late 20s to early 40s. Their attitudes 
seemed confident instead of worrying about tourists’ satisfaction about facilities. 
99 Which was only available in large cities in South Korea including, but not exclusively, Seoul, 
Incheon, and Busan. 
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I’ve stayed at several guesthouses through this travel. The guesthouses are clean 
and cool. Some guesthouse runners provide fieldtrip to near mountains everyday 
early in the morning. I have fun here (I27-T6). 
 
 
Tourists particularly enjoyed the “new culture” of the guesthouses along the Jeju Olle 
Trail. The tourist went on: 
I like this new culture of guesthouse. I felt unsafe when I traveled other 
provinces, because I had to spend nights at motels or lodges [not like in 
guesthouses on Jeju Island]. Of course, Jeju nature is so beautiful. My friend 
recommended me to visit the Jeju Olle Trail…. I decided to come because I 
heard many tourists are coming alone here to the Jeju Olle Trail and staying at 
guesthouses, interacting with each other. I went to the barbecue party last night, 
and I scheduled today’s trail with other oppa [elder brother] and unni [elder 
sister] that I met there. They are very nice to me, and I heard that many people 
[tourists of the Jeju Olle Trail] still keep contact with each other after going back 
home in Seoul. I think we will be like that, too (Ibid.). 
 
 
As she described, tourists enjoyed foreign culture amenities like barbecue parties100 and 
the resultant socialization with other tourists, going so far as to call each other “oppa” 
and “unni101.” Furthermore, the environment of socialization made them believe that 
guesthouses were safe compared to other tourist facilities such as motels and lodges. The 
new type of services provided by migrant accommodations provided to the mainland 
urban middle class safety, a new culture of tourism, and quality of tourism. 
These facilities and cultural attractions provided by urban entrepreneurs sharply 
contrasted with those provided by Jeju rural entrepreneurs. I stayed at one of two rooms 
                                                
100 Koreans use the term “barbecue party” borrowed from English. It is written “바베큐파티” in 
Korean. Barbecue party in South Korea has a nuance of foreign culture in terms of the ways to 
grill meats, use of utensils etc. 
101 Korean women widely use the terms “oppa” and “unni” regardless of age groups. They use 
the terms for intimately referring to older males and females, respectively. 	
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at a local lodge in summer 2011, and my experience illustrates why local 
accommodations were not viable compared to those of urban entrepreneurs. First, the 
types of meals differed: one had Korean traditional-style and one had foreign-style. On 
the first day of my stay at a rural accommodation, the woman running the lodge asked 
me if I wanted to have dinner from her house. I agreed, and she brought my Korean-style 
dinner to her living room. It was good and cheap. Tourists traveling to experience nature 
and culture different from home would not have been attracted to this style of food. 
Second, the environment was different: one had village hosts and observers and one had 
socialization among tourists. For dinner at the rural lodge, I sat at the center of the living 
room floor while the lodge owner’s neighbors sat at the corner. I felt rather awkward 
being surrounded by the village women, who were curiously staring or glancing at me 
until I finished dinner. Afterward, I went back to my room, the only guest that day. 
Being in this type of environment contrasted with that of the guesthouses, where tourists 
freely and casually interacted with each other over beer and food. Third, facilities 
differed: one had conventional facilities long used as farming households and one had 
brand-new facilities laid out for accommodations. In my room in the rural lodge, there 
was a fan, but it was not enough to provide cool air for a tired tourist in the hot and 
humid climate of the island. Bugs and mosquitoes often interrupted my sleep during the 
night. The room’s unpleasant condition sharply contrasted with the amenities I enjoyed 
at guesthouses. Lastly, tourist accommodations run by rural and urban entrepreneurs 
differed in terms of safety, as the female tourist mentioned. While I was staying at the 
local lodge, the husband of the female rural entrepreneur stayed at home alone during 
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days. As the only guest at the lodge, I felt unsafe in the room during these times. I felt 
safe when I stayed at guesthouses, though, because the rooms were separated by gender, 
and there were always people in the guesthouse, whether employees or guests. As an 
urban mainlander tourist, my experience of local lodges was unfavorable overall, and the 
experiences contrasted with the tourist accommodations run by urban entrepreneurs.  
Tourist accommodations run by mainland urban middle class migrants are often 
located on the Jeju Olle Trail among farming houses, so competition between 
guesthouses and rural lodges is direct. For example, the “Legend of OZ” guesthouse and 
the Italian restaurant guesthouse are located within a 1- to 3-minute walk of the lodge 
run by the Village Women Association representative. While the representative 
struggled with the business, the Italian guesthouse runner said she was very grateful that 
tourists liked the guesthouse and restaurant. Rooms were fully booked during summer 
2013. Urban entrepreneurs clearly won the competition.  
As sales decreased, rural entrepreneurs gained anxiety. The Village Women 
Association representative said that she was happy for the migrants’ success in business, 
but her facial expression looked more confused than happy. What explains the 
inconsistency between the woman’s representative’s facial expression (confused) and 
what she said about her feeling (happy)? On one hand, she felt nervous about outsider 
intrusion to the village. She also felt jealous of the migrants for having better tourist 
accommodation businesses. She might even have felt that their entry to the village 
tourism market, moreover in her close neighborhood, threatened her own business. On 
the other hand, she had to be diplomatic. As a representative of a Village Women 
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Association, she had to be cautious expressing her personal feelings toward me, an 
outsider examining the Jeju Olle Trail. Rural villagers felt their businesses threatened 
because urban entrepreneurs intruded on their territories and excelled in the same market 
(even if the rural entrepreneurs tried to hide their feelings).  
 
Adapting to Urban Middle Class Tastes 
 Jeju rural entrepreneurs had to implement changed business environments caused 
by the transition of tourist flow from rural to urban entrepreneurs. Rural entrepreneurs 
attempted to adapt to increased competition due to migrant influx through (1) quitting 
the tourist business and returning to agriculture and fisheries for livelihoods; (2) turning 
to long-term stay lodges and lowering prices; and (3) competing with urban 
entrepreneurs by imitating them in an effort to cater to urban middle class tastes. 
My assumption in examining the strategies employed by Jeju rural entrepreneurs 
is that catering to urban middle class tastes determined the success of urban 
entrepreneurs and caused Jeju rural entrepreneurs to struggle. This assumption stems 
from my stay at a local lodge in January 2013, at which time the owner was struggling 
with business. Even though it had been renovated, the lodge was still traditional Korean-
style. When I revisited the lodge in summer 2013, there were paintings on the wall, and 
several young tourists were resting in the yard. Villagers informed me that the lodge 
owner rented the lodge to a migrant, who changed the interior and decorations of the 
lodge to guesthouse-style. After that, tourists returned, proving that urban middle class 
taste makes the difference in business between urban and rural entrepreneurs on Jeju 
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Island. Based on this assumption, I discuss below the strategies adopted by rural 
entrepreneurs to adapt to the changed business environment. 
 Some rural residents adapted to the environment by simply giving up additional 
income derived from running local lodges or restaurants on the Jeju Olle Trail. Most 
local lodges targeting Jeju Olle Trail tourists actually shut down by the time I collected 
data in 2013. For example, one day I entered a house located on an inner village lane of 
Shihungli. The house gate had a local lodge sign, but I opened the door to find a young 
man lying on the living room floor, giving me the impression that I was an unexpected 
stranger to the house. He informed me that his parents used to run the lodge but were in 
the field for agriculture then. I ran across a similar situation when I interviewed a 
previous Shihungli village leader. The leader’s lodge had been relatively well known as 
tourists posted their experiences on online blogs and the Jeju Olle Foundation leader had 
written about it. As tourists increased, he built a couple more rooms within his house to 
expand the sales from increased guests. But when I interviewed him at his house, there 
was no sign of tourists staying there and he looked distressed, saying that he had to go 
out to the field. He was going out because he knew that no guests would be coming to 
stay there. His business was not viable anymore. Like this one, many local lodges that 
invested capital and labor to initiate a tourism business gave up the business as 
customers drastically decreased.  
 Other Jeju villagers attempted to adapt to the changed environment by changing 
their business. For example, some local lodges turned to extended-stay setups, where 
guests stayed and paid rent on a monthly basis that was lower than what tourists had paid 
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on a daily basis. Demand was sporadic for this type of stay102, so the additional income 
was less than what they had generated from Jeju Olle Trail tourists. A grandmother had 
begun a local lodge as the Jeju Olle Foundation encouraged her. Her neighbor who 
worked for the lodge for months (I4-V4) told me that the grandmother made more than a 
couple million KRW (thousand USD) around 2010. When I visited the grandmother’s 
lodge in 2013, there were no tourists staying there. The grandmother showed me a room 
and asked for 500,000 KRW (450 USD) for monthly payment, saying that there were 
sailors who would want the room and would pay higher rent (I assumed this was a 
marketing strategy). Through the grandmother’s lodge and two other extended-stay 
lodges, I learned that tourists no longer stayed at local lodges. Instead, sailors, 
researchers, or new migrants sporadically stayed at them for temporary housing. Local 
lodge runner income, therefore, significantly decreased. 
 Although Jeju rural entrepreneurs were indirectly forced to give up benefits from 
Jeju Olle Trail tourists in the process of adapting to the changed business environment, 
the last group stayed in the tourism business, risking competition with urban 
entrepreneurs from the mainland. The existing local tourist business owners employed 
strategies to increase competitiveness: utilizing, mimicking, and learning knowledge 
about the urban middle class from the mainland. 
                                                
102 I do not mean either that local lodges were full everyday all year round. There were seasonal 
fluctuations. Nonetheless, neighboring villagers agreed that the lodge runners made significant 
money (I4-V4; I50-V24; I48-V22). At the same time, though, villagers used the past tense such 
as “once,” demonstrating that lodge runners’ businesses of extended-stay guests (three of seven 
guesthouses in Shihungli) were inactive. I also witnessed the inactiveness during my stay at one 
of the three lodges for a month.  
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 First, Jeju residents utilized labor and knowledge of the mainlanders familiar 
with the urban middle class. For example, Wolpyong renovated a building located on the 
Jeju Olle Trail103 that had previously been used by the Village Association for selling 
agricultural products. The association decided to renovate the building into a café to 
generate additional income for villagers, based on the persuasion of a young female 
novelist from the mainland. The novelist embarked on the renovation by bringing young 
artists, including photographers, painters, a cook, public project artists, and a traveler to 
the village from the mainland. The artists decided to participate because they expected 
solid income and places to stay on Jeju Island as they planned to migrate there. The 
artists were seriously committed to the renovation using their specialties. After the 
renovation was completed, the café was decorated with candles, wooden tables, 
Wolpyong village–related brochures, and flowers. Menus included Jeju local food and 
beverage (e.g., Jeju oranges) modified to cater the urban middle class. After awhile, the 
villagers and young artists began to conflict over menus and work ethic, and young 
artists including the novelist left the village. The vacancies of café workers whose 
salaries were provided by the provincial government were filled with villagers. As such, 
rural entrepreneurs made use of external labor and knowledge in an effort to equip their 
tourism businesses with urban middle class tastes.  
Another strategy that Jeju rural entrepreneurs adopted to increase 
competitiveness was imitating urban entrepreneurs. Jeju Olle Trail Route 6 passed 
                                                
103 I closely witnessed the renovation process because I used the building as my base for data 
collection from Wolpyong.  
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through a coastal line of a rural village called Bophwan104. On the trail, two snack shops 
were located next to each other, with a village lane located in the middle. I entered the 
snack shops one by one and interviewed the owners. The female owner of the shop on 
the right was in her mid-40s and had lived on Jeju Island for her whole life. She said that 
her sister transferred the shop ownership after making significant money from it in 2011. 
Once she took it over in 2012, though, she failed to generate the income that she 
expected. She was dissatisfied with tourists who made the restroom dirty and wasted 
water and toilet paper while spending little money at her snack shop. On the other hand, 
the female migrant owner of the snack shop on the left said that the business was fine. 
She also ran a guesthouse from the second floor of the snack shop building. In her late 
20s, she had little to report in terms of troubles experienced since beginning the business 
a couple years earlier. When I was about to finish the short interview (about 15 minutes), 
she hesitantly reported about “nothing important”:  
Oh, there’s one thing… It’s nothing important or anything, but…neighboring 
snack shops like the one at the next-door watch how I do here and follow 
whatever I try. I don’t know why they do that, but it bothers me a little (I87-M3). 
 
 
Then the young migrant took an example. She introduced popular bread called “Olle 
Bread” in her snack shop, and it became a best seller. Soon after, the migrant found that 
                                                
104 Bophwan is beyond the research scope. However, I included it in the chapter considering its 
significance to the argument of the chapter. In fact, my research scope is loosely defined. I lived 
everyday lives as a temporary migrant for a year on Jeju Island. The region where I stayed was 
moreover not one of the research sites. However, I was almost always focused on Jeju Olle Trail, 
even during my everyday life. Thus, along with the data collection process in the research sites, 
what I learned through everyday life significantly contributed my understanding about people, 
culture, and nature of Jeju Island, and its relation with the Jeju Olle Trail.  
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the snack shop next door was also selling it. She did not think to mention what bothered 
her until the last minute, but someone copying her was important enough to include. It 
was important for the urban entrepreneur even though she said that she was unaware of 
“why they do that” because she felt that the behavior could threaten her business. Facing 
direct competition, Jeju rural entrepreneurs observed how urban entrepreneurs ran 
tourism businesses105 and imitated them because as members of the urban middle class 
themselves, the mainland entrepreneurs had better knowledge and sense about the ways 
to attract tourists from their same demographic group.  
The last strategy that Jeju rural entrepreneurs adopted was to learn skills to meet 
the demands from the urban middle class. As cafés were established to cater to urban 
middle class tastes, rural entrepreneurs fell into a position where they “had to” acquire 
the skills to satisfy tourists. Rural entrepreneurs “learned” the “secrets” of making 
“good” or “Dutch” coffee from the urban middle class who were willing to teach the 
skills. A villager barista of the renovated Wolpyong village café and a village official of 
Murung 2 li said: 
I learned this from [the traveler]. He said that the secret was to pour only some 
drops of water first and pour the rest of water after 30 seconds. You can’t pour all 
water at once, because coffee taste would not be good if you do that (I102-V65). 
 
                                                
105 The specific example from the snack shops can be generalized to tourism businesses in 
discussing mimicking as marketing strategies, because two of four rural village associations 
began to run guesthouses to generate the funds for village affairs. The guesthouse concept was 
foreign to Jeju residents until mainland urban entrepreneurs increasingly opened them on Jeju 
Island. One of the two guesthouses run by village associations had facilities belonging to the 
imported guesthouses in terms of characteristics, such as bunk beds in rooms, a dining hall in the 
middle, and brand-new shower facilities. 
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I didn’t know what Dutch coffee was before, let alone how to make it. I just 
made some here in the café because I had to, but it wasn’t good, of course. [An 
entrepreneur who closely supported the village] tasted the coffee that I made and 
gave me some tips to make good Dutch coffee. I tasted the coffee that he made, 
and it was totally different. I think now I know how to make a good Dutch coffee 
(I73-V46). 
 
 
After relying on fisheries and agriculture in their rural life, these villagers took on the 
job of making gourmet coffee to target urban middle class tourists and generate income. 
The villager baristas looked like job trainees due to their serious and careful attitudes in 
making coffees. The inconsistency between what rural entrepreneurs faced in tourism 
businesses and what they had expertise in lowered confidence among them. Jeju rural 
residents could make good traditional Korean foods such as “rice wine” and “rice cake,” 
but they had to work to adopt foreign cultures in tourism businesses. A previous leader 
of Murung 2 li said in an interview: 
[A migrant] took charge of the café. We do not know how to make mainlanders 
laugh and cry. We are only good at making traditional rice wine or rice cake. We 
are good at those (I67-V41). 
 
 
By “laugh” and “cry,” the village leader meant attracting tourists through catering to 
them based on knowledge of their preferences and deficiencies. Even though Jeju rural 
villagers were confident about their culture, they were less so that of the clientele. 
Lacking skills resulted in poor sales. I visited Wolpyong village café in winter 
2013 when I completed the fieldwork. The menu had changed to sushi and noodles, 
representative street foods of South Korea. Outside the café, an employee was selling 
fish bread, also a representative South Korean street food. There were remnants of the 
urban middle class in the interior, but the location had instead become a snack shop for 
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villagers lacking cash to spend. Jeju rural villagers failed to receive expected return from 
their efforts to generate additional income from Jeju Olle Trail tourists. Only feelings of 
deprivation and inadequacy were left for the villagers.  
 
From Ethnography to the Coproduction of Scale and First Nature 
The process in which the Jeju Olle Trail was established was highly political. 
The contentious and political coproduction of scale and nature was the key thread over 
which actors of the Jeju Olle Trail governance struggled. The Jeju Olle Foundation 
shifted spatial distribution of tourist destinations (production of scale) and reframed Jeju 
nature on the shifted scale as authentic (production of first nature). The coproduction of 
scale and nature contributed to the Jeju Olle Trail being imagined as resolving the social 
deprivations caused by the South Korean developmental state, namely rural and urban 
uneven development and lost composure among the urban middle class due to the 
excessively competitive environment of the society. The discourse about what the 
coproduction of scale and nature offered to the South Korean society largely appealed to 
the urban middle class. The urban middle class, the source of economic, and thus 
political, power in the Jeju tourism industry began to strongly support the Jeju Olle 
Foundation. Public support strengthened the Jeju Olle Foundation’s power in making 
decisions regarding the Jeju Olle Trail. As the power structure was reconfigured toward 
the Jeju Olle Foundation, other actors such as provincial state agencies and rural 
villagers reoriented themselves within the power regime while attempting to influence 
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the simultaneous production of scale and nature. The Jeju Olle Foundation’s power in 
making decisions regarding the Jeju Olle Trail was consolidated as a result.  
The outcome of the political coproduction of scale and nature through the Jeju 
Olle Trail was economic and again political. Jeju rural residents strived to participate in 
producing scale and nature to cater to urban middle class tastes and expected the 
generated capital to economically benefit them. However, the particular ways of catering 
to urban middle class tastes through the coproduction of scale and nature resulted in 
reconfiguring political economy at the village level in favor of urban entrepreneurs. 
Attracted by what Jeju nature was imagined to offer and changing other institutional and 
infrastructural conditions, the urban middle class increasingly migrated to Jeju Island 
and participated in the capitalist competition of the tourism industry. They excelled in 
catering to taste because it was their own taste, and capital generation ceased for Jeju 
rural entrepreneurs. Complicated political processes of competition began as rural 
entrepreneurs were involved in cooperating, mimicking, and learning to supplement 
deficiencies of certain factors of capitalist production such as labor (knowledge) and 
capital, which belonged to the urban middle class. Cooperation among classes soon 
turned into conflicts over the capital derived from the outcome of the cooperation. Thus, 
rescaling the production of first nature brought about not only the shift of capital 
mobility, but also class struggles over deploying factors for capitalist production (labor 
and capital) from the produced nature among each other. Jeju rural entrepreneurs, 
although ending up marginalized, were savvy enough to seek ways to take benefits from 
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the dynamically shifting environment of political economy due to the coproduction of 
scale and the first nature. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Relying on the scholarship of respective and simultaneous production of scale 
and nature, particularly on the eco-scalar fix incorporated with extended temporal scales, 
this chapter demonstrates that longitudinal examination enables us to see the continual 
marginalization of Jeju people through shifting ways of the production of the first nature 
and scale. In other words, locating the rescaled Jeju nature in the historical context of 
Jeju Island in terms of how it has been used for economic development reveals that the 
alternative way of tourism development only exacerbated regional disparities and 
environmental destruction. Mainlanders’ exploitation of Jeju people and Jeju nature 
since the Chosun Dynasty has been extended through the developmental state’s nature-
based tourism development and the establishment of the Jeju Olle Trail. The 
coproduction of scale and nature was critical in extending the marginalization because it 
set the stage (generated capital flows and channeled capital circulations) for political and 
economic struggles in favor of a particular class.  
 In conclusion, the Jeju Olle Trail case demonstrates that the historical enquiry 
incorporating eco-scalar fix is a useful analytical framework in articulating political and 
economic reconfiguration caused by discursive and material rescaling processes of using 
natural resources. Examining emerging landscapes of Jeju Island adopting the eco-scalar 
  166 
fix also provides insight on the neoliberal shift of a regional development pattern on Jeju 
Island, considering (1) the retreat of the state’s role as a political and economic arbitrator 
in regional development; (2) increasingly and persistently evolving forms of 
commodificaiton (and value) of first nature; and (3) significantly increased contribution 
of migrants’ private capital to the emergent landscapes. 
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CHAPTER V 
COMPETING OWNERSHIP OVER TRANSITIONING RURAL LANDSCAPES 
IN A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY  
 
Introduction 
 
 
Olle Tourists can come and enjoy this place, they really don’t have to report (to state 
agencies) when there’s something that they are uncomfortable about. But they just 
did right away. Tourists filed civil complaints saying that there was clutter at the 
coast. I was fined several times. [Tourists] actually messed the trail up here by 
defecating everywhere! This is how we, Jeju people, live our lives. I don’t know why 
tourists see these things that we need for livelihoods and everyday lives negatively. 
Other [tourists] complain [to] us that farm roads are paved, saying Olle trail 
shouldn’t be like that. They think the Olle trail as theirs! (I49-V23) 
 
This quote about the Jeju Olle Trail, given in summer 2013 by a disgruntled ship 
repairman who ran a shop along the coast in Shihungli, illustrates the ongoing conflict 
over landscape106 representations in the recent rural landscape transition of South Korea. 
As demand has increased among the South Korean urban middle class for rural scenic 
beauty, environmental and aesthetic ideas have competed with, and sometimes 
overridden, the idea about rural landscape as being a mere outcome of production 
activities. This chapter examines landscape transitioning in purpose from a mere 
outcome of traditional production activities, like agriculture and fisheries, to an object 
for tourism due to the preconceived idea of anti-modernism embedded in natural and 
                                                
106 Landscape is defined collective images of different land uses determined through power 
struggles over access and control of the images. 
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cultural landscapes. More specifically, through examining mixed and conflict-laden 
interactions among landscape viewers, the chapter determines processes and outcomes of 
class struggles over the ownership107 of rural landscapes in South Korea, a newly 
industrialized country (NIC). 
South Korea, like other NICs such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, has achieved rapid 
economic growth in recent decades. Its population demonstrates an explosive demand 
for rural landscapes as places for leisure and alternative ways of life. For leisure, urban 
residents have increasingly chosen trekking within rural landscapes108, and some have 
even migrated to rural villages after living in cities for about three decades since the 
rapid urbanization of South Korea. These urban residents perceive rural landscapes as 
nature and culture unaltered by development, while rural long-term residents perceive 
them as simply the backdrop of their traditional production activities. Short-term 
residents (or tourists) and long-term residents in rural South Korea tend to conflict due to 
these differing perceptions about what rural landscapes should look like, as the ship 
repairman’s concerns highlight. After the interactions of these social groups, rural 
landscapes may look the same as they ever did, but the ideas embedded in them are 
                                                
107	The struggles over landscape ownership entail class conflicts over both representational and 
material landscapes in this chapter. While representational landscape means how landscape is 
imagined as an abstraction, material landscape indicates concrete, visible, and touchable 
components of landscape such as stones, plants, fences etc. Determining representational and 
material landscapes are inextricably intertwined processes. ‘Landscape ownership’ in this 
chapter is defined as the entitlement to define landscape representations, to decide material 
components of landscapes, and to enjoy landscapes that are formed through the reiterating 
interaction of representations and material components of landscape.	
108 2015 September 25, Kyonghyong Biz N Life 
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significantly contested and shifting as a result. As landscape representations shift, 
political, economic, and cultural reconfiguration of an NIC’s rural societies ensues.  
This chapter employs what has been learned from both the First and Third World 
regarding the relationship between landscape and social struggles. And while the studies 
provide useful insights, neither First nor Third World political ecologies address the 
problems with shifting the definition of rural landscape because of increased demand. 
Because NICs have achieved rapid economic growth in recent decades, different paces 
of historical and socioeconomic development have been demonstrated. What is specific 
to NICs in how social groups struggle over landscape representation and in how the 
interactions are materially reflected in rural landscapes?  
The chapter examines and relies on insights gained by political ecologists and 
cultural geographers interested in the social dynamics of landscape change, particularly 
in examining the specifics of landscape transition in NICs. It explores the processes in 
which rural landscape ownership is determined through class struggles. Jeju Island in 
South Korea that experiences a rapid transition of rural landscapes, both in 
representations and materiality, due to increasing demand for rural amenities from the 
public. This chapter will examine the processes and outcomes of contested property 
rights over rural landscapes on Jeju Island among Jeju rural villagers, tourists, and the 
Jeju Olle Foundation. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses NIC applications from First 
and Third World cases examined by political ecologists regarding struggles over 
landscape access and control. It then discusses the ways in which landscape studies 
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under cultural geography could offer insights to the political ecology of landscapes in 
NICs. Second, the chapter demonstrates that the Jeju Olle Trail is an urban middle class 
project. Third, relying on landscape studies, the chapter determines discourses entitling 
South Korean urban middle class tourists to intervene in and determine rural landscapes. 
Fourth, the chapter identifies NIC-specific themes of conflict over landscape views 
between urban middle class tourists and local farmers and fishermen. Fifth, the chapter 
determines the outcomes of landscape transition by discussing the changes in NIC-
specific social problems. As a conclusion, the chapter advances the idea of an NICs 
political ecology. 
 
Toward NICs Landscape Political Ecology 
 
Landscape in the Third and First World Political Ecology 
 Before McCarthy (2002) urged political ecologists to turn their attention to the 
First World, political ecologist insights about struggles over landscape access and 
control derived dominantly from the Third World (Neumann 1998, Fairhead and Leach 
1996, Zimmerer 1991). Political ecologists, who share their interests in resource access 
and control determined by broadly defined, multi-scalar political economy (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987, Watts 2000), demonstrate that national elites, international agencies, 
and colonial histories established ideals embedded in landscapes of the Third World. 
Competing representations of landscapes tend to marginalize local people by obliterating 
their labor on landscapes or by impacting local livelihoods. For example, Neumann 
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(1998) examines the colonial history of Arusha National Park in Tanzania and its 
relation to the current state power exercised over the Maru people by denying their 
customary rights to access livelihood sources located in the park. He reveals that the 
state power, in conjunction with international agencies, maintains the western 
construction of Africa established by colonial perspectives. It views African nature as 
distinct from culture. Thus, remnants of local culture such as religion, livelihoods, and 
labor were all erased from the park to conform to western imageries about African 
nature. Even though the park was established as a park to enable the public to enjoy 
natural landscape and to attract foreign tourists, local residents have been 
disenfranchised in the process. Political ecologists demonstrate that constructing 
particular representations and materiality of landscapes is contested and is contingent to 
multi-scalar political economy and histories in the Third World.  
There are commonalities between the Jeju Olle Trail project and cases from the 
Third World, such as national elites’ imposition of landscape ideals (an urban middle 
class view in case of the Jeju Olle Trail) and the disturbance of local livelihoods caused 
by the imposition. However, there also exist important inconsistencies between the Third 
World and the case of the Jeju Olle Trail. First, the disturbance to livelihoods is not as 
severe as in the Third World such that it hampers local subsistence (differing economic 
status). Second, the remnants of colonial histories seem to dominate definitions of rural 
landscapes more in the Third World compared to South Korea. South Korean citizens 
often find the state’s remnants on rural landscapes disturbing (differing historical paths). 
Third, although customary rights do exist in South Korea, property rights are mostly 
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formal rather than informal, impeding arbitrary exercise of state power on properties 
(institutional arrangements). Fourth and most importantly, not all culture was obliterated 
from South Korean rural landscapes. For example, in Neumann’s case, all cultural 
aspects were removed to conform to the western ideal about African nature as primitive. 
On Jeju Island, though, tourists dismissed the materiality reflecting industrial 
development such as paved roads while appreciating the unaltered nature and unpaved 
village lanes on Jeju Island. This difference derives from the fact that ideals about rural 
landscapes are contingent to the socioeconomic, political, and historical paths of 
particular regions (differing landscape ideals as a combination of the above three). These 
differences between the Third World and South Korea hinder our understanding about 
struggles over ideas about rural landscape and its impact on rural residents on Jeju 
Island. Therefore, now I turn to lessons learned from the First World.  
William (1975) sets up a foundation for political ecologists interested in how 
conflicting rural landscape ideals intersect with material changes in the First World by 
examining pervasive ideals of rural landscapes embedded in their increasing public 
demand in England in the 1970s. In doing so, he investigates a long history of romantic 
ideals about the country as opposed to the city, which was also imagined as an archetype 
of social, economic, and political distortions. He argues that the increasing public 
demand for idyllic landscapes of the country in order to escape ugly city development 
stems from the romanticization of rural landscapes obscuring the brutal realities of social 
exclusion and exploitation, prevalent as much in the country as in the city, as well as 
relationships pertaining to landscape ideologies.   
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Relying on William’s seminal work, some political ecologists have responded to 
McCarthy’s call by turning their attention about conflicting ideals of landscapes to the 
First World (Walker and Fortmann 2003, Robbins et al. 2012, Cadieaux et al. 2013). 
They examine conflicts caused by increasing population influx to rural areas in the 
1970s and 1980s and note that particular ideas about rural landscape increasingly 
pursued by urban residents began to generate value. Robbins et al. (2012) explicitly 
demonstrate that rural landscapes generate value, rendering them susceptible to political 
and economic struggles. They examine how an informal collective governance regime in 
rural Montana effectively regulated property developments to lessen externalities to 
landscape quality, yet at the same time, threatened public amenities with deregulation 
tendencies in planning. Robbins et al. (2012) also demonstrate, however, that not all 
rural landscapes generate value, an observation previously written by Williams (1975), 
who notes that only rural landscapes presenting rural qualities unhampered by ugly 
development (thus containing unspoiled natural scenic beauty) are perceived as valuable. 
Only when rural landscapes have those characteristics, they are public resources that 
generate values. Walker and Fortmann articulate this idea, saying, “economic and 
cultural value is being placed…on aesthetic and environmental values109 (such as ‘view 
shed’ or ‘rural quality’)” (2003:471). Rural landscape becomes a resource as it gains 
pursuable value with aesthetic and environmental ideals, instead of as mere outcome of 
traditional rural activities.  
                                                
109	Following Walker and Fortmann, this chapter calls the rural landscape pursued by urban 
residents “aesthetic and environmental landscapes.”	
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The transition of rural landscape from a mere display of rural livelihoods mixed 
with natural backgrounds to a resource causes struggle over access and control among 
resource users. Walker and Fortmann (2003) document such struggles from a case in 
Nevada County, California. Long-term residents and in-migrants conflicted over 
landscape visions of the traditional natural resource–based “production” and aesthetic 
landscape “consumption.” Newcomers wanted to see the environmental and rural 
landscape that drew them to migrate, and long-term residents saw this view of common 
landscape as a threat to their property rights and as a potential hindrance to their 
economic gain deriving from development, growth, and traditional production activities 
occurring on their land. They also felt that the environmental and aesthetic view of 
landscape threatened their identity as a social class relying on traditional ways of making 
a living. Through this piece, Walker and Fortmann (2003) well demonstrate that social 
classes struggle to define how landscapes should look, depending on the perspective of 
the landscape, which engenders political tensions between the classes because social, 
economic, and cultural dominations are at stake.  
These studies from the First World provide useful insights for understanding 
struggles and conflicts on the Jeju Olle Trail. Actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project have 
also struggled over the benefits derived from a particular representation of landscapes, 
i.e., the environmental and aesthetic view of landscapes. At the same time, they have 
also experienced the contested representation of rural landscapes between the traditional 
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“production” view and the aesthetic “consumption” view110. Studies from the First 
World also reveal that the ownership of aesthetic and environmental landscape is 
undefined. For example, Robbins et al. (2012) approach Montana’s landscape as a 
commons from which social actors struggle to take benefits. Walker and Fortmann 
(2003) also argue that undefined landscape ownership renders the ideas of landscapes 
and the subsequent material outcomes particularly contentious because it is hard to 
define the legitimacy of claimants. In addition, landscape is a kind of resource often 
comprising various landholdings, but value lies in the total space rather than the 
individual landholdings (Walker and Fortmann 2003:471), making benefit distribution 
difficult. Defining landscape and distributing benefits become deeply political processes. 
Employing insights gained from First World landscape studies, this chapter examines 
class struggles over access and control of rural landscapes on Jeju Island, focusing on the 
idea that defining landscape ownership is not easy.  
Despite the useful insights from First World cases, they also bear limitations to 
explain social processes over defining landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail. Scholars tend 
to examine ongoing struggles between migrants and long-term residents several decades 
since the migrant influx to the country began (Cadieux 2011, Adam and Gosnell 2011), 
meaning there already had been struggles and adaptations among social groups, 
including contestations on landscape views. So the First World cases might be useful in 
explaining what South Korea will experience in the future after decades of competing 
                                                
110 For the debate on the dichotomy between the landscape representations of production and 
consumption, see Neumann (2011:845). 
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landscape representations, yet they fail to fully explain the conflicts along the Jeju Olle 
Trail that began quite recently (differing economic status and subsequent development of 
the environmental and aesthetic view of landscapes, as William argues). This chapter 
documents the power dynamics created in the initial phase of introducing an 
environmental and aesthetic view of landscape to rural villages. It will therefore broaden 
our understanding of dynamic conflicts over landscapes in different phases. The First 
World cases differ from the South Korean case also because of different social groups 
introducing and practicing the view of landscape. In First World cases, individuals, such 
as people seeking alternative lifestyles or property developers, introduced the view, 
utilized the view, and struggled to realize the view. On the other hand, in South Korea, a 
group of cultural elites introduced the environmental and aesthetic view of landscape 
with support from the state; urban middle class tourists subscribed to the view imposed 
by cultural elites and practiced it on rural landscapes. The idea imposer and idea 
practitioner, then, are not necessarily consistent in the case of the Jeju Olle Trail. 
Differentiating these actors is critical to my argument because it determines the 
subjectivity of the ownership about the environmental and aesthetic landscapes.  
In sum, the shift of rural landscapes in South Korea reflects the socioeconomic 
qualities of both the global north and the global south. More specifically, they face 
demand for economic development (the global south) and environmental and aesthetic 
ideas (the global north) from the same rural landscape. By examining these struggles, 
this study speaks to debates on the false dichotomy of First and Third World political 
ecologies (e.g., Schroeder et al. 2006). It introduces a new "NICs political ecology" of 
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landscape focused on the unique political economic context generating from particular 
struggles between social classes over rural landscapes.  
 
Exclusion and Ownership 
Landscape studies in cultural geography also provide insights about critical 
characteristics of landscape, including exclusion. Cultural geographers view landscape 
as “ways of seeing” (Cosgrove 1985, originated from Berger 1972) or as a “screening 
process.” “Ways of seeing” originated from a bourgeoisie perspective of landscape as 
entertainment. Historically, the components of accumulated histories and labor were 
removed from landscape pictures in order for bourgeoisies to focus on the bucolic 
picturesque beauty of the countryside. Based on this view, cultural geographers have 
examined landscapes as being produced through class struggles and subsequent social 
exclusion. For example, Duncan and Duncan (2001) demonstrate that landscape as an 
aesthetic production, which produced and enhanced social distinction for a suburb of 
New York City. Environmental and aesthetic views on landscape reflected and realized 
the ideologies of planners and bourgeois residents, including anti-urbanism and anti-
modernism, through the zoning process. Landscape as a “screening process” means it 
reflects a particular class ideal and renders it especially conducive to social exclusion. 
Landscape is a “scene” reflecting elite possession and social control of land and erasing 
the real messiness of everyday life that fails to confirm to the class ideal (Mitchell 2003: 
186). Social groups with the potential to contaminate the aesthetic landscapes are 
annihilated from them (Mitchell 2003). Mitchell (2003) demonstrates that homeless 
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people in New York City were banned from public spaces so as not to spoil the intended 
aesthetic landscape. When a public space is interpreted as landscape, filthiness of the 
homeless is the reason to legislate against their presence at public spaces. In this sense, 
“messiness” of certain components of landscapes is defined within a particular society 
context. Here, defining the aesthetic landscape view reflect class ideals simultaneously 
determine the messiness based on its unconformity to the ideals. The social groups 
creating messiness in the landscape (and their behaviors) were removed from it. And 
because of the lack of political power of the excluded groups, resistance was not likely. 
Whether for seeing or screening, landscape definition makes it prone to social exclusion. 
Adopting insights from landscape studies is an already established tradition 
among political ecologists interested in power dynamics over landscapes (following 
Williams 1975, Neumann 1998; Walker and Fortmann 2003; Neumann 2011; Cadieux et 
al. 2013). Political ecologists have shown how particular ways of seeing determine 
social exclusion through screening processes of what is displayed on landscapes initiated 
or facilitated by a multi-scalar political economy, such as state authorities (Braun 1997, 
Fairhead and Leah 1996), international organizations (Neumann 1998), or formal 
(Walker and Hurley 2004, Cadieux et al. 2013) and informal (Robbins et al. 2012) 
decision-making organizations at a local level. Let me revisit the above-discussed 
Neumann (1998) as an example. Neumann examines how landscape studies articulate 
“ways of seeing” as a means for social exclusion (pages 15-25) and incorporates the idea 
in his case study from Tanzania. The colonial bourgeoisie historically established the 
landscape view of Arusha National Park as a primitive and uninhabited nature, and state 
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and international agencies effectively excluded the Maru people by incorporating a 
Western landscape view. Neumann’s study shows that political ecologists have 
demonstrated that political organizations with legal authority or organizational power 
facilitate or enforce landscape screening and subsequent social exclusion. However, how 
individuals or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without any legal authority 
materialize landscape ideals is poorly understood in literature. How do individuals with 
conflicting landscape ideals interact when they encounter? How do individuals claim 
their rights to landscape that derive from others’ property in an effort to materialize their 
views on landscape?  
 A notion specific to landscape from cultural geography, the sense of landscape 
ownership that Lefebvre (1991) suggests, helps answer these questions. Lefebvre 
contends, “the power of a landscape does not derive from the fact that it offers itself as 
spectacle, but rather from the fact that, as mirror and mirage, it presents any susceptible 
viewer with an image at once true and false of the creative capacity which the subject (or 
Ego) is able, during a moment of marvelous self-deception, to claim as his own” (1991: 
189). Williams also discusses the sense of ownership among landscape viewers, using 
the term “landlord” and focusing on his “real invention” of Nature (1975:124). Even 
though agricultural fields and mountains are not their own, landscape viewers such as 
tourists tend to feel a sense of ownership over what they see once the resources are 
viewed as “landscapes.” In other words, landscape uniquely enables viewers to 
transgress legal and customary property rights through self-deception about ownership. I 
would argue that this sense of ownership offers an insight particularly meaningful to 
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political ecologists interested in access to and control of resources. The concept 
particularly informs this chapter because it highlights the contested representations and 
materiality caused by its undefined ownership. I explore how tourists on the Jeju Olle 
Trail acquire a sense of ownership over the Jeju rural landscapes through discourses that 
the Jeju Olle Foundation have produced with the aid of regulative authority of Jeju 
provincial government, as well as how they express this sense in their interactions with 
Jeju people, essentially competing over defining landscapes. Linking the idea of 
screening with the sense of landscape ownership, landscape screening becomes a process 
of materializing the imagined ownership of landscapes. This chapter investigates the 
processes and outcomes in which the urban middle class screened rural landscape along 
the Jeju Olle Trail, focusing on conflicts between the “certified owners” (tourists) of 
landscapes and the “actual owners” (rural residents) of resources derived from the 
landscape. It determines how discourses of NIC social problems resulting from rapid 
economic growth facilitate excluding particular behaviors of rural residents from rural 
landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail.  
By emphasizing struggles over the representation and materiality of landscape at 
the individual scale (face to face), this chapter contributes to amenities landscape 
literature. By doing so, it also responds to Bunce’s (2008) call for exploring how people 
who live and work on shifted rural landscapes experience aesthetic and environmental 
landscape. 
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South Korea, a Newly Industrialized Country 
 
South Korea achieved rapid economic growth under the strong leadership of the 
developmental state. Beginning in the 1960s, the national economy grew annually for 
two decades by 8.4%, earning it the moniker “the miracle of Han River.” Based on this 
growth, South Korea joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1996, and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranked 
30th among 185 countries across the world in 2014 (World Bank database). The growth 
in South Korea can be attributed to the growth-pole strategy, which the developmental 
state employed for efficiency, i.e., achieve maximum industrialization with minimum 
resource input. Developmental plans thus often focused on industrialization in urban 
areas, which simultaneously resulted in urban sprawl.  
Even though the plans successfully brought about rapid economic growth, they 
also caused social problems by prioritizing economic growth focusing on urbanization 
over social welfare and the environment. The problems included, notably, environmental 
degradation and rural-urban uneven development (Cadien and Kim 1990, Eder 1996). 
The South Korean public believed that urban residents suffered from environmental 
degradation, such as lacking green space and poor air and water quality caused by rapid 
urbanization (Choi 1997). The public also believed that infrastructure and living 
standards in rural areas lagged behind urban areas for having been excluded and only 
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used111 to facilitate industrialization without any returns, despite the government’s 
expanded spending for rural social and economic development. Once the developmental 
state achieved rapid economic growth through a strong industrialization drive through 
the 1980s, the South Korean government invested significantly in rural areas for 
infrastructure improvement and boosting the rural economy, spending 2 billion USD 
from 1992 to 2013 (Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, cited from Lee 
2011:4). This spending was relatively large considering its proportion in the national 
budget compared to other countries. 6.7% was spent for boosting the Agriculture and 
Fisheries industry in South Korea, while 2.7% and 3.6% were spent in the United States 
and Japan (2006). However, as a result of rapid urbanization and marginalized rural 
economy, the South Korean rural society has continued to experience unfavorable social 
and economic conditions relative to urban residents. The ratio of rural household income 
over urban household income decreased from 80.1% in 1998 to 66% in 2009, and the 
number of houses built 25+ years ago in rural areas was recorded at five times more than 
in urban areas (Lee 2011: 12).  
South Koreans perceive that the tendency of the developmental state to pursue 
rapid economic growth still remains. This feeling includes the tourism industry, which 
has been criticized for focusing only on numbers of tourists and tourist facilities rather 
than on quality of experience. The public regarded this quantitative approach to resemble 
the ways in which the country achieved industrialization and modernization, caring only 
                                                
111 For example, the Low Crop Policy implemented by the developmental state (1960s) enabled 
the urban economy to structurally exploit the rural economy by maintaining low crop prices. 
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about quantitative growth of the economy. Thus, demand increased in the 2000s for 
improved quality of leisure experiences (Lee 2008: 500-501), as did public demand for 
alternative tourism, such as unaltered nature and social intimacy, often imagined as 
typical characteristics of rural areas. 
Since 2007, the Jeju Olle Trail project has gained increasing popularity112 among 
the South Korean public because of the ideals incorporated in the rural landscapes of 
Jeju Island. By enabling tourists to access to the previously unintroduced natural and 
cultural landscapes of Jeju Island, the Jeju Olle Foundation spiked urban residents’ 
nostalgia about rural intimacy and nature, which were claimed to be lost in South Korea 
since its economic growth and rampant infrastructure establishment. The Jeju Olle Trail 
landscapes were claimed to provide alternatives to the tourism industry by retrieving 
nature and social intimacy lost in the process of rapid industrialization and 
modernization (Chapter 4). 
 
The Jeju Olle Trail: Village-Level Politics Over Property Rights 
 
Rural Villages on the Landscape of the Jeju Olle Trail 
The Jeju Olle Foundation designed the Jeju Olle Trail to encircle Jeju Island, 
passing along coastal lines, over small mountains, and along village lanes. In rural 
                                                
112 By this time, the advent of Low Cost Carrier (LCC) in South Korea facilitated domestic 
travels. Jeju Island, which lost its reputation as a tourist destination due to increased foreign 
travels, most benefitted from the LCCs. The LCCs lowered flight fare from the mainland to Jeju 
Island by more than half (prices dropped to about 50,000 KRW (45 USD) from about 110,000 
KRW (100 USD).  
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villages particularly, the Jeju Olle Trail passes along farm roads among agricultural 
fields and greenhouses, over small mountains used as cow pastures, and through 
residential areas (Figure 5.1).  
In Shihungli (Route 1), the Jeju Olle Trail begins at the intersection of a farm 
road and a village road. Route 1 continues on a farm road about 1-meter wide toward 
two small mountains. Pastures and agricultural fields of Shihungli villagers are located 
on the mountains. The trail continues to the coastline of the village after passing through 
a neighboring village. In Woodo (Route 1-1), the Jeju Olle Trail encircles the island. It 
passes along the coast, where many restaurants, farm roads, and residential areas are 
located and where female divers plunge into the sea to catch abalones and shells. The 
Jeju Olle Trail located in Wolpyong (Route 7) passes through the village port and the 
coastline on farm roads between orange and flower greenhouses (gray shiny rectangles 
on the map) and on village lanes scattered with several houses. Lastly, in Murung 2 li, 
the Jeju Olle Trail passes through farm roads between large garlic and orange fields and 
village lanes among rural houses.  
By passing through corners of Jeju rural villages, the Jeju Olle Trail enables 
people to visit unexplored areas by tourists, being that they include residential areas and 
locations for fisheries and agriculture. Walking along the Jeju Olle Trail located on 
village lanes and coastlines, tourists can communicate with rural villagers and learn how 
people on Jeju Island live every day, along with enjoying scenic beauty that has not been 
“processed” for tourists, diverging from the tourist destinations established during the 
country’s development and modernization era. 
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Figure 5.1 Village Land Uses Along the Jeju Olle Trail 
1.Shihungli:
Route 1 
2. Woodo:
Route 1-1 
3.Wolpyong:
Route 7 
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4. Murung 2
li: Route 12 
* The Jeju Olle Trail in pink lines.
Source: http://map.daum.net, Kakao Corporation 
The rural villagers encountered by Jeju Olle Trail tourists have been dominated 
by those over 50-years-old with an average household income of 37,700 USD in 2014 
(Korean Statistical Information Service). This average income is higher than the national 
average (30,900 USD), but their average household debt at 48,000 USD is double the 
national average (24,600 USD), demonstrating the highly unstable status of the Jeju rural 
economy.  
Village-level Politics 
When the Jeju Olle Trail was established, rural villages adjacent to the trail 
received opportunities to generate income by hosting tourists (Chapter 4). The economic 
expectation of rural villagers made the Jeju Olle Foundation’s job of establishing the 
trail easy, despite the fact that about 30% of the Jeju Olle Trail was on privately owned 
Figure 5.1 Continued
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property113. Many village representatives on Jeju Island began to compete with each 
other to locate the trail in their villages because of the expectation to receive economic 
benefits. Furthermore, for village leaders, adopting the Jeju Olle Trail in their villages 
was a good chance to improve their performance as a village representative because their 
achievements were often measured by the number of developmental projects they won, 
such as building and renovating village halls. Reputation within a village was critical to 
village leaders in South Korea, particularly in rural villages on Jeju Island originating 
from kinship-based relationships. Indeed, about a half the village leaders that I 
interviewed (total of nine) mentioned that their villagers’ opinion about their 
performance mattered to them, so they tried to win as many developmental projects as 
possible. Adopting the Jeju Olle Trail in their villages was critical from an economic and 
political standpoint.  
In trying to adopt the trail, village representatives made mistakes in that they did 
not necessarily request every property owner’s permission to allow public access to the 
private lands along the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation also committed similar 
mistakes when it established the trail based on information provided by village leaders. 
Thus, many property owners reported that there was no prior notice or process to 
persuade or inform them of the trail passing through private lands; some were not even 
aware that their lands were included in the trail. However, the Jeju Olle Foundation 
publicized that it spent significant time and efforts in meeting with and persuading 
                                                
113 A 2011 estimation of Seogwipo City (Source: A report of Seogwipo City, titled, “The Status 
of Private properties on the Jeju Olle Trail”) 
  188 
private property owners along the Jeju Olle Trail to allow tourist access114 (Ahn 2009). 
 The foundation also claimed its efforts to minimize the negative impact of 
tourists walking along agricultural fields, pastures, and other private landholdings. For 
example, it claimed it put signs on privately owned lands for tourists’ caution and 
annually compensated property owners for economic loss from not being able to 
cultivate fields holding the trail. Village leaders and the Jeju Olle Foundation hastened 
the Jeju Olle Trail project in rural villages because they lacked awareness of property 
rights and were eager for performance, resulting in private properties being included in 
the trail without owner consent. 
For the cases in which the Jeju Olle Foundation exploring team did obtain 
property owner permissions, it utilized strong social ties among Jeju natives and at the 
village level. Once the team decided the potential path of a new route, it inquired with 
property owners through social ties, as said by the exploring team leader:  
We then ask around about property owners’ names and villages. With those, we 
can easily contact owners through social ties [across Jeju Island], like 
somebody’s brother, or somebody’s village uncle (I77-F2).  
 
 
When contacted, property owners tended to orally permit public access because of the 
strong social ties. 
While the competition for potential economic benefits among village leaders 
facilitated private land inclusion in the Jeju Olle Trail, village-level social pressure 
                                                
114 There seemed to be a growing awareness of the property rights issue within the Jeju Olle 
Foundation through trial and error because it checked with property owners in establishing 
routes at a later phase. 
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caused by economic expectations contributed to parts of the trail remaining on private 
lands. Since villagers enjoyed economic benefits from the influx of tourists for at least a 
year (refer to Chapter 4 for details), property owners faced criticism from their neighbors 
for being selfish when they attempted to eliminate the trail from their lands. For 
example, a rancher asked the municipal government to provide him with incentives for 
using his land for the Jeju Olle Trail. Seogwipo City and the Jeju Olle Foundation 
refused his request and detoured the route off his ranch. The rancher later furiously 
complained that his neighbors criticized him for “closing the entire segment when the 
local government refused to accept his request for money115.” The rumor in the village 
was that the rancher sought only his own interest, “selling” his neighbors, i.e., bringing 
disadvantages to his neighbors. Losing his reputation among neighbors mattered to the 
rancher because he was born in the village and his three kids went to school there. Like 
this rancher, most rural residents on Jeju Island are natives and want to maintain local 
ties among neighbors, avoiding situations that could harm their relationships. Indeed, 
many villagers, including those with properties along the Jeju Olle Trail, reported that 
they left their lands or village-owned lands to seek the broader interests of the village 
and the province: 
We regardless think that the Jeju Olle Trail is good for village development. By 
development, I mean to promote the village so that many people visit the village 
and spend money here (I122-V82). 
 
(Landowners) can block the trail along the port, but most of them cannot do that. 
We, Jeju people are generous, so we can’t block. Not generating troubles among 
                                                
115 Citizen’s complaints uploaded on 6/14/2012, on the Seogwipo City webpage 
(http://www.seogwipo.go.kr/contents). 
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villagers is good. Less than 2% of village households work in the service 
industry. The trail is good only for those people. There’s nothing good for us 
(making livelihoods beyond the service industry) (I82-V52) 
 
I do not block the trail because it’s good for the village and the province (I102-
V64). 
 
 
The quote “not generating troubles among villagers is good” is particularly telling. It 
demonstrates Jeju people’s tendency to avoid community conflicts, thereby facilitating 
property owners’ oral concession116 about public access to their properties. If a 
landowner claimed ownership from the Jeju Olle Trail, it would cause social trouble 
with other villagers, Jeju Olle Foundation employees, and provincial and municipal 
officials, as shown in the rancher’s case.  
 Concerns were heightened in this arena with landowners from the mainland. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, mainlanders own a significant portion of Jeju land, particularly 
lands with scenic beauty that made good candidates for the trail. Jeju villagers reported 
that mainlanders often refused to include their lands on the trail or wanted to be excluded 
from the trail because they were socially unconnected from Jeju Island. Villager 
representatives put it like this: 
Compensate the loss (caused by using lands for public purposes), there are many 
this kind of people, especially outsiders. People from this region rarely do that, 
but outsiders do (I40-V19). 
 
I contacted with a Seoul owner when establishing the trail in the village, and the 
person said no. So we had to choose another way. These are mainly outsiders. 
They can be so definite in saying no, because they are outsiders, who are 
speculators for development. (Local) corporations or villagers here do not behave 
                                                
116 The Jeju Olle Foundation leaders informed that the foundation provides hard copy of 
landowners’ concession only upon landowners’ request (I78-F3; I77-F2). 
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like that. Because they have to meet us anytime later, they maintain favorable 
attitude, such as donating lands for village uses. But outsiders neither release 
their lands even we offer compensations nor allow using the lands for the Jeju 
Olle Trail (I89-V56). 
 
 
The village representatives’ remarks contrast mainlander attitudes to those of Jeju people 
in dealing with the issue of including privately owned lands in the Jeju Olle Trail: 
mainlanders easily reject donating their lands for the trail, and Jeju people have trouble 
doing the same or asking for compensation because of their community ties. This 
vulnerability allowed exploitation of private property owners. 
 Of course, not all property owners with lands along the trail immediately allowed 
public access to their lands; there were indeed property owners who wanted to exclude 
their lands regardless, for example on Routes 7 and 8. However, the above-discussed 
cases illustrate that Jeju property owners were unable to easily exercise their property 
rights over their own lands when their neighbors and the province were believed to 
benefit from tourists’ passing through them.  
The Jeju Olle Trail was established through struggles over cost/benefit 
distribution revolving around property rights. The local struggles provide a critical 
starting point for understanding competing representations and materiality of landscape 
along the Jeju Olle Trail because they demonstrate that private properties, along with 
otherwise-owned lands, comprise the landscape of the Jeju Olle Trail. The struggles also 
show that property rights were highly contested at the local level in the process of trail 
establishment. Most importantly, the local struggles highlight that tourists were not only 
uninvolved with the struggles, but also had no property rights along the Jeju Olle Trail 
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An Urban Middle Class Project 
Urban Middle Class Targeting the Urban Middle Class 
On the afternoon of November 2, the final ceremony of the 2013 Jeju Olle 
Walking Festival was held on an elementary school playground located in Jeju City. 
Tourists in colorful outdoor clothing who had walked along Route 16 all day long 
entered the playground one after another, exploring the several tents set up for souvenirs 
and dinner and settling on the ground in the center of the playground to enjoy the 
ceremony. A psychologist popular among the South Korean public began performing 
onstage; in a calm tone, she spoke of warm childhood memories that had been lost in 
today’s society. Then she began playing a piano and asked the audience to sing along to 
an old popular children song about a girl in the countryside missing her elder brother 
who had left for Seoul to make money.  
To the right of the stage, another group of people watched the stage and the 
tourists. They contrasted with the tourists: village grandmothers, children, and farmers 
stood (not sat) in a corner (not the center) of the playground wearing everyday clothes 
(not outdoor looks). They did not sing with tourists. 
The slogan of the 2013 Jeju Olle Walking Festival was “Communicate on this 
trail!” proclaiming that festival programs aimed to facilitate tourist communication with 
Jeju local people (www.jejuolle.com). However, it seemed that the festival was just for 
the South Korean urban middle class without communicating with Jeju local people. 
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Tourists and Jeju people were not only spatially separated, but also looked very different 
from each other in appearance, attitude, and posture. 
 
Tourists 
Jeju Olle Trail tourists were likely to be middle-aged, college-educated, white-
collar professionals from the metropolitan area of Seoul. A survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism in 2010 reported that tourists in their 40s to 50s 
accounted for 55.6%; college-educated and white-collar professionals were 76% and 
38%, respectively; and 73% of tourists were from the metropolitan area of Seoul (MCST 
2010: 103-105). A tourist spent 355 USD on average per visit, which was 50 USD more 
than spending by island tourists with purposes other than the Jeju Olle Trail. The report 
suggested that marketing strategies targeted urban dwellers of South Korea (Ibid.: 104). 
Research defines average Jeju Olle Trail tourists as urban middle class117, most of whom 
are satisfied with their visit; a survey conducted by Seogwipo City found that 99% of 
tourists wanted to revisit the trail (cited from Ahn 2009: 12).  
 
Volunteers 
As the Jeju Olle Trail gained increasing popularity across the country, the Jeju 
Olle Foundation received wholehearted support from the South Korean public, 
particularly among the urban middle class (Chapter 3). Their support included 
                                                
117	Urban middle class is defined as households with an income between 50% and 150% of the 
median income in South Korea, which in 2013 roughly 38,000 USD, making the middle class 
households living between 19,000 and 57,000 USD (SBS 2014).	
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participating in volunteer and educational programs of the Jeju Olle Trail (Appendix 1). 
I joined the Jeju Olle Academy118 in both basic and intensive courses in 2013, as well as 
volunteer activities for cleaning the Jeju Olle Trail. I describe volunteers that I met in the 
programs in order to define their general characteristics: 
 
• Mr. CH: male in his 60s, from Seoul 
Mr. CH recently retired from a higher managerial position in a large automobile 
company. He was from an affluent family and was well educated (he graduated from one 
of the top three universities in South Korea). Mr. CH began to be involved in the Jeju 
Olle Foundation through the 13th basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy in 2013. Since 
then, he actively participated in events held by the Jeju Olle Foundation such as the 
Clean Olle Campaign and Acarzabong (Appendix 1).  
 
• Ms. RT: female in her 40s, from Seoul (migrated about 20 years before) 
Ms. RT was a wife of the owner of one of the largest rental car companies on Jeju 
Island. She was from Seoul and migrated to Jeju Island after she married to her husband, 
who was from the island. Ms. RT enjoyed meeting new people in different volunteer 
activities related to the Jeju Olle Foundation. She had also gotten involved in the Jeju 
Olle Foundation through the Jeju Olle Academy. 
                                                
118 The Jeju Olle Academy is a program in which participants can learn about culture, language, 
nature, food, and flora and fauna on Jeju Island. The academy has two courses, basic and 
intensive. When I took the courses in 2013, the basic and intensive courses cost 60,000 KRW 
(52 USD) and 110,000 KRW (95 USD), respectively.  
  195 
 
• Mr. SW: male in his 40s, from a suburban city of Seoul 
Mr. SW ran a restaurant in a suburban city of Seoul after having been a teacher. We met 
in the basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy, and he appeared at every Jeju Olle 
Foundation event I participated in. 
 
• Mr. LS: male in his 30s, from Seoul 
Ms. LS was a doctor who had recently migrated to Jeju Island from Seoul. He was 
initially attracted by the Jeju Olle Trail and then enjoyed walking along other trails 
established across the country. He was active in Jeju Olle Foundation volunteer 
activities, such as taking charge of the Clean Olle Campaign and acting as vice 
representative of the Jeju Olle Academy, for which he also lectured on emergency care 
in the basic course. 
• Ms. MN: female in her 30s, a migrant from Seoul 
Ms. MN worked in the office of a marine logistics company for almost 20 years before 
she took a month leave and traveled to Jeju Island. She quit her job upon her return and 
migrated to Jeju Island without a particular reason for choosing it for the second chapter 
of her life. After taking the basic course of the Jeju Olle Academy, Ms. MN actively 
sought volunteer opportunities with the Jeju Olle Foundation. 
 
These volunteers and trainees of the Jeju Olle Foundation were mostly from the 
urban middle class of South Korea in terms of socioeconomic status even though there 
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were some Jeju residents. These urban middle class volunteers supported the Jeju Olle 
Foundation for management of the trail and landscape maintenance. More specifically, 
they used their skills and knowledge to contribute to the trail project through programs 
like the Jeju Olle Academy alumni organization or tour guides. Once the trail was 
established with aid from numerous Jeju villager volunteers (labor unacknowledged by 
the Jeju Olle Foundation) (as discussed in Chapter 4), the urban middle class also 
contributed to maintaining the environmental and aesthetic landscapes of the Jeju Olle 
Trail through cleaning programs such as the Clean Olle Campaign on a monthly basis 
(labor acknowledged by the Jeju Olle Foundation). The latter group of volunteers 
established and maintained the landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail based on the ideals of 
environmental and aesthetic landscapes proposed by the Jeju Olle Foundation. 
 
The Jeju Olle Foundation 
In 2013, The Jeju Olle Foundation had 10 – 11 employees who were mostly from 
the urban middle class of South Korea. The foundation leader herself was a successful 
journalist, who describes in her book (2008) urging one of her colleagues to leave a 
journalist job and join the Jeju Olle Foundation. The colleague eventually came to Jeju 
Island and took the position of Jeju Olle Foundation director. Another member was an 
environmental activist protesting against large construction projects that destroyed the 
environment through cutting mountains, etc. She left her NGO job in Seoul and joined 
the Jeju Olle Foundation with an offer from the foundation leader to be the education 
team leader. Two other employees I met had m
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Kingdom and one from the United States. Having a degree from a developed country 
tends to guarantee an urban middle class job in South Korea, but one of them actually 
left her decent job in Seoul to join the Jeju Olle Foundation. 
These key figures of the Jeju Olle Foundation who left their urban middle class 
jobs in Seoul understood urban middle class tastes and the marketing that would “hook” 
urban middle class tourists—they also knew how to circulate the marketing through 
media to reach the urban middle class, as the following section demonstrates. 
 
Environmental and Relational Nostalgia 
 The Jeju Olle Foundation leader evoked environmental and relational nostalgia 
when she established discourses about rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail for 
promotion. She communicated that leaving her hectic urban life, surrounded by 
buildings and trapped in business relationships, for Jeju Island, where she walked in 
nature and related with grandmothers (hallmang in Jeju dialect), restored her physical 
and mental wellness. In her book (2010), the leader describes herself as a typical South 
Korean middle class urban resident who had lost precious old memories of childhood in 
striving to achieve the rapid modernization and development of the country. Nature and 
social relations had not been destroyed during her childhood on Jeju Island. This rhetoric 
evoked the urban middle class’s nostalgia about the environmental and social ideals of 
the Jeju Olle Trail, implying that tourists could enjoy undestroyed or retrieved nature 
and social relations on the trail.  
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The Jeju Olle Foundation battled physical evidence of modernization to achieve 
the ideals of the Jeju Olle Trail. During the rapid industrialization period, modernization 
swept the country regardless of urban and rural areas, with paved roads being prime 
evidence. The foundation struggled to avoid them and retrieve “old village lanes that had 
been forgotten even among villagers” (the foundation exploring team leader) because 
they symbolized nature and social intimacy lost in modernization. By battling physical 
remnants of modernization, the Jeju Olle Foundation implicitly claimed to correct this 
one of two main problems caused by the country’s rapid economic growth. The other 
problem was rural-urban inequality, which the trail also corrected, according to the Jeju 
Olle Foundation. The foundation claimed that the trail directed tourist spending to rural 
villages that had received less benefits from the country’s industrialization process 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 4). The foundation’s goals of environmentalism and rural 
benefits, then, coincided with correcting the environmental destruction and social 
inequality caused by South Korea’s economic development and modernization process.  
In pursuing its goals, the first priority of the Jeju Olle Foundation was to satisfy 
tourists (Seo 2010), even before meeting their expectations about the scenic beauty and 
cultural uniqueness of Jeju Island. A team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation said the 
following on the matter: 
 
I think the most important thing, that I’m still dissatisfied with it now, is 
condition of the trail. You would enjoy scenic beauty once you feel 
comfortable…I realized that cars were the enemies of those who walk…[cars] 
threaten walkers’ safety and hamper them focusing (I77-F2). 
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The team leader implied that the Jeju Olle Foundation utilized unpaved village lanes 
because paved roads were uncomfortable for trailers to walk on. Tourist satisfaction was 
also the primary driver for generating additional income for rural villages adjacent to the 
trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation leader and director said in a keynote speech and article 
that tourists felt warm because villagers who benefitted from the Jeju Olle Trail project 
welcomed them (Seo 2012119; Ahn 2009). The team leader also mentioned the following:  
 
We made the [length] of a route to seem about right for an ordinary person to 
walk for a day. We also located villages at beginning and ending points of a route. 
It was because tourists walking along the trail would conveniently take a rest 
there, and villagers could communicate with tourists…some villages complained 
when the trail did not pass, but I did not negotiate…because our first principle 
was ‘would those who walk on the trail be satisfied’ (Ibid.). 
 
These examples reveal that rural villagers should be economically satisfied with the Jeju 
Olle Trail in order for them to host tourists in a favorable manner. Minimal 
environmental impacts and local benefits were seen as the way to maximize tourist 
satisfaction, which was the foundation’s top priority: 
The first principle in determining a route was, the dominant principle was this. 
‘Would a person who walks on this trail be satisfied?’ [We] just strived to meet 
the goal rather than wanted to show something [special] (Ibid.). 
 
 
It is important to understand this as the priority of establishing the Jeju Olle Trail 
because prioritizing tourist satisfaction, as opposed to other proclaimed goals, namely, 
rural development and environmental conservation, implanted and enhanced the 
perception about landscape ownership among tourists.  
                                                
119 http://www.worldtrail.org/conference/conference2012.php 
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Certified Ownership 
As a result of the Jeju Olle Foundation’s emphasis on tourist satisfaction, along 
with the representations of landscapes promoted through media, tourists visited the Jeju 
Olle Trail with particular imageries of the trail and rural villages. They imagined the trail 
would lead them to Jeju nature through unpaved roads and that rural villagers would host 
them. So some tourists were displeased to find discrepancies between what was 
imagined and what was actually encountered. They expressed their feelings to Jeju local 
villagers, which came off as having an attitude of ownership. An orange farmer was 
disgruntled by the tourist criticism, saying:  
tourists talk to us as if they are the owners of this road (I82-V52). 
 
 
This attitude of ownership also made rural villagers confused and depressed, as said by 
the orange farmer’s neighbor:  
I don’t know why tourists complain to us about the problems of the trail. I don’t 
like it (I133-V93). 
 
 
These farmers felt that it was unfair to receive tourist criticism because they did not 
establish the trail. At most, they provided knowledge and labor in the establishment 
process, and the Jeju Olle Foundation used that knowledge to design a trail conforming 
to a preconceived ideal.  
The tourist ownership attitude was most explicit when they treated Jeju farmers 
and fishermen as “tourist helper or something.” Another orange farmer reported his 
experience of taking a rest after working in the field: he was sitting on a bench located in 
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front of a snack corner where tourists also rested on Route 7 and was asked for tourist 
help.  
It seems that they think us as a tourist helper or something. They not only asked 
me to show directions of the trail, but also asked me to call taxis for them (I136-
V96).. 
 
 
The farmer thought tourists did not have the right to “order” him like a servant, 
especially because farmers and fishermen did not receive benefits from tourist spending. 
In other words, the farmer found tourists presumptuous in behaving with an attitude of 
ownership, revealing their assumptions that rural villagers’ labor and emotions could be 
left uncompensated and that villagers had no other sources of livelihood beyond hosting 
tourists.  
The Jeju Olle Foundation actually formed this ownership attitude among tourists. 
The ways in which it targeted urban middle class tourists in marketing the environmental 
and aesthetic view of landscapes implanted the “self-deception” of the ownership of 
landscape and beyond. The Jeju Olle Foundation explicitly entitled tourists as “certified 
owners.” On the webpage of the Jeju Olle Foundation, it solicits donation from tourists: 
The Jeju Olle Trail is open to everybody without any entrance fees. In order to 
expand and maintain the Jeju Olle Trail, we need more owners. With your 
donation, the Jeju Olle Foundation is making and maintaining the most beautiful 
and peaceful trail in the world. Please become the owner of the Jeju Olle Trail by 
registering as a supporting member of the Jeju Olle Foundation 
(www.jejuolle.com).  
 
 
In a similar context, the government official in charge of the Jeju Olle Trail in Jeju 
Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP) for about two years attributed the success of 
the trail to the “entitling” of tourists: 
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In my opinion, the reason why the Jeju Olle Trail has been so successful is that 
the Jeju Olle Foundation leader has drawn a lot of people [to the Jeju Olle Trail], 
as supporters. ‘You’re the owner of the Jeju Olle Trail just because you are 
walking on it.’ Then the people become supporters or volunteers [of the Jeju Olle 
Trail], and feel a lot more entitlement of ownership, and want to participate in the 
Jeju Olle Trail later again. Once you know what it is like to become an owner 
through festivals or something, then you would want to come down here again 
for the next year’s festival. Beginning festivals, tourists later come in even during 
non-festival period. [And] they feel kind of obliged to walk along the Jeju Olle 
Trail when they talk with other people about it. It seems to me that [the Jeju Olle 
Foundation] makes tourists as owners of the Jeju Olle Trail, sometimes they also 
feel obliged to write a positive review on the internet, it just touches people in 
that way (I43-G7). 
 
 
The official’s quote implies that tourists are entitled to feel not only ownership of the 
trail, but also responsibility for maintaining its environmental and aesthetic beauty.  
Tourists’120 having ownership implies that (1) tourists behave as they want on the 
Jeju Olle Trail; (2) tourists take responsibility for what happens on the Jeju Olle Trail; 
and (3) tourists have the right to intervene and correct local behavior if they feel 
something is different (wrong) from their view of the “right” landscapes of the Jeju Olle 
Trail. 
The feeling of ownership and the accompanying rights and responsibility over 
trail landscapes can be explained by Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of the “self-deception” 
about landscape ownership. Property rights belong to Jeju individuals, villagers (village-
owned lands), and Jeju citizens (municipality/province-owned lands), but tourists can 
                                                
120 I do not intend to argue that all tourists behave as owners. Indeed, villagers also reported that 
tourists have treated rural villagers with respect and have shown a sense of responsibility for the 
environment of Jeju Island.  
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easily imagine it as theirs because landscape ownership, even for private properties, is 
undefined.  
The Jeju Olle Foundation implanted and enhanced the self-deceived perception 
of ownership among tourists by issuing certified ownership on what does not belong to 
it. It owns neither the properties on which it located the Jeju Olle Trail nor the 
landscapes viewed from the properties. The foundation only appropriated landscapes for 
itself by establishing environmental and aesthetic ideals of landscapes and “sold” the 
landscape ownership to tourists. By doing so, it achieved political and social gains 
(nationwide reputation and political influence on Jeju Island, as discussed in Chapter 3).  
Because of the self-deception of ownership, tourists participate in “screening” 
Jeju Olle Trail landscapes through their encounters with local people along the trail, 
which are often in conflict with the ideals presented to them about the environmental and 
aesthetic landscapes, as the following section demonstrates.  
 
Landscape, Contested Ideas About Livelihoods and Modernization 
 
Jeju Olle Trail tourists and Jeju local people have often conflicted as a result of 
the discrepancy between tourists’ expectation and their reality, as well as the tourists’ 
certified ownership issued by the Jeju Olle Foundation. The conflicts demonstrate 
competing discourses of modernization and environmentalism, livelihoods and leisure, 
and rural and urban cultures.  
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Leisure vs. Livelihoods 
The impact to farming by the Jeju Olle Trail differs among rural villages, 
depending what part of village lanes were included. Murung 2 li villagers reported few 
conflicts because they encounter tourists less than other villages due to their larger garlic 
fields and farm roads. A Murung 2 li grandmother whom I helped select garlic seeds told 
me that she sees some tourists coming and going from a distance, but she actually does 
not have much chance to encounter them while working (I197-V148). Like the 
grandmother, other Murung 2 li farmers had to neither sit with tourists and listen to their 
complaints nor wait until tourists give way for agricultural tractors on narrow farm 
roads.  
Income levels also contributed varying interactions among tourists and villagers. 
Larger field sizes also imply a higher income of these farmers (also depending on crop 
values). A village officer of Murung 2 li reported:  
Villagers here earn quite a lot of money, unlike in other villages. Many of them 
are rich farmers. Their annual incomes are comparable with, or even more than, 
those managers’ in large corporations, like 100 million KRW (90,000 USD) (I97-
V60). 
 
 
The representative of the Village Youth Association explained that Murung 2 li villagers 
would therefore care less about potential earnings from tourist spending (I75-V47). He 
said that farmers, in addition, are very busy due to field size, so busy that most of them 
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find it easier to buy lunch from restaurants, implying further that they would by no 
means have time to run lodges or restaurants for insignificant earnings121.  
As a result of fewer encounters with tourists and less dependency on (or 
expectation about and following disappointment from) tourist spending, Murung 2 li 
villagers showed favorable attitudes in general toward tourists. Another grandmother in 
Murung 2 li, who was making chili paste when I visited her house, said that she liked to 
see tourists walking along farm roads wearing outdoor clothes splashed with a variety of 
colors. She said: 
How beautiful [tourists] are walking on colorful clothes! I feel refreshed by only 
looking at those young (I77-V44). 
 
 
Contrast to Murung 2 li villagers who were favorable to tourists, villagers from 
Shihungli, Wolpyong, and Woodo reported significant conflict with tourists because the 
trail passes narrow farm roads between agricultural fields and vinyl greenhouses. The 
villages tend to experience tourists’ interruption to their production activities. Tourists 
want to interact with villagers by saying hello or by asking questions, which not only 
interrupts production activities but also makes villagers tired, as a peanut farmer in 
Woodo said, “I feel so tiresome with increasing tourists here (I157-V116).” Questions, 
which vary from the kinds of crops and harvesting periods to crop prices, have 
                                                
121 Instead, the Murung 2 li Village Association was actively involved in the Jeju Olle Trail 
project through the “1 Village and 1 Corporation” program implemented by the Jeju Olle 
Foundation.  
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significantly bothered farmers to the extent that a female farmer of a plant used for 
medicine called bangpoong, complained,  
The Jeju Olle Trail tourists in a row were asking same questions over and over 
again, that I could not precede working on the field. I even wanted to write the 
[same] questions and answers on a board and post it. I liked tourists coming here 
at first, but it was not one or two people, I just could not work (I53-V27). 
 
 
Other farmers also said many curious tourists in a row delayed agricultural production 
by hindering work focus. Even though tourists ask simple, short questions out of plain 
curiosity or for learning purposes in their leisure activities, the questioning turns into 
considerable time spent for farmers.  
Tourists in these villages have also caused farmers to lose agricultural products 
because they pick crops such as potatoes, carrots, and oranges in quantities from a 
product to a box of products. A Shihungli woman villager reported her neighbor’s 
experience of tourist theft: 
I saw a grandmother in my neighborhood was angry because one of the boxes of 
potato that she left at the edge of her field was gone while she was harvesting in 
the field (I51-V25). 
 
 
An orange farmer from Wolpyong similarly reported that he produced about 10,000 kg 
of oranges on average from his field of 0.33 ha. Among the total product, he had lost 150 
to 200 kg, which he assumed to be caused by tourist theft. Even when the quantity was 
insignificant to total production, the farmer felt frustrated over the theft. Farmers tried to 
resolve tourist theft at the village level, as the orange farmer reported:  
I lost some oranges from the field several times. I reported it to the Village 
Association, and it was discussed among village representatives. But nothing 
happened after the discussion. I ended up putting a camera and Japanese Cedar 
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fences around the field to prevent [Jeju Olle Trail tourists from picking oranges 
(I128-V88). 
 
 
Crop theft also negatively impacts future yield because tourists lack knowledge of 
agricultural techniques. Another orange farmer said:  
Tourists pick oranges out of curiosity, but they don’t know about farming. We 
have particular ways to pick oranges to sustain production in coming years. The 
orange tree branches fail to produce later when oranges are picked up so 
randomly (I134-V94). 
 
 
The village leader acknowledged the theft issue, but the Village Association decided to 
“digest the issue within the village” (I128-V88;I89-V56) rather than appealing to other 
actors of the Jeju Olle Trail project, such as provincial state agencies or the Jeju Olle 
Foundation. So the farmers, then, bore the costs of both lost crops and prevention efforts 
because the village is politically less influential compared to state agencies, the 
foundation, or tourists.  
Agriculture has also been hindered by tourists because they do not give way for 
tractors and cars on farm roads, delaying production and frustrating farmers. Delay could 
critically impact crop growth or harvest, especially during busy seasons of agriculture:  
Tourists do not step aside on the farm road when we’re busy. It’s really 
frustrating. Are they taking responsibility when we ruined this year’s farming? 
(I188-V143) 
 
These people even ignore the sound of honking horns from behind. I don’t know 
if they were thinking or whatever (I101-V64).  
 
Those who walk along the trail think that [farm roads] are theirs. Not as the roads 
[established] for farming (I189-V144). 
 
 
Other farmers reported inconveniences in agricultural production caused by tourists:  
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I had to pick up trash on the mountains where I had my cows for grazing. Some 
trash such as wet tissues are not decomposable in soil, and it can harm cows 
when they happen to eat them along with weeds (I40-V19). 
 
We have to be extremely cautious when we sprayed agricultural pesticides. They 
are highly toxic in most cases. Farmers wear protective clothes in doing the job, 
but tourists just wear outdoor look clothes. So if pesticides reach tourists, it can 
cause them serious injuries (I50-V24). 
 
When the Jeju Olle Trail became very poplar after being broadcasted in ‘One 
Night and Two Days122,’ there were many complaints among villagers. In the 
morning when farmers went out to fields to begin work, fields were white all 
over because of the tissues that tourists dumped after defecation in fields. Who 
would want to begin working in there in the morning? (I114-V76) 
 
 
These incidents demonstrate that tourists are insensitive to farmers sharing their roads 
with them. The insensitivity can be explained by the fact that (1) tourists are mostly from 
the urban middle class and are therefore rather ignorant about rural activities and (2) for 
urban middle class tourists, the Jeju Olle Trail was established for their leisure through 
marketing efforts emphasizing self-reflection (Chapter 4), so they are in no way focused 
on their potential impact to agriculture. Sharing farm roads with tourists even caused 
financial loss for a villager in Shihungli. An old woman who passed away in 2012 in her 
late 70s accidently hit a tourist walking along a farm road. Her daughter not only had to 
buy new pants for the tourist, but also had to pay him about 600 USD as settlement 
money. A farmer also reported that her neighbor was very angry because his tractor 
turned over when he tried to avoid tourists on a farm road. Yet he had nowhere to go and 
ask for compensation (I51-V25). Damages caused by villagers have been compensated 
                                                
122 One of the most popular TV shows in South Korea in 2012. 
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out of their pocket, but villagers have in no way been compensated for loss caused by 
tourists. Concessions are made by villagers alone: 
Those who go to fields should be careful. Would those on the Jeju Olle Trail [be 
careful]? It’s revered somehow…(I189-V144) 
 
 
The bitter rancher who stated this felt that tourists should be the ones to be careful and 
make concessions, not the farmers, because farm roads have been village-owned for 
hundreds of years and the Jeju Olle Trail was established recently without any change in 
property ownership. Farmers have also experienced emotional distress because they feel 
they have no control over the tourists’ disrespect for their livelihood. The tourists seem 
to consider the livelihood landscape as mere background for leisure activities. 
The conflicting purposes of the landscape have also brought about social and 
cultural impacts to rural villages on the Jeju Olle Trail. First, some farmers were 
frustrated when they saw tourists enjoy leisure activities by walking along the Jeju Olle 
Trail: 
I felt irritated when tourists talked loudly or sang songs on the trail. I was 
working! (I135-V95) 
 
I don’t like seeing them pass by my field wearing colorful clothes when I am 
working hard (I174-V132). 
 
 
These quotes imply that farmers feel relative deprivation by comparing their situation 
with that of tourists. Tourists frivolously pass by where farmers are seriously working 
hard, demonstrating a social distance between citizens of the same state caused by the 
Jeju Olle Trail. 
  210 
The comparison between tourists and farmers has also brought about farmers’ 
fear for being disrespected by tourists because of what farmers eat or wear. An old 
peanut farmer in Woodo furiously expressed his feeling about the inconvenience:  
I cannot have lunch now on the field. These people are staring at me eating 
lunch, so I have to eat lunch [delivered] from a restaurant for 7,000 KRW [6 
USD]!” (I157-V116) 
 
 
Before tourists arrived, the farmer brought a lunch from home, but felt pressured to buy 
lunch because of tourists’ gaze on his humble lunch. Tourists may have just been 
curious, but their gaze caused lack of privacy and shame. As for clothing, the previous 
leader of the Village Women Association said that she hoped tourists enjoyed their visit 
to Jeju Island, but she was: 
Just a little bit worried that they would look down on us villagers because of how 
we wear [when they encounter us in the village].” (I96-V59) 
 
 
Villagers wear work clothes and are often dirty and sweaty by the end of a day of hard 
work. Before the Jeju Olle Trail was established on the village road in Wolpyong, 
villagers did not have to worry about how they looked because they would have only 
encountered their kinship-based neighbors123. Clothing style was nothing to hide or 
worry about. However, the tourist influx meant that villagers encountered outsiders 
during work who wore colorful, nice outdoor wear that sharply contrasted with work 
clothes. Trail establishment caused private spaces among kinship-based villagers to turn 
                                                
123 Rural villages on Jeju Island were established based on kinships. In fact, three brothers called 
“Goh,” “Boo,” and “Yang” became the ancestors of people on Jeju Island, according to the 
legend about Jeju Island’s establishment. Thus, people on Jeju Island today call their seniors 
“uncle,” regardless of gender and family relationships.  
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into public landscapes, and villagers began to feel encroached upon by and inferior to 
outsiders about how they look and what they eat. And tourists felt that they were entitled 
to watch private spaces for learning purposes as invited guests and certified owners. 
The conflicting purposes and expectations from a single landscape and resulting 
class struggles among farmers and tourists well illustrates the social, economic, and 
cultural marginalization of Jeju rural villagers living adjacent to the Jeju Olle Trail.  
 
Environment vs. Development  
Trash: conservation vs. livelihoods 
The Jeju Olle Foundation had much emphasized that it achieved landscape along 
the Jeju Olle Trail through practicing environmental conservation. It applied 
environmentally friendly principles (Chapter 4) in the process of establishing the trail, 
but once the trail was established and large numbers of tourists started visiting, 
maintaining the landscapes along the trail became an issue.  
Removing trash became an urgent matter to resolve because media reported that 
trash was spoiling the natural landscape of Jeju Island. The leader of the Jeju Olle 
Foundation once investigated the trail in order to determine what kind of trash was 
dominant on the Jeju Olle Trail and wrote about it in her book (2010: 218-226). She 
initiated the “Clean Olle Campaign,” walking the trail herself starting from Route 1 and 
picking up trash for 10 days. She found that the trash along the Jeju Olle Trail was 
dumped by both tourists and rural villagers, making both parties responsible, unlike 
tourists alone as reported by media. More popular routes had more tourist trash, and less 
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popular routes had farmer and fishermen trash. In investigating and removing the trash, 
the leader gathered supporters to help: 
The participants who hated trash in the beginning turned to be delighted when 
they found trash…later they ran towards trash [to pick up] when they found 
[large volume trash] shouting, ‘That’s mine!’ “Oh, it’s a jackpot!” A sense of 
obligation to pick up trash turned into an enjoyment of restoring clean nature, 
and the hard labor of repeated bending waist turned into a game among 
participants. On the Jeju Olle Trail, even trash was [an enjoyment]…(Seo 
2010:221) 
 
 
The excerpt, showing volunteers having fun picking up trash, implies that the Jeju Olle 
Foundation leader regards trail tourists to be environmental guardians. They were 
willing to use their time and labor in restoring nature and landscape along the Jeju Olle 
Trail that had been spoiled by residents and tourists. These supporters and tourists 
actively participated in “maintaining” the trail through other programs that the Jeju Olle 
Foundation implemented such as a reward system called the “Clean Olle.” They also 
individually corrected the practices of garbage disposal in rural areas when they 
encountered them.  
Due to these environmental efforts, Jeju rural villagers had to keep “trash” 
produced in the process of making livelihoods invisible from tourists. A good example is 
the experience of the ship repairman discussed in the introduction. He runs a small shop 
for ship repair along his village’s coastline, and equipment and ship bodies have often 
been outside his shop. Jeju Olle Trail tourists saw these items as trash and registered 
civil complaints. The repairman worked hard to avoid possible fines levied by the 
government. He had to adjust the way he made his living to conform to the new ideals of 
landscapes brought by the Jeju Olle Trail. The Jeju Olle Foundation decided what the 
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landscape should look like, and the particular perspective about landscape was 
institutionally supported by JSSGP state agencies, which had maintained close 
collaboration with the Jeju Olle Trail. Levying fines to the ship repairman with the 
introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail reveals that the state essentially facilitated the 
requirement for rural villagers to accept inconveniences to achieve the desired 
environmental and aesthetic standard about landscapes on the Jeju Olle Trail.  
In sum, as environmental guardians with institutional support from the Jeju Olle 
Foundation and JSSGP state agencies, tourists and supporters feel responsibility for 
nature and landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail, which has been spoiled by rural villagers’ 
livelihoods. Before the trail was established, though, the landscapes of Jeju Island were 
merely outcomes of these local livelihoods. Rural villagers certainly disposed of garbage 
from work and everyday lives in illegal ways (e.g., dumping or burning trash on 
coastlines and farm roads), but received little attention before the trail was established. 
At that point, rural livelihoods began to be regarded as threats to environmental and 
aesthetic landscapes. Tourists regard agricultural fields for crops and ships for fisheries 
as environmentally sound and aesthetically beautiful, but the processes involved in such 
livelihoods (e.g., pesticides, plastic vinyl, and ship repair) are ugly and harmful to the 
environment, thus needing to be removed by the guardians.  
Rural villagers’ practices for livelihoods are not necessarily right for the 
environment, but these examples demonstrate the struggles over landscape maintenance. 
Rural villagers and tourists have competed over how and what to define as legitimate 
landscapes of the Jeju Olle Trail, with villagers claiming landscape as an outcome of 
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rural livelihoods and tourists viewing it as a background for leisure activities. By 
defining the practices of rural livelihoods as harmful to the environment and aesthetics 
of the Jeju Olle Trail, the Jeju Olle Foundation’s aspiration for landscape on the trail 
gained more legitimacy, especially with the attitudes of ownership and guardianship.  
 
Roads: conservation vs. modernization  
Road pavement is an indicator of modernization and development in South 
Korea124. As South Korea expedited industrialization beginning in the 1970s, the central 
government strived to increase pavement rates. In 2012, paved roads on Jeju Island 
accounted for 87.28% of total roads, ranking it 9th among 16 South Korean provinces 
(Korean Statistics Office). So after understanding the Jeju Olle Trail to be untouched by 
the modernization drive of the country because it was established through “finding 
hidden lanes, linking disconnected lanes, bringing back disappeared lanes, and making 
new lanes125,” tourists are often surprised to find that a significant part of the trail is 
paved. A woman working at the Jeju Olle Trail Information Booth at the airport reported 
on what she does when tourists first arrive to prepare them from being disappointed:  
There are tourists who visit the trail expecting that they could comfortably 
walk…pretty routes along the coast, TV showed only those routes, they expect 
all [routes] are like that…So I say, ‘the Jeju Olle Trail is never pretty from the 
beginning to the end. There are dirty, boring parts too…then you will encounter 
pretty parts…’ I do so particularly to the old…people imagine pretty and 
comfortable trail rather than paved ones. Pretty roads along the coast than paved 
roads (I184-F4). 
                                                
124 Pavement rate is widely regarded as a development indicator in international development 
organizations such as the World Bank, 
125 http://www.jejuolle.org/?mid=10, accessed on 9/24/2014 
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A snack shop owner along the coastline of Route 1 witnessed further, 
Tourists who walked the trail many times said that there were too much paved 
roads. For them, it’s fine up to the small mountain there, but after that, the roads 
were paved. Tourists didn’t like it…they said the landscapes were good, but the 
pavement created distraction (I45-V20). 
 
 
The roads distract tourists because they expect them to be composed of dirt or stones. 
Along with the above-described landscape materials, pavement has irritated those who 
subscribe to Jeju Olle Trail discourse because it is regarded as a product of 
modernization and industrialization, which are supposed to be foreign to the 
environmental and aesthetic landscapes particular to the Jeju Olle Trail.  
Pavement, though, was actually an achievement for villagers. Small lanes and 
farm roads located in villages were paved during the 1970s as part of the “New Village 
Movement,” in which labor and resources were systematically mobilized to modernize 
underdeveloped living conditions in rural areas under the strong leadership of the central 
government. The movement reached virtually all rural villages of South Korea. Under 
the slogan, “Diligence, Self-help, and Cooperation,” the developmental state urged rural 
villagers to voluntarily participate in its every endeavor for rural development, from 
changing roof materials from straw-thatched to slate to expanding village and farm 
roads. Expanding roads was the paragon of this self-help movement because the 
government provided cement, and villagers organized themselves to expand existing 
narrow and unpaved lanes. The villagers successfully mobilized land and labor in order 
to improve commonly used resources, even sacrificing private properties in many cases 
  216 
for the new roads. Landowners were rather willing to participate because they could 
contribute to their town’s development and property values were much lower back then. 
Cars and farm tractors could enter village and farm roads, and villagers could walk 
without worrying about mud after rain.  
With the introduction of the Jeju Olle Trail, though, these achievements of 
villagers displayed on landscapes fell in status to something wrong and ugly. For 
example, the exploring team leader of the Jeju Olle Foundation blamed rural villagers 
for erasing the physical representations of nature unaltered by development and the 
social intimacy from rural landscapes of Jeju Island due to their eagerness for 
unnecessarily excessive modernization. The exploring team leader used Gotjawal as an 
example of excessive modernization. Gotjawal refers to four forests scattered on Jeju 
Island with significant biodiversity due to its unique combination of flora and fauna. It is 
often referred to among environmental activists as the “lung of Jeju Island.” The 
exploring team leader said: 
 
There are many paved roads in Gotjawal, many that go used only a couple of 
times in a year…[In order to increase accomplishment of village leaders after 
taking the positions,] village leaders just paved roads there because they couldn’t 
find [appropriate places] to spend developmental funds once received from the 
state (I77-F2). 
 
 
According to the leader, the eagerness and political calculations of jumping on the 
development bandwagon removed the precious nature and culture unaltered by 
modernization from landscapes. He also meant that the Jeju Olle Foundation was taking 
on the formidable task of retrieving what was lost in the process of modernization. 
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The conflict over pavement is another illustration that tourists were dissatisfied in 
being unable to enjoy nature and nostalgia as expected from the Jeju Olle Trail and that 
rural villagers were also dissatisfied with tourists only viewing the landscapes from 
environmental and aesthetic perspectives. 
 
Expedited “Modernization” 
 
The conflict over landscapes with paved roads implies different experiences of 
modernization between urban and rural regions in South Korea. Urban regions in South 
Korea have rapidly modernized in terms of infrastructure development and ways of 
living. Roads are extensively paved, and apartment and office buildings have been 
densely established and renovated in cities. 98.8% of roads were paved in six 
metropolitan cities and one special city in 2014 (Korean Statistical Information Service). 
After a couple of decades enjoying modern conveniences, urban residents became sick 
of living surrounded by concrete (or at least wanted to leave it behind from time to time). 
South Korean urban residents increasingly sought opportunities to be closer to nature, 
giving way for the success of the Jeju Olle Trail. 
On the other hand, rural residents still aspired for modernization. Because of the 
developmental state’s uneven developmental strategies among rural and urban spaces 
and among sectors during the industrialization period, rural residents had received less 
attention (investment) from the government. A road pavement rate of 79.6% (2014) in 
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78 guns126 is an indicator of this lacking attention. Thus, rural residents sought to 
increase modernization with support from the government, even determining the 
capability of a village leader by how many developmental projects they implemented 
through competitions.  
For rural villagers, the Jeju Olle Trail project was one of these developmental 
projects that would provide funds for villages (Chapter 3), and Village Associations 
requested financial support from state agencies to improve convenience, not only for 
villagers, but also for tourists. Villagers also received developmental funding by 
appealing to the Jeju Olle Foundation. Because the foundation had bargaining power 
with state agencies, it could influence them to channel developmental funds toward 
particular villages. I found this tendency in Wolpyong (a village café), Shihungli (dispute 
over building an information center), and Murung 2 li (a village café). Lastly, utilizing 
the title of the Jeju Olle Trail helped Village Associations get selected for developmental 
projects held by different levels of government agencies. For example, Murung 2 li, 
along with a couple of neighboring villages, was selected as the recipient of a 4.4 million 
USD developmental fund by winning a village-level competition held by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs. The winning project title was the “Murung Paradise 
Olle Regional Project,” emphasizing that the villages located near the Jeju Olle Trail 
would contribute to improving the environment along the trail. Multiple village leaders 
confirmed that including “Olle” in the title of the project could have contributed to being 
                                                
126 The largest administrative unit for rural areas in South Korea.  
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selected as the winner. These villages adopted the Jeju Olle Trail as a developmental 
project, using it as leverage to attract more developmental funds from state agencies.  
 Drawing state-provided developmental funds explains why rural villagers 
decided to endure negative economic and cultural impacts caused by environmental and 
aesthetic landscape ideals and tourist attitudes of ownership instead of expressing their 
distress as the actual owners of landholdings generating landscapes as a totality. Many 
villagers perceived that the Jeju Olle Trail contributed to the village or provincial level 
(indirect advantage) rather than individual levels (direct advantage), so they were willing 
to accept the trail regardless of costs they would have to endure.  
 The ways in which villages implemented developmental projects after using the 
Jeju Olle Trail as leverage ironically conflicted with the environmental and aesthetic 
landscape ideals pursued by the Jeju Olle Foundation, tourists, and foundation 
supporters. The changes brought about to the village landscapes were all building 
constructions that, of course, used the “concrete” that bothered many tourists. Wolpyong 
Village Association built a building and recently renovated an agricultural produce shop 
into a café. Murung 2 li also built a building as a footbath hall for tourists and recently 
renovated it into a café. Also, by the end of 2013, Murung 2 li landscape was occupied 
by several constructions of buildings such as agricultural produce storage, a hall to teach 
Jeju dialect to tourists, and a village hall that were built in implementing the winning 
project. These constructions were all accomplished with developmental funds and the 
support of the Jeju Olle Foundation and the state, but they are also the “hardware” 
development, being criticized because of environmental and aesthetic landscape ideals 
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(by the Jeju Olle Trail education team leader). Even though the foundation has claimed 
to focus on “software” establishment for rural and tourism development, the Jeju Olle 
Trail ended up facilitating many hardware buildings.  
The increasing popularity of the Jeju Olle Trail across the country also 
contributed to the hardware construction along the trail beyond rural villages because the 
demand for residential and commercial lands on Jeju Island rapidly increased. In fact, 
Jeju Island became the most competitive auction market in the country in recent years 
(2015, July 16, Korean Economy). Furthermore, commercial and residential building 
construction rose above the national average after the Jeju Olle Trail began to gain 
popularity in 2009 (Figures 5.2 and Figure 5.3), boosting the economies of interior 
design businesses. Interior design businesspersons that I met on Jeju Island in 2013 
agreed that they struggled to meet increasing demands because of lack of employees.  
 
Figure 5.2 Change of Residential Building Area from Previous Years: 
                  South Korean Provinces vs. Jeju Island 
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Figure 5.3 Change of Commercial Building Area From Previous Year:  
                  South Korea vs. Jeju Island 
 
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service c. 
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instead of resolving the problems of environmental degradation and social inequality, the 
Jeju Olle Trail project reproduced, expanded, and intensified the social problems caused 
during the rapid industrialization and modernization of South Korea.  
 
Conclusion 
 
South Korea, as an NIC, is experiencing the transition of rural landscape 
purposes from a mere outcome of traditional production activities like agriculture and 
fisheries to an object for tourism due to the preconceived ideal of anti-modernization 
embedded in natural and cultural landscapes.  
This chapter examines class conflicts occurring in this process of landscape 
transition. An NGO called the Jeju Olle Foundation established environmental and 
aesthetic ideals of rural landscapes on Jeju Island and endowed the urban middle class 
with landscape ownership. Subscribing to both the promoted ideals and endowed 
ownership, the South Korean urban middle class discursively and materially claimed its 
entitlement to rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail. Even though the rural 
landscapes could be seen as aesthetically pleasing “natural” landscapes, the landscape 
ideal required further modification of actual rural landscapes. Rural villagers were asked 
to take the cost of landscape modification by shifting their ways of making livelihoods. 
In addition, the landscape discourse–subscribing urban middle class negated rural 
villagers’ developmental achievements because of anti-modernization embedded in the 
landscape ideal. This process erased history, lived experience, and labor for livelihood 
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from the landscape and incorporated and enhanced environmental and aesthetic aspects 
of the landscapes along the Jeju Olle Trail.  
By exploring class conflicts over landscape ownership and pertaining power 
struggles, this chapter also illuminates the spectrum of “the public.” The public 
commonly owns landscape and has the right to imagine and modify landscape as it 
aspires. But a question arises as Harvey asks, “But whose rights and whose city? (2003: 
939).” In this vein, the chapter suggests to consider whom or what the public comprises. 
Is the public, in the form of a collective entity, entitled as a legitimate controller of 
landscape? The public by no means can be defined uniformly throughout the span of 
social classes within it, though. This chapter determines the processes and outcomes of 
defining the citizenship of landscapes by examining the spectrum of the public and 
differentiating social groups included in the concept of the public. In doing so, it 
explores how undefined landscape ownership complicates landscape politics on Jeju 
Island. By doing so, the chapter also responds to McCarthy’s (2005B) call for examining 
membership of the commons to make it “truly just and sustainable.”  
Examining the processes of particularizing the public as resource users in favor 
of one social class over another also poses a question about “making resources a 
commons,” beyond landscape127. In general, scholars and activists are concerned that 
larger and socioeconomically vulnerable populations tend to lose their access and control 
over resources such as open space because of privatization (McCann 1999). Scholars and 
                                                
127 I would still argue that political struggles over landscapes are especially pressing, considering 
increasing demand for rural amenities across the world, beginning with the First World in the 
1970s and moving toward middle-income countries like NICs. 
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activists thus tend to advocate for public access to privatized resources, often employing 
Lefebvre’s idea of the “right to the city.” However, there are cases in which resources 
are privately owned or bound by another’s property rights, like landscape, and have not 
been used for profit. As public demand for resources increases, private property right 
holders can face increasing pressure in any form, such as requests from the state or 
kinship to grant public access to their properties, as shown by the case of the Jeju Olle 
Trail. This process of “commonization128” as opposed to privatization looks progressive. 
It appears to realize just resource use by expanding resource users to “the public.” Yet 
property rights among another span of the public might be infringed by the guised and 
informal enclosure. The commonization could be a process of exclusion rather than 
inclusion in that sense, as McCarthy points out (2005). The case of the Jeju Olle Trail 
demonstrates the processes in which particular representations and the materialization of 
a landscape excludes certain public groups in the process of including other public 
groups, if we regard it as an experiment of applying the rights of the city129 to the 
countryside. Baraclough (2013) proposes to expand the scope of this concept and 
explore possible places of discrimination and disempowerment, so this chapter provides 
a timely case study to begin our exploration of the right to a new realm of the city.  
The class struggle over landscape examined in this chapter also reflects particular 
characteristics of NICs, which determine struggles over access and control of rural 
landscapes and thus demonstrate unique socioeconomic development paths that 
                                                
128 Making landscape common 
129 Purcell (2002) argues that Lefebvre’s definition of the city is “stubbornly vague.” (page 8). 
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simultaneously demonstrate socioeconomic characteristics from the Third and First 
Worlds. The uniqueness includes state involvement in developmental plans, formalized 
property right institutions (i.e., de jure and de facto property rights that are mediated by 
social relations instead of courts), temporality of increasing demand for rural landscapes 
for leisure purposes, contrasting attitudes about modernization and industrialization 
between rural and urban residents, and the developmental path of rural economy in 
national economies. These particularities of NICs inform political and economic 
struggles over representations and materialization of rural landscapes along the Jeju Olle 
Trail in South Korea.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation determined the processes and outcomes in which state and non-
state agencies, tourists, and local residents struggle over political and economic benefits 
derived from the Jeju Olle Trail project in South Korea. It focuses on contested property 
rights about lands and landscapes along the trail.   
The overarching goal of the dissertation is to determine how NIC-specific 
socioeconomic characteristics in South Korea mediate in a critical way the social 
processes revolving around class struggles, particularly between the urban middle class 
(tourists and investors from the mainland) and the Jeju rural working class. Notable 
characteristics of NICs include rapid economic growth based on the strong leadership of 
the so-called the developmental state, accompanied by the state’s political oppression on 
its citizens and ensuing citizen demand for democracy, green spaces, and social equities. 
These characteristics, though, have been ever-changing in NIC societies for decades 
after achieving economic growth. The changes reflect domestic and international 
imperatives: the neoliberal ideology that swept the globe resulted in a decentralization of 
state agencies and deregulation of the economy in South Korea like in other regions; the 
citizens’ political awareness about democracy has augmented; and citizens’ 
socioeconomic conditions have far improved compared to the 1960s when the 
developmental state embarked on developmental plans, meaning to the tourism industry 
that they gained purchasing power to afford their pursuit of green spaces. Based on this 
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view of NIC characteristics that bear ongoing changes, the three main chapters of the 
dissertation examine how the shifts have mediated actors’ multiscalar struggles over 
access and control of the Jeju Olle Trail that has brought about class-differentiated 
outcomes. 
The first main chapter, titled “The Territorializing State: Scalar Struggles for 
Control of The Jeju Olle Trail,” describes the processes in which a decentralized state 
reinforces state authority through scalar politics. Scalar struggles are defined as contests 
between state and non-state actors beyond the scales at which they are typically 
identified as acting (e.g., the state acts at the scale of the state, typically). These actors 
create new scales in order to create new territories of engagement. State and non-state 
actors strategically leverage power at the scales they believe to offer them the greatest 
advantage in the struggle. By creating new scales, non-state actors have new venues 
from which to oppose the state. For example, Perreault (2005) describes the process that 
a local union reaches out toward lawyers and activists at the international scale to boost 
the union’s power in negotiating water rights with the state (See also Agnew 1998). The 
state's goal for deploying other scales’ power is often territorialization. The 
“territorializing state” refers to a state agency that actively builds up its authority for 
controlling land-based resources and resource users within its administrative and spatial 
boundaries. It is this territorializing state that non-state actors maneuver to oppose. 
One of the scalar tactics that the state often employs for territorialization is 
governance. Governance is defined as a system of resource management in which state 
and non-state actors collectively make decisions at a scale of involved actors’ resource 
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use. The key idea here is that resource management is devolved to users such as NGOs, 
the private sector, and local communities, instead of the state. However, in many cases, 
state authorities turn out to be still reinforcing by the state’s tactic of reaching out higher 
scales of state authority (Brannstrom et al. 2006). Non-state actors' acts of governance 
often end up being controlled by the state. The idea of the state devolving power to 
resource users becomes controversial because of the inconsistency. Governance is then 
merely rhetoric for consolidating state power, thus, reinforcing the territorializing state. 
The Jeju Olle Trail case demonstrates this paradoxical process.  
The state's intervention in the Jeju Olle Trail project was obfuscated by the 
rhetoric of governance. While participating in governance of the Jeju Olle Trail along 
with the Jeju Olle Foundation and Jeju village associations, the Jeju Special Self-
Governing Province agencies also employed the strategy of “jumping scales” (Smith 
1993). In order hide its efforts to control and monitor lands and people on the Jeju Olle 
Trail, the JSSGP jumped scales by allowing the National Assembly and the Jeju Olle 
Foundation to take the lead in JOT governance, ahead of itself. Unlike Smith’s original 
use of jumping scales, the scale jumping of the JSSGP was done without any direct 
appeal to the National Assembly and the JOF. Through stealthily scalar politics, JSSGP 
agencies successfully leveraged the power needed to territorialize the Jeju Olle Trail, as 
well as its territory, Jeju Island. JSSGP agencies reinforced state authority through the 
Jeju Olle Trail project in contradiction to the rhetoric of a bottom-up approach.  
By focusing on state behaviors in scalar politics, the chapter theoretically 
contributes to scalar theories literature. Current work assumes that the state does not 
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shift scales after active decentralization processes cease. Instead, non-state actors deploy 
resources from higher scales (“jumping scales,” e.g., Cox 1998 and Perreault 2005) to 
resist state restructuring. However, the state must continually act to stabilize scales that 
are destabilized by non-state actors (Brenner 2001; Smith 2008). The chapter shows that 
state actors also actively deploy scalar politics in the same way that non-state actors do 
when resisting the state. Thus, the chapter argues that decentralized state actors 
collaborate with non-state actors to reinforce the state's authority at a newly created 
scale.   
The chapter also takes up the idea of 'variegated neoliberalization' (Brenner et al. 
2010). Variegated neoliberalization is defined as the processes of creating hybrid forms 
of neoliberalism particular to historical and geographical contingencies. In this chapter, 
the strong leadership of the developmental state is emphasized as the local historical and 
geographical particularity. The South Korean developmental state partially explains 
actually practiced neoliberalism on Jeju Island. In a similar way, the 4.3 Jeju Incident 
(i.e., the massacre during the Korean War) partially explains actually practiced 
neoliberalism on Jeju Island. The chapter reveals that the JSSGP evolved as a 
“decentralized” (generic to neoliberalism) “developmental” (particular to NICs) state as 
a result of the neoliberal drives of the Jeju Olle Trail project.  
The second chapter employs the thesis of the production of first and second 
nature (Smith 2008) and the eco-scalar fix (Cohen and Bakker 2014) in analyzing the 
processes and outcomes of regional developmental programs on Jeju Island. First nature 
refers to pristine nature untouched by humans. On the other hand, second nature means 
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nature altered by, or intentionally left beyond the reach of human activities for 
capitalists’ value creation. 'Eco-scalar fix' refers to often the state’s rescaling the spatial 
arrangement of natural resource control. The goal is to resolve social and environmental 
crises caused by a mode of capitalist production.  
The chapter demonstrates that Jeju tourism development initiatives by state and 
non-state actors alike brought about economic marginalization for some local residents 
through consecutive eco-scalar fixes. In the 1960s, the South Korean developmental 
state framed Jeju nature and culture (people) as exotic when it incorporated the tourism 
industry on Jeju Island. The developmental state’s discursive establishment of Jeju 
nature and culture as being exotic was the production of first nature. The ideal of exotic 
Jeju nature and culture spiked tourists’ curiosity about Jeju Island and facilitated the 
circulation of tourist capital. In the process of tourism incorporation, the developmental 
state configured the tourism industry and related property ownership in ways to channel 
capital accumulation mainly to mainlanders. Jeju people who provided labor and 
resources for the capital accumulation were excluded from the benefits of tourism.  
In order to “fix” the benefit distribution problem, the Jeju Olle Foundation 
spatially rearranged the tourism industry. It selected locales of scenic beauty and linked 
the points to set up a line of tourist destinations. Jeju nature and culture along the trail 
were framed as authentic and undestroyed Jeju nature because they were located beyond 
the developmental state’s endeavor for tourism development. The Jeju Olle Foundation 
produced a new first nature, i.e., nature untouched by the state, through the eco-scalar 
fix. The spatial rearrangement expanded capital flows because tourist visits to the island 
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increased. Further, it supposedly channeled the capital flows toward previously 
marginalized Jeju people. Nonetheless, capital flows eventually went to mainlanders 
because tourists spatially relocated themselves to newly established tourist destinations 
and dominated village-level tourism industries. The developmental state’s regional 
development initiative on Jeju Island resulted in diverting tourism benefits from Jeju 
people. 
Therefore, the alternative eco-scalar fix through the production of first nature 
only extended mainlanders’ historical exploitation of nature and people on Jeju Island. 
The chapter reveals that the Jeju Olle Trail project failed to fix the social crises, despite 
contradictory claims. The project instead consolidated and expanded the historical 
marginalization of Jeju people that the developmental state caused.  
The chapter has theoretical contributions to literature on the simultaneous 
production of nature. Studies of the coproduction of scale and nature have tended to 
employ a snapshot approach in examining how social, economic, and political crises at 
particular time spans appear to be resolved through rearranging spatial scales of 
ecologies (Cohen and Bakker 2014; Swyngedouw 2003). These studies overlook 
possible productions of scale and nature at other time spans and their relationships with a 
production of scale and nature at a particular time span. This oversight is a serious 
lacuna in understanding human-nature interactions considering that the coproduction of 
scale and nature is a slowly evolving process that requires time to bring about social 
impacts. In addition, a creation of scaled nature necessarily evolves from existing 
discursive and material arrangement of nature, so a historical understanding can deepen 
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our understanding about the nature-society relationship. The chapter incorporates the 
historical structure of political economic exploitation of Jeju nature by the South Korean 
mainland state. By doing so, it emphasizes a longitudinal approach in examining the 
simultaneous production of scale and nature to enhance the analytical power of the eco-
scalar fix.  
The third main chapter, titled “Competing Ownership Over Transitioning Rural 
Landscapes in A Newly Industrialized Country,” examines how the newly scaled tourism 
industry caused class conflicts over representations and materiality of landscape. I define 
landscape as collective images of different land uses determined through power struggles 
over access and control of the images. By “transitioning,” I specifically mean rural 
landscapes that experience shifting goals of viewers, from mere outcomes of agricultural 
practices to objects of beauty, healing, and conservation. The chapter demonstrates that 
Jeju people created an agricultural landscape that served their livelihood needs. The 
South Korean urban middle class, however, divorced from livelihood production and 
instead desired an aesthetic landscape.  
 In examining the conflict between Jeju people and the urban middle class over 
landscape along the Jeju Olle Trail, the chapter particularly emphasizes contested 
ownership. Landscape ownership is defined as the entitlement to define landscape 
representations, to decide material components of landscapes, and to enjoy landscapes 
that are formed through a reiterative interaction of representations and material 
components of landscape. Having actual (de facto and de jure) and perceived ownership 
respectively, Jeju people and the urban middle class competed to realize incompatible 
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ideals of rural landscapes. More specifically, Jeju people aspired expedited 
modernization on rural landscapes while the urban middle class wanted to enjoy natural 
and cultural landscapes untouched by modernization.  
The chapter bears theoretical implications. It suggests expanding Lefebvre’s “the 
right to the city” to the countryside. As Barraclough (2013) also found, the chapter finds 
that struggles over access to public spaces in the countryside present different patterns 
from those in cities. I call this struggle 'the commonization of resources'—the 
disenfranchisement of marginal classes from lands (and landscapes) they have rights to. 
By illuminating that those with property rights have been marginalized, the chapter 
suggests rethinking the ways to determine rights over access and control of the common 
spaces differentiated among spectrum spans of the public.  
The chapter also makes a theoretical contribution to the resource geography 
literature that emphasizes the particular materiality of resources.  Resource geographers 
have demonstrated that the particular materiality of resources critically determines the 
political economic struggles over access and control of resources (Birkenholtz 2007 on 
water; Hollander 2005 on ETC sugar; Prudham 2005 –Douglas Fir; Véron 2006 – air). 
For example, drawing on Polanyi’s (1957) idea about nature as a fictitious commodity, 
Bakker (2003) shows that the fluidity of water limits its commodification, thereby 
influencing social relations related to its commodification.  
Despite of these endeavors among resource geographers, the materiality of 
landscape has not been scrutinized yet. By the materiality of landscape, I mean the often-
undefined ownership of land and landscapes. As Walker and Fortmann (2003) 
  234 
persuasively demonstrate, struggles over landscape visions are particularly political 
because landscape values derive from the totality of individually and privately owned 
properties. In other words, often-undefined landscape ownership facilitates struggles 
over landscape visions. More importantly, the outcomes of landscape politics are also 
material. Classes conflict over different forms of rural capitalism and related social 
controls, along with rural landscape ideals (Walker and Fortmann 2003). Likewise, the 
case of the Jeju Olle Trail demonstrates that the deeply political process of determining 
access and control of landscapes revolved around contestations over property rights and 
over forms of rural capitalism. I suggest further exploring about how undefined 
landscape ownership enables and constrains class-dependent access and control of 
landscapes. 
Lastly, the chapter fills a gap in political ecology studies by examining the 
political ecological impacts in NICs where the use value of landscape shifts rapidly from 
livelihoods to aesthetics due to in-country economic growth. This overlaps with the 
overarching goal of the dissertation, which challenges a problematic dichotomy of First 
and Third World political ecology. It demonstrates that because South Korea has social 
and economic characteristics mixed between the two sides of the “World” as a result of a 
social shift caused by rapid economic growth, the case of the Jeju Olle Trail does not fit 
in the First-Third World dichotomy widely accepted in political ecology scholarship 
after McCarthy’s (2002) suggestion.  
Through the dissertation, I suggest an NIC political ecology. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, NICs have been a research interest in the discipline mainly to identify 
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driving forces that have enabled remarkable economic growth in short period of time. 
Once those forces are identified, NICs seem to have failed to intrigue researchers. This 
dissertation suggests expanding research areas about NICs from narrow economic 
concerns to a political ecology realm, as well as expanding geographic boundaries of 
political ecology (First/Third). By examining political ecology concerns (i.e., multi-
scalar struggles over access and control of resources) in one of the NICs, the chapter 
illuminates a new “World” to explore. 
Besides these theoretical contributions, the dissertation findings have the 
following policy implications. I discuss them by scale of impact. 
Community The research suggests that rural citizens should be actively engaged in 
driving regional development programs in ways to reflect their true aspirations, instead 
of uncritically inviting or being subjected to development projects. Detailed discussion 
of rural population aspirations, fears, and struggles experienced due to ecotourism 
enables local voices to be heard. 
Province Historical analyses of regional development programs based on local 
nature enables research to identify provincial government policies and behaviors in 
environmental governance that channel economic and political benefits toward external 
sources rather than proclaimed beneficiaries. The research findings will aid in 
determining forms of provincial government policy intervention that ensure 
sustainability of local livelihoods and democratic decision-making processes, 
considering geographic, historical, cultural, and social particularities of locales. 
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State  The research findings will inform the South Korean government's efforts 
to improve pending legislation on trail management. Inspired by the Jeju Island project’s 
success in boosting a regional tourism industry, other state agencies have established 500 
trails across the country, spending 2.3 billion USD. Yet, an absence of systematic and 
consistent management of the established trails has resulted in environmental destruction 
and little local economic benefit. Closely examining the exemplary project’s (i.e., the 
Jeju Olle Trail) resource governance, processes, and outcomes will provide the South 
Korean central government with the knowledge necessary to systematically manage 
trails. The knowledge will also serve provincial-level governments to improve 
management of established trails. 
Global  The Jeju Olle Trail ecotourism project is gaining popularity as an 
exemplary regional development program beyond South Korea, both in First (Japan) and 
Third (Indonesia) Worlds in Asia. Understanding failures as well as successes of 
ecotourism will provide possible trajectories to Asian countries seeking to achieve 
regional development through ecotourism. Ecotourism projects such as the Jeju Olle 
Trail require little in start-up costs because trails are established with existing natural 
landscape, so they have the potential to spread to neighboring developing countries 
seeking rural economic development. For these reasons it is critical to understand the 
successes, failures, processes, and outcomes of ecotourism implementation and widely 
disseminate the results.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Annex 1. The Jeju Olle Foundation Implementing Rural Development Programs 
Program Description Implementing 
organization 
Halmang 
Lodge 
• 5 lodges designated in a village 
• Curtains, beddings, and wall papers 
were provided to lodges 
Seogwipo City 
1 Village       
1 Corporation 
• 1 Corporation from the mainland 
established a relationship with 1 rural 
village along the Jeju Olle Trail 
• Corporations supported villages  
• Example: a hospital located in Seoul 
annually examined residents of a village 
The Jeju Olle 
Foundation 
Olle-Keeper • Villagers regularly walks around trails 
within a village to help tourists 
• Municipal governments pay for the 
service on an hourly basis 
Seogwipo City; 
Jeju City 
Olle-Guide • Villagers serve as paid-guides after 
being trained by the Jeju Olle 
Foundation 
• Tourists pay for the service 
The Jeju Olle 
Foundation 
260 
Annex 2 Trailblazing Jeju Olle Trail Routes and Maintenance 
• Avoid the asphalt road as much as possible
• Looking for the old trails which disappeared
• Using a definitely eco-friendly method when making a new trail
• Getting the width of a trail not to exceed 1 meter
• Getting a variety of manpower including the army and civilians at a time when
making a new trail or doing repairs (Marine Corps, Special Forces, and Jeju
Coast Guard, etc. participate in Jeju Olle Trail spontaneously)
• In principle, Jeju Olle Trail doesn’t expropriate a private land but mediates with
the interested party so that Jeju Olle Trail can pass through
• A route passes through at least 3 villages*
Source: http://www.worldtrail.org/; http://korea.ashoka.org (*); 
